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ABSTRACT
China is the largest developing country in the world, and yet
internationally comparable data about her economy is very scarce, to the
detriment of our knowledge both of China and the Third World as a whole.
This thesis attempts to piece together a crucial statistic, her terms of
trade, from the 1930's when the last major Chinese series ends to the
1970's when CIA estimates become available. Because of the lack of
Chinese data, the thesis constructs core unit value indexes for Sino-
British trade from British returns,and subsequently adjusts the com¬
ponent weights to allow for the difference in composition between China's
trade with Britain and her trade with the West. This necessitates the
development of a specific methodology and the meticulous construction of
the Sino-British indexes at a high level of disaggregation.
Chapter One examines the available statistics and explains the
strategy of using British data. Some of the problems of defining Sino-
British trade, especially undeclared indirect trade via Hong Kong, are
examined in Chapter Two, while Chapter Three describes the methodology
and documents the structure of the sample (which incorporates some 600
commodities). Chapters Four and Five describe the intellectual and
historical contexts in which the study is located. Chapters Six and
Seven construct the core indexes, Chapter Eight examines the weighting
modes used, Chapter Nine focuses on the 1930's and links the British
indexes with the Chinese ones. Chapter Ten analyses the price movement
of the components of Sino-British trade over the period and Chapter
Eleven arrives at an estimate of China's terms of trade with the West
and links up with the 1970's statistics, thus completing China's long-term
terms of trade from 1867 to 1976. The investigation is extensively
documented with some 1,000 pages of tables and figures.
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PREFACE
Bill Brugger has recently written: "The study of contemporary China
suffers not only from a lack of adequate conceptual framework. There is
also a major problem of evidence."'1' The lack of adequate conceptual
framework has, of course, as the title of the book he was editing
implies, become painfully obvious since the death of Mao and the fall
of the "Gang of Four".^ Before 1976 it seemed as if China could be
identified; that one could, for instance, talk of a "Chinese Road to
3 4
Socialism", or, less specifically, of "China's Road to Development".
Subsequent developments threw all this conceptual apparatus into doubt
and even rendered the certainties of the past illusory. There is nothing
new in this. China has been stripping off mask after mask for a long
time, and with increasing rapidity over the last century, and in the
5
process astonishing and confusing both the world and herself. We
should have been warned, and should expect more transformations in the
future, perhaps, as suggested in the postscript to Chapter Eleven, in
the very near future.
"^Bill Brugger, ed. , China Since the Gang of Four (London, Croom Helm,
1980), p.14.
2
The widespread acceptance of the label "Gang of Four" in itself
implies a lack of political identification.
3
Title of a book by E.L. Wheelwright and Bruce Mcfarlane (New York,
Monthly Review Press, 1970).
4
Title of a collection edited by Neville Maxwell. The first version
of this appeared as a special issue of World Development for July/
August 1975. By the time the second, enlarged, edition appeared in 1979
(Oxford, Pergamon) it had been painfully overtaken by events in China,
a predicament bravely faced by Neville Maxwell in his introduction.
5
Raymond Dawson's The Chinese Chameleon is perhaps the best study of
this but it very much needs to be supplemented by a thorough investi¬
gation of foreign perceptions of 20th century China.
VI
The inadequacies of our conceptualization of the Chinese chameleon
have led to, and have in turn been exacerbated by, the failure to place
China within a proper comparative framework. She has frequently been
regarded as sui generis, in which case no comparison can be made and
she can only be described in herself, or, paradoxically, any
comparison can be made, since one is as good as another, and anything
said.
Sometimes this absence of a comparative framework is manifested as
ahistoricism. How often do we read (not merely in the press) that the
0
Chinese economy dates from 1949, or 1976, or 1978? Occasionally,
although this is a lesser absurdity and one becoming increasingly uncommon,
China is seen as little more than her history - the pattern of the
Chinese past overwhelms all.
However, the problem usually has been one of trying to force China
into an unsuitable framework - the genus "Communist". This is not for
one moment to say that the classification "Communist" is meaningless or
cannot be used, rather that we have to be clear what we mean by it and
what we don't mean by it, or perhaps, how little we can justifiably mean
by it in any rigorous way. The label "Communist" is applied to so many
countries, with such diverse histories, economies and cultures, that
any encompassing definition is likely to be suffused with so many
qualifications and exceptions as to merge imperceptibly into the back¬
ground .
A far more fruitful framework for comparison, though not exclusive of
the historical or communis^ perspective, and certainly as diffuse and
undefined as the latter, is that afforded by the definition "developing
0
This often happens because the rhetoric of the post-Mao regime fits
in so well with the assumptions (and ignorance) of many western
observers. My favourite is a heading in International Petroleum Times
(February 1, 1979, p.14) which claimed: "The commercial exploitation of
oil probably started in China, but not much has been done since. Post-
Mao thinking is aligned to change that quickly." The article in fact
gave a reasonable description of the enormous expansion of the oil
industry during Mao's lifetime (an expansion which, ironically, had
stopped a few years after his death).
VII
7
country". This, it should be said, does not exhaust the directions of
comparison; for instance, many observers fail to connect issues, problems
and policies in China (or elsewhere) with actualities at home:
perceptions of foreign events are not anchored in the consciousness of
8
the experience and practice of one's own society. However, the
relevance and primacy of the developing country framework as a major
aspect of the perceptual matrix is brought home by a simple, but
overwhelming,statistic - China's current per capita GNP is approximately
$220 a year.^
One reason for the frequent failure to see China as a developing
country lies in what Dr. Brugger called "the problem of evidence". He
was thinking principally of the problem a Sinologist faces in piecing
together fragmentary and contradictory evidence. That is part of it,
but there is also the further problem, especially for the non-China-
Specialist, not merely of the paucity of the Chinese "evidence", but
also of its non-comparability and of the difficulty of access. Nowhere
is this difficulty keener than in the field of international trade
because here, paradoxically, the potential evidence is enormous, and
the demands for comparison most pressing.
Trade, like the tango, takes two, and comparability is of the essence
of trade statistics. At the same time trade is perhaps the most docu¬
mented of economic activities for good practical reasons - it has been,
historically, an excellent way of levying taxes. Within the plethora of
international trade statistics there is a notable lacuna - China. When
7
This label has gone through many transformations - developing
country, under-developed country, less developed country, newly indus¬
trializing country (some of them), Third World and more recently, South.
The latest, apart from smacking of euphemism, is in geographical terms
rather inappropriate for China; indeed, when her population is included,
probably most of the South actually live in the Northern Hemisphere.
O
For instance: "The attack on Mao's belief that material incentives
alone are of limited value is based on simple ignorance of all the
studies made in the West for the last generation on work motivation."
Jack Gray, Mao Tse-tung (Guildford and London, Lutterworth, 1973), p.77.
g
Beijing Review, No.52 (December 29, 1980), p.3. (See also Appendix L
postscript for fuller quotation.) Like all 'simple statistics' it should
be treated with caution.
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the China trade does appear it is as the reflection of that of other
countries and is often as difficult to embrace as Li Po's moon.^ As a
result even the simplest of statistics, such as aggregate exports or
imports, need to be laboriously pieced together from trade partner
reports and are subject to severe uncertainties.'^
Much of the post-war debate about economic relations between developed
and developing countries, or what is known now as the North-South
dialogue, has taken place without China. True, since the beginning of
the seventies, and the restoration of the U.N. seat, she has been
increasingly a participant, but 'China as evidence' is still lacking.
This thesis sets out to furnish a crucial piece of the evidence - the
terms of trade.
The original academic argument about the deterioration in the terms
of trade of primary products, or of developing countries (the connection
between the two classifications being part of the question), has merged
into wider issues. This is partly because the pioneering work of Prebisch
and Singer was necessarily based on narrow and uncertain statistical
foundations, whilst today we are inundated with data (except, of course,
12
for China).
Nevertheless, the terms of trade loom large in the consciousness of
the Third World, and many perceive that there is a deterioration which makes ,
in the words of the then Jamaican Prime Minister, Michael Manley, "the
development process...like trying to walk up the down escalator". Mr.
Manley, who, significantly, was delivering the "Third World Inaugural
10Li Po, the T'ang Dynasty poet, drowned, it is said, by trying to
embrace the reflection of the moon on the water while drunk.
"^See, for instance, Tables 5-14, 15. Chapter One examines these
problems.
12
For a recent summary of the statistical aspect of the debate see
John Spraos, "The Statistical Debate on the Net Barter Terms of Trade
between Primary Commodities and Manufactures", The Economic Journal, 90
(March 1980), pp.107-128. Spraos concludes that "...though the relative
price of the developing countries' primary products has had its ups and
downs since the war, it has on average done quite well by the standard
of pre-second war decades, even when petroleum is excluded as a special
case since 1973. So, while the deteriorating tendency cannot be decisive¬
ly refuted, it is open to doubt when...the record up to the 1970's is
taken into account." (p.126).
IX
Lecture" continued:
In 1965, the average price per ton of sugar realised
by Jamaica was Jamaican $73.7 compared with Jamaican
$1,536 (cif) for the Ford 5000 tractor - a ratio of one
tractor to 20.84 tons of sugar. In 1979, the Ford 5000
tractor is no longer available. It has been replaced by
a new model called the 66,000 which is slightly more
powerful but is designed for exactly the same purposes.
For 1979, the provisional average price per ton of
sugar is Jamaican $534 compared with Jamaican $30,905
for the Ford 66000 tractor - a ratio of one tractor to
57.87 tons of sugar. Insofar as sugar and tractors are
concerned, the ratio has moved from 21 to 58 tons of
sugar to provide the foreign exchange to bring one
tractor into Jamaica.
And lest this might seem to be proof by selected
instance drawn from the Jamaican experience, it would
be of interest to examine figures published by the
International Sugar Organisation comparing the export
value of manufactured goods with the daily price of
sugar in US cents per lb, which is one of the two
major indices of the world market price of sugar. And
these figures of course show a general international
trend. Starting from a base of 100 in 1970, the unit
export value of manufactured goods moved to 245 by the
first half of 1979. The price of sugar, on the other
hand, declined from 3.68 cents a lb in 1970 to 3.30 in
the first half of 1979.13
On a more general level New Society recently commented:
For those which have no oil and whose prosperity
depends on a single primary product, these are diffi¬
cult times. Despite the fall in the value of the dollar,
there is no major commodity, apart from oil, whose price
has kept up enough for the same quantity today to be
exchangeable for the same number of dollars as in 1975.
To buy the same amount of oil as in 1975 you need, on
average, twice the quantity of the major commodities; in
the case of jute, maize, tea or zinc, about three times
as much. With a ton of cotton, you could buy 119 barrels
of oil in 1975: the same ton would buy you about 65
barrels today. In 1975, a ton of copper covered $17,800
of debt repayments: today, about $12,000. The total debt
burden of the oil-less developing countries is expected
to rise to about $450 billion this year.-*-4
13
Michael Manley, The Politics of Affirmation: Inaugural Third World
Lecture, 1979 (London, Third World Foundation, 1979; Third World
Foundation Monograph 1).
14
New Society, 15 January, 1981, p.87, "Reagan's globe".
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This thesis, then, is basically a process of investigation to
determine China's terms of trade. Two chapters deal with other issues:
Chapter Four covers the genesis and development of the concept of terms
15
of trade in classical and neo-classical literature, and Chapter Five
surveys China's foreign trade from earliest times to the present. Apart
from that, the rest of the study is a sequential piecing together and
assessment of data. Chapter One examines the available statistics and
explains the strategy of building up a core of indexes from data on
China's trade with Britain. Some of the problems of defining that
trade, principally the question of indirect trade through Hong Kong,
are examined in Chapter Two, while Chapter Three describes the specific
methodology developed and documents the structure of the sample. The
unit value indexes on various levels (individual commodities, sections,
etc.) are built up on a year-by-year basis in Chapters Six (1930-69) and
7 (1946-69). Such is the complexity of the data that eleven pages are
needed for each year.
Chapter Eight examines the various weighting modes that are used and
concludes that unit values in the sample are not section-specific (that
is, the prices of foodstuffs do not move in a coherent and distinguish¬
able group compared with chemicals or machinery). Chapter Nine focusses
on the thirties and links the Sino-British terms of trade indexes with
the pre-war Chinese ones. Chapter Ten analyses the price movement of
Sino-British trade at various levels of disaggregation, both for
intrinsic reasons and also in order to identify areas in which the
British trade might be particularly unrepresentative. This question of
the representativeness of China's trade with Britain is continued in the
final chapter, where the composition of Sino-British trade is compared
with that of her trade with the West, and the weighting of the British
indexes adjusted to take account of this and other possible distorting
factors, to arrive at an estimate of China's terms of trade with the
West.
15
It had been planned to write a chapter on the post-Prebisch debate
but time was not available.
16
Suitable international data was not available until 1953.
An investigation of this type must be carried out primarily by means
of tables - the text is ancillary and comparatively slight. Tables are
unfortunately quite appalling things to 'read', if that is what one does
to them, and because of the complexity of the investigation there are
an unconscionable number. In order to abate the agony, mine as well as
the reader's, I have given some thought, if not sufficient skill, to
the lay-out of each table so that its form serves its function. At the
same time, wherever possible, I have also graphed the information, or
the salient aspects of it. Taken together the two forms (with the
17
overlays ) can be a very powerful tool to analyse, comprehend and
develop the information.
I have no pretensions to an advanced command of statistics or
econometrics and a specialist may well find my efforts both inelegant
and undeveloped. Nevertheless, I trust they will be found sufficient
for their purpose.
An enterprise which has taken so many years cannot but have led to
the acquiring of innumerable debts. Firstly, my earliest supervisors at
the Department of Business Studies, Robin Bade and Simon Coke. Then
their successors, Vassilis Droucopoulos,and Jack Gray of the Institute
of Development Studies; to the latter I owe an additional intellectual
debt stretching back to the days when I was a student of his, and
stretching forward, I am sure, for as long as he keeps writing.
Many people have commented or advised on work in progress or have
helped in other ways, and especially Premen Addy, Doug Anthony, Joan
Atkins, Pia Bloch, Srikanto Chatterji, Pat and Barbel Daly, Philip
Deakin, Andy Exon, Ian Gow, Ian Glendon, Ankie Hoogvelt, Pat Heron,
George Jelinek, Judy Matthews, Bob Rait, Ruth Victorin and Keith Wilson.
All these debts fade in comparison with those to my wife Christina.
Not merely did she correct my spelling, criticise, edit and type the
thesis - a gargantuan task in itself and one, it will be obvious, done
The overlays, it should be explained, sometimes do not fit together
for unavoidable technical reasons - both the photocopying and trans¬
parency reproduction distort the original, but they do it in different
directions.
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with great skill - but she also had a full-time job and supported us
for most of the period:
"A cold coming we had of it,
Just the worst time of the year
for a journey, and such a long journey"
That we have come to the end of such a long journey is due very much to
her and I hope she finds this Birth more satisfactory than Eliot's
Magus found his.
This work could be dedicated to no other person but her.
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Precedents, Problems and Strategy
Determining Britain's China Trade
Problems of Constructing the Indexes
CHAPTER ONE
Precedents, Problems & Strategy
One result of "The Invasion of China by the Western World"'®", of the
2
highest importance both in practice and symbol, was the establishment
3
of a modern Customs service. This was initially administered by the
Chinese government, but following the seizure of the Shanghai Customs by
the Taipings in 1853, an event which perhaps nicely epitomised interplay
between the three main actors, people, government and foreigner, a
4
Foreign Inspectorate was set up there the following year. Its activities
were subsequently extended to the other Treaty Ports and its role
"The phrase is the title of a book by E.R. Hughes, published in 1937
(London, Black). On the importance of the Customs to both the Chinese
government and the foreign powers, Hughes notes: "The steady revenue
derived from the Customs proved of immense advantage to China, even
though after 190O it was made the security for a second and enormous
indemnity." (p.34).
2
Fairbank saw it as becoming "the eventual compromise between China
and the West - a joint Chinese and Western administration of the modern
centers of Chinese life and trade in the treaty ports." John King
Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast (Harvard, 1964), p.462.
3
Following the Treaty of Nanking (1842).
4
In order, it was claimed, that the Chinese government should not
lose any of its due revenues. This attempt at self-policing by the
foreign community was not a complete success - the American merchants
paid up by one-third of what they owed, and the British none. "...this
perfidy seems to have disappointed the Chinese authorities more than
it surprised them - they had never regarded the barbarians as
particularly trustworthy. Meanwhile the new foreign collectorate at
Shanghai was bringing them a greatly increased revenue." Fairbank,
Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast, p.461.
3
5
confirmed by the Treaty of Tientsin (1858). It was on the basis of
statistics compiled and issued by the Imperial Maritime Customs (the name
was changed to Chinese Maritime Customs after the fall of the Ch'ing in
1911) that the first major study of China's terms of trade was made. This
was done by a team under Franklin L. Ho at the Institute of Economics,
Nankai University, Tientsin, and was published in 1930. (It is designated
C
in Table 1-1, Fig.1-1 as Ho 30. ) It covered virtually the whole period
up to that date during which statistics had been collected - 1867 to 1928.
The starting data was largely determined by a problem which was to
re-appear, in different guises, in the future. Ho noted that the Customs
had begun publishing an annual Returns of Trade in 1859, and that this
had been joined by the annual Returns of Trade and Trade Reports in
5
Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast, pp.393-461. He
describes the role of the Customs thus:
"The Maritime Customs soon became the key institution in
the use of these foreign treaty rights, no less important
than the foreign consulates. Under Robert Hart as
Inspector General (1863-1908) the Customs became a chief
financial pillar of the Chinese government, providing
both an unprecedented and reliable revenue from foreign
trade and useful security for foreign loans and in¬
demnities. Hart and his commissioners became the trusted
counsellors of Chinese officialdom. They supplied at
first some of the functions of a diplomatic service and
supported financially the early efforts to educate and
train such a corps. Lighthouses on the China coast,
harbor conservancy and aids to inland navigation, hydro-
graphic charts, pilotage and quarantine, the collection
of many special dues and taxes were all by degrees added
to the Customs' original functions. The great variety of
Customs statistical, commercial and scientific publications
partially made up for the lack of a modern Chinese
government printing office. The Maritime Customs
organized and until 1911 financed China's modern Postal
Service." [emphasis added] (p.462)
An insider's view (with the limitations that implies) is afforded by
Hosea Ballou Morse who, having been an official of the I.M.C., became
the pioneer historian of China's foreign trade. See especially his
The Trade and Administration of China (London, Longmans, 3rd rev.ed.,
1921, first published 19o8), Chapter 12, "The Inspectorate of Customs",
pp.385-410.
^Franklin L. Ho, Index Numbers of the Quantities and Prices of Imports
and Exports and of the Barter Terms of Trade of China, 1867-1928




China's Terms of Trade, 1867-1936
(3-year average annual value) ,
C MunWol? l3i?> ~\O0 1 ketonej ~\00)
NANKAI INDEXES
YOUNG
HO (30) HO (37) HOU
1867-69 113 102 134
1870-72 113 lOl 134
1873-75 127 114 151
1876-78 135 121 161
1879-81 121 109 145
1882-84 106 95 127
1885-87 98 94 127
1888-90 123 122 162
1891-93 126 126 165
1894-96 84 84 108
1897-99 97 97 122
1900-02 98 98 120
















*1926 only **1927-28 only
Sources:
-Ho(30): Franklin L.Ho, Index Numbers of the Quantities and Prices of
Imports and Exports and of the Barter Terms of Trade in China, 1867-
1928 , Tientsin, Nankai University, 1930, p.24.
-Ho(37): Franklin L.Ho, "Economic Indices", Nankai Social and Economic
Quarterly, July 1937.
-Hou: Chi-ming Hou, Foreign Investment and Economic Development in
China 1840-1937, Harvard, Camb.(Mass), 1965, p.198.
-Young: National Tariff Commission, An Annual Report of Shanghai




1864 but that 1867 had been selected because:
6
Previous to that year, returns of trade were given by
some ports in Mexican dollars® and by others in taels.
The currency question presents peculiar difficulties
in the analysis of trade statistics, rendering a
direct comparison of the results almost an impossibility.
In 1867, however, the first attempt was made to bring
uniformity in the currency employed for the trade returns.
The Haikwan tael10 was introduced and, since that time,
it has become ^he standard currency at all ports for
trade returns.
7
The two publications were amalgamated in 1882 (Ho, Index Numbers,
p.2) .
8
It is one of the curiosities of history that, because of the Chinese
bartering of silk for silver, via the Spanish galleon trade through
Manila, the Spanish or 'Mexican' dollar became the dominant silver
currency on the China coast, the name still lingering on with the Hong
Kong dollar, (cf. Fairbank, Reisq^uer and Craig, East Asia, the Modern
Transformation, London, Allen and Unwin, 1965, p.26.) The China Yearbook
(Shanghai, The North-China Daily News and Herald Ltd.,various years)
gives an excellent, succinct, coverage of this and other subjects. It
describes the Mexican dollar as "the most widely used coin in the world...
(being) current in North and South America, the West Indies, the islands
of the Pacific, Japan and throughout the major portion of Asia." (1934
ed., pp.392-393).
9
According to the China Yearbook (1934 ed., p.392) the word is of
Malay or Indian origin, the Chinese term being, of course, the unit of
weight LIANG. The expression 'sycee tael', a 'liang' of silver in the
shape of a shoe (there is a fine illustration in H.B. Morse, Trade and
Administration of China, facing page 167 in the 1921 edition) comes
from the Cantonese pronunciation of XI SI, 'fine silk', the idea being,
it appears, that both silk and silver, if of good quality, could be
spun into fine thread. The word SI, incidentally, is the origin of the
Roman's 'seres' for Chinese according to Sir Henry Yule, whose Cathay
and the Way Thither is the pioneer work on the subject (revised edition
by Henri Cordier, London, Hakluyt Society, 1915).
lO
The Haikwan tael (HAIGUAN, literally 'Customs') was a 'purely
fictitious and non-existent currency'; for an account of the complica¬
tions of ascertaining its value see Morse, Trade and Administration of
China, pp.169-172.
^Ho, Index Numbers, p. 2. Reiner, however, says that it was not until
1873 that all values were given in Haikwan taels; cf. Remer, The
Foreign Trade of China (Shanghai, 1926), p.43.
7
In 1930 the Haikwan tael was replaced by another unit of account,
the Customs Gold Unit, for the assessment of the import tariff, and
consequently the compilation of import statistics. The sycee taels
actually in use, of which there had been hundreds of local varieties,
had been over the years supplanted by the minted silver dollar. There
were again many varieties of dollar - the original Spanish 'Carolus', the
'Mexican' dollar, the Straits dollar, the Maria Theresa 'Thaler' (the
original 'dollar', and one still being minted today in Vienna for
investors), the American Trade dollar, the Canton 'Dragon' dollar, which
lost its popularity because of the custom of leasing out the mint to
persons of less than perfect probity, and the two main dollars of the
Republican period, the Yuan Shih-kai dollar of 1914 and the Sun Yat-sen
dollar of 1927, amongst others. In 1933, in an attempt to establish a
uniform currency, the government introduced the new standard Chinese
12
National Dollar (CN$) which was minted only at Shanghai. This was
used for export statistics and frequently, after conversion from Gold
Units, for imports as well from then up to 1949, although its real
value (in terms of commodities, or more usually, vis-a-vis foreign
currencies, especially the US$) became increasingly erratic and uncertain.
Ho's original series underwent a number of revisions during the early
thirties and the period covered was extended to 1936. The final indexes
were republished in Nankai Index Numbers 1936 and in Nankai Social and
13
Economic Quarterly (July 1937) along with other indexes of commodity
prices, cost of living, etc.
The original indexes were accompanied by a short commentary which
gave the formulae used (Fisher's 'ideal' formula), trend equations, annual
aggregate coverage and the method used for adjustment for incomplete
coverage, and outlined some of the problems of compilation and calcu¬
lation. Regrettably this commentary was not carried forward to the 1937
12
China Yearbook, 1934, pp.394-396.
"^Both published in Tientsin. The tables in the Nankai Quarterly,
which appear to have been identical both in substance and presentation
to those in the other Nankai publication, are referred to hereafter as
HO 37.
publication, nor was there any explanation of the revisions. This
presentation of quite different indexes (cf. Table 1-1, Fig.1-1) led to
confusion and caused Theodore Morgan to complain:
We have, after a considerable enquiry, rejected data
from three countries that we once hoped to include:
Australia, China, and Argentina....(n 16).... For
China, the most hopeful series we have been able to
find are those of Franklin L. Ho, Index Numbers of
Quantities and Prices of Imports and Exports in
China, Tientsin, 1930; and also under the direction
of Ho, Nankai Institute of Economics, Nankai Index
Numbers, Tientsin, 1937. But the series (for 1867
to 1928) of these two publications, for unexplained
reasons, march off in opposite directions: one shows
China's terms of trade improving, the other shows
them deteriorating, though the data are supposedly
identical.
Hou Chi-ming, who has tracked down explanations of the revisions in
15
Chinese, claims that they "were made because of technical computational
14
Theodore Morgan, "The Long-Run Terms of Trade between Agriculture
and Manufacturing", Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol.8,
1959/60, pp.8-9.
15
The sources quoted by Hou (Foreign Investment and Economic Develop¬
ment in China 1840-1937, Camb.,Mass., Harvard, 1965, pp.268-269, n 23
and 24) are:
a. Ho Lien (Franklin L. Ho), "Chung-kuo chin-ch'u-k'ou mao'i
wu'liang chih-shu wu-chia chih-shu yll wu-wu chiao-i-lti chih-shu pien-chih
chih shuo-ming" [index numbers of quantities and prices of imports and
exports of China, an explanation], Ching-chi t'ung-chi chi-k'an 1.1:
128-149 (Mar.1932).
b."Min-kuo erh-shih nien chih Chung-kuo tui-wai mao-i" [China's
foreign trade during 1931], ibid., 1.4:741-810 (Dec.1932).
c. Wu Ta-yeh and Hu Yuan-chang, "Min-kuo erh-shih -szu* nien chih
Chung-kuo tui-wai mao-i" [China's foreign trade during 1935], Cheng-chih
ching-chi hsueh-pao [Quarterly Journal of Economics and Political
Science], Vol.5, No.l, October 1936.
At the time of writing I have not yet located a copy of these articles.
*
In his note Hou (incorrectly) gives the date as "er-shih nien";
that is, 1931.
errors; the basic method of constructing the series... remained the same."
Hou then himself made a further revision of the series (labelled HOU in
tables and figures) to take account of a change in the valuation method
of the Chinese Customs at the beginning of the century. Before 1902-4,
contrary to usual practice, imports were valued inclusive of import
duties "and all other charges incurred in delivering the imported goods
to the market", while the export valuation excluded duties and "other
charges". During 1902-4 the method was changed to the more usual
practice of valuing imports c.i.f. and exports f.o.b. (see Chapter Two)
and this necessitated the adjustment of the pre-1904 data to make it
17
compatible with the subsequent statistics.
In addition, there are features of Ho's commentary which are disquiet¬
ing. At times he is baffling:
Whereas in index numbers of prices, all commodities,
whatever be their individual peculiarities, are ex¬
pressed by means of a single common denominator - the
monetary unit; in index numbers of quantity it is
necessary to work with data in tons, in pieces, in
quarts, in pounds, in gallons, etc. [emphasis added]
Since price is the relationship between value and quantity ("in tons, in
pieces, in quarts, in pounds, in gallons, etc."), the passage as it
stands is meaningless - indeed, both price and quantity indexes use the
Hou Chi-ming, Foreign Investment, p.195.
17
Hou, Foreign Investment, pp.196-198. The adjustment he uses is "duty
plus 7 per cent for other charges" deducted from imports and "duty plus
8 per cent for other charges" added to exports. The ratio of what he
calls his "adjusted series" (not to be confused with Ho's 'adjusted
series' which is in fact percentage deviation around a trend) to the
Nankai (HO 37) terms of trade is approximately 75 per cent. Since both
of them use an inversion of the usual relationship (that is, they put





same data, but in different combinations. Presumably he means an index
number of value.
Elsewhere he mentions that his indexes "are based on data recorded by
Chinese Maritime Customs" and notes:
The practice of the Chinese Maritime Customs, again, has
been to give the total value of a commodity imported or
exported with or without its quantity. Those commodities
that were reported in value only have to be excluded
from the study, or else their quantities have to be
"derived" by dividing the reported value by their prices.
The difficulty in obtaining the price data in China is
insurmountable.20 [emphasis added]
It is doubtful whether he is really using 'prices' within or without the
trade returns to estimate quantities where these are not given. To have
done so would have been extremely hazardous since, although to the
researcher it may seem that Customs omit quantities out of perversity and
malignancy (sometimes, when they give a quantity in one year and omit it
in another, one suspects that this is indeed the case), they do so precise¬
ly for those commodities or commodity groups which are so heterogeneous
that there are no common measures of quantity, or where unit value would
be meaningless - a problem which is discussed in some detail in Chapter
Three.
Ho is also puzzlingly modest about his coverage:
In the calculation of the index number of imports and
exports it is impossible to include directly all
articles imported or exported. For a large number of
these articles either no quantities are given or the
given quantities lack significance. However most of
the major articles are reported with quantity. The
In fact Ho, and anyone using Customs statistics, calculates from
unit values rather than prices. There is no clear distinction between
the two; they are both value divided by quantity, but a price is more
specific. The unit-value of shoes in a shop may be £10, with the prices
depending on quality, style, size, etc., ranging from £5 to £50. In
this case the unit value, calculated from the total 'value' of the shoes
divided by the number of pairs, would be a weighted arithmetic mean.
In practice, the term 'price' is often used where, because an average
of some sort is meant, 'unit value' would be more correct - "The price
of beer has gone up" (but "prices" would be correct).
20
Ho 30 , p.2.
11
Table 1-2
China's foreign trade 1936-41: Indexes
(1936 = 100)
1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941
IMPORTS
E PcQc 191,176 197,230 240,434 484,623 843,980 1,045,439
E PoQc 191,176 178,293 195,378 481,440 504,462 443,150
E PcQo 191,176 217,222 211,328 238,665 346,269 498,802
Paasche UVI lOO 111 123 lOl 167 236
Laspeyres
UVI
100 114 111 125 181 261
Fisher UVI 100 112 117 112 174 248
Coverage 20 21 27 . 36 42 48
EXPORTS
E PoQc 386,430 501,097 469,859 531,575 941,062 1,204,218
E PoQc 386,430 405,052 393,138 257,792 204,702 200,647
E PcQo 386,430 408,407 417,757 663,444 L,608,743 2,41/,567
Paasche UVI lOO 124 120 206 460 600
Laspeyres
UVI lOO 106 108 172 ■ 416 626
Fisher UVI lOO 115 114 188 437 613
Coverage 55 60 62 52 48 47
TERMS OF TRADE
Paasche lOO 112 98 204 275 254
Laspeyres lOO 93 97 138 230 240
Fisher 100 102 97 168 251 247
Fisher (13) 91 93 89 154 229 226
Fisher (13): adjusted to link with Nankai index (1913=100; 1936=91;
for explanation see text)
The data from which these indexes are derived is given in Appendix J,
Tables 1M and IX.
12
value of those articles entering into the direct
calculation of the index numbers of imports or exports
represents something over two thirds of the total
import-value or export-value. Table I and Table II in
the Appendix give the percentage of the value of
commodities directly covered by the index number of
imports or exports in each year to the total value of
ail commodities imported or exported.2^
However, Table I shows import coverage ranging up to 99 per cent, and
averaging 83 per cent, while exports average 91 per cent - on both sides
22
high, even embarrassingly so, and certainly well above three-quarters,
let alone two-thirds, of the value.
These may be quibbles, a too-punctilious reading of what is perhaps a
translation. There are, however, further difficulties. Both the initial
and revised versions give quantity and price indexes for both imports and
exports, the fixed-base re-adjustments (to base 1913) as well as the
original year-to-year linkage, the net barter terms of trade (annoyingly
upside down in terms of the usual convention of export prices over import
prices) and a table which he rather cryptically entitles: "Quantity and
Price Index Numbers of Imports and Exports of China, 1867-1928. Ordinate
of Trend = 100", but which the commentary identifies as percentage
deviation around a second degree polynomial trend. He gives equations for
the trends, although he does not mention that the time units (x) are
half-years around the centre of the period. The resulting series of de¬
viations he calls an 'adjusted index'. Ho 37 does not give the trend
equations (which, of course, will now be different), but Table 1-3,
Figs.1-2, 1-3, examines his import series on the subsequently validated
assumption that he is again using a parabolic trend. It will be seen that
the two trends differ and, consequently, so do the deviations. This of
course affects any conclusions that might be drawn as to how much, and
sometimes in what direction, import prices at any particular time 'differ
from normal'. Since Ho's indexes were superseded by Hou's, it would be
21
Ho 30 , p.3.
22
It will be seen in Chapter Three that a very high coverage often
indicates that the commodity description is imprecise and its validity
as an indicator of price change doubtful. Ho, unfortunately, does not
say how many commodities were used in his sample.
13
Table 1-3 China's import unit values, 1867-1936:
Year
















1867 -69 34.4700 46.9 111.9 41.9124 136.1
1868 -67 34.7212 46.9 113.8 41.2127 135.1
1869 -65 35.0316 47.9 118.0 40.5932 136.7
1870 -63 35.4012 46.7 116.2 40.1893 131.9
1871 -61 35.S300 47.4 119.1 39.7985 132.3
1872 -59 36.3180 45.8 115.9 39.5168 126.1
1873 -57 36.8652 46.3 117.8 39.3039 125.6
1874 -55 37.4716 38.5 98.2 39.2057 102.7
1875 -53 38.1372 35.3 90.1 39.1787 92.6
1876 -51 38.8620 33.8 86.2 39.2111 87.0
1877 -49 39.6460 35.5 89.9 39.4883 89.5
1878 -47 40.4892 35.7 89.7 39.7993 88.2
1879 -45 41.3916 35.2 87.8 40.0911 85.0
1880 -43 42.3532 38.3 94.3 40.6151 90.4
1881 -41 43.3740 39.6 96.4 41.0788 91.3
1882 -39 44.4540 37.6 90.0 41.7778 84.6
1883 -37 45.5932 37.1 87.1 42.5947 81.4
1884 -35 46.7916 37.1 85.3 43.4936 79.3
1885 | -33 48.0492 38.1 85.8 44.4056 79.3
1886 -31 49.3660 43.3 95.4 45.3878 87.7
1887 -29 50.7420 43.0 92.5 46.4865 84.7
1888 -27 52.1772 43.6 91.4 47.7024 83.6
1889 -25 53.6716 44.3 90.2 49.1131 82.5
1890 -23 55.2252 40.7 80.6 50.4963 73.7
1891 -21 56.8380 38.7 74.4 52.0161 68.1
1892 -19 58.5100 39.6 73.9 53.5859 67.7
1893 -17 60.2412 44.7 80.8 55.3218 74.2
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Table 1-3, cont'd.
China's import unit values, 1867-1936:
Index and Trends




1894 -15 62.0316 62.8 110.0 57.0909 101.2
1895 -13 63.8812 66.1 112.0 59.0179 103.5
1896 -11 65.7900 67.1 110.0 61.0000 102.0
1897 - 9 67.7580 71.8 114.0 62.9825 106.0
1898 - 7 69.7852 71.9 110.3 65.1859 103.0
1899 - 5 71.8716 67.2 99.7 67.4022 93.5
1900 - 3 74.0172 74.8 107. 2 69.7761 101.1
1901 - 1 76.2220 75.3 104.3 72.1956 98.8
1902 + 1 78.4860 78.0 104.1 74.9280 99.4
1903 + 3 80.8092 88.3 113.9 77.5241 109.3
1904 + 5 83.1916 87.2 108.7 80.2208 104.8
1905 + 7 85.6332 81 .2 97.8 83.0266 94.8
1906 + 9 88.1340 75.4 87.8 85.8770 85.6
1907 +11 90.6940 82.3 92.6 88.8769 90.7
1908 +13 93.3132 95.4 103.6 92.0849 102.2
1909 +15 95.9916 95.1 99.8 95.2906 99.1
1910 +17 98.7292 102.5 104.0 98.5577 103.8
1911 +19 1O1.5260 102.2 lOO. 2 101.9960 lOO. 7
1912 +21 104.3820 lOO.O 94.8 105.4852 95.8
1913 +23 107.2972 lOO.O 91.7 109.0513 93.2
1914 +25 110.2716 108.9 96.5 112.8497 98.8
1915 +27 113.3052 113.0 97.0 116.4948 99.7
1916 +29 116.3980 122.4 101.7 120.3540 105.2
1917 +31 119.5500 131.0 105.4 124.2884 109.6
1918 +33 122.7612 147.O 114.5 128.3843 119.7
1919 +35 126.0316 150.2 113.4 132.4515 119.2
1920 +37 129.3612 175.7 128.4 136.8380 135.8
1921 +39 132.7500 167.4 118.6 141.1467 126.1
1922 +41 136.1980 146.8 100.8 145.6349 107.8
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Table 1-3, cont'd.
China's import unit values, 1867-1936:
Index and Trends
Year X Yt Pi
Ad j . Yd PD
index
1923 +43 1J9.7052 148.7 99.1 150.0505 106.4
1924 +45 143.2716 148.8 96.2 154.6778 103.9
1925 +47 146.8972 151.0 94.7 159.4509 102.8
1926 +49 150.5820 150.8 91.8 164.2702 lOO.l
1927 +51 154.3260 161.7 95.6 169.1423 104.8
1928 +53 158.1292 159.1 91.3 174.2607 100.6
1929 +55 161.9916 158.1 88.2 179.2517 97.6
1930 +57 165.9132 174.7 94.7 184.4773 105.3
1931 + 59 169.8940 192.9 101.7 189.6755 113.5
1932 +61 173.9340 180.1 92.3 195.1246 103.5
1933 +63 178.0332 173.2 86.3 200.6952 97.3
1934 +65 182.1916 151.9 73.7 206.1058 83.4
1935 +67 186.4092 138.1 65.2 211.8098 74.1
1936 +69 190.6860 152.3 70.0 217.5714 79.9
Notes:
x: half-year units around 1901/2
Yt; 2nd degree polynomial trend calculated from Pi.
Yt = 77.3466 + 1.1320x + 0.0074x^
Pi: Ho' s 1937 import unit value index (Ho, 1937, pp.346-347)
Adjusted Index: Ho's term (Ho, 1937, pp.348-349) ; in fact, percentage
deviation around an (unstated) trend.
Yd: The trend derived from Pi and wsadjusted index. Yd for x =
-69 , +1, +69 yields formula:- Yd = 73.4567 + 1.2729x + 0.0118x2
Calculated values from this formula give values which correspond
reasonably well to derived values. confirming that this is
approximately the trend that Ho used.






































































































































pointless to examine the others; Hou, himself, limits his trend analysis
22
to calculation of the linear trend of the terms of trade.
Ho's work has come under criticism from another quarter. Ch'en Chi-shih
and Liu Po-nien argued that:
The Price, Quantity and Value Index of China's Imports
and Exports [i.e. Ho 30] ^4 was based on data in customs
records. But the data of quantities were incomplete for
the compilation of the price index. A lot of technical
problems arose. Although there was some technical
improvement in the compilation of the index by Nan Kai
University, the assumption that the price movements of
"commodities not directly listed" were identical with
the price movements of "commodities directly listed"
was too sweeping. Also, the index included only the
general index, with no group index. As to the compu¬
tational formula, ...Nan Kai University adopted Fisher's
"ideal" formula. ... the "ideal" formula cannot freely
change the base period and thus cannot be converted
from the link index to the fixed base index. But they...
adopted the chain index. This presented theoretical
problems .... the "ideal'-'formula, aside from the fact
that the weights of two time periods could be used,
did not make any practical economic sense. The price
index computed from the "ideal" formula was subject
to the influence of quantity movements. And the
quantity index was subject to the influence of price
movements. The "ideal" formula was, therefore, far
from being "ideal".25
23
Hou, Foreign Investment, p.269, n 33. The trend equation he gives is
Y = 76.0027 + 0.4442X with origin at 1866. (It should be remembered that
his terms of trade are inverted.) He claims that: "This means that at
the end of the period a given quantity of exports could pay for 74 percent
of the imports it could have bought at the beginning of the period. The
trend line would appear slightly different if the catastrophic 1930's
were disregarded." It should be added that, whilst it is true that, trun¬
cating the series at the end of the twenties would produce a more
favourable trend (from China's point of view), China's actual experience
in the thirties was, as a corollary, even worst then the (full) trend
would suggest.
24
Ch'en and Liu mention only the earlier work by name, but they must
have been aware of the revised indexes since they refer to 1936, and indeed
the phrase "some technical improvement" confirms this. They make no other
references to the differences between the indexes, but presumably they
must have seen at least some of the articles Hou quotes since they clearly
have access to information not in the 1930 commentary.
25
Ch'en Chi-shih and Liu Po-nien, Tui-wai mao-i t'ung-chi-hstteh
[Foreign Trade Statistics] (Peking, Finance and Economics Publishing Co.,
1958) translated in Chinese Economic Studies, Vol.3, No.4, Summer 1970,
p.324. This work is referred to hereafter as "Ch'en and Liu".
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Their complaints then, are threefold. Firstly, that Ho makes an
unwarranted assumption that the aggregate price movement of commodities
not covered by the sample is 'identical' with the aggregate movement of
the sample. Secondly, as an extension of the first point, that he did
not differentiate the commodities into groups. These are problems that
are tackled at some length in Chapter Three, and they are taken very much
into account during the construction of the indexes in Part C. The third
problem, that of the Fisher formula, is perhaps intractable. Their
preference, as we shall see later, is for a fixed base Paasche price
index, which is in fact the type used for the construction of my indexes.
The Fisher formula is an attempt at compromise — it averages the weights,
but in doing so it is open to the charge that it falls between two stools.
There is a further difficulty which must be faced by anyone using, as
Ho does, Chinese Customs statistics during the thirties - the use of
different accounting units for imports and exports. This is dealt with
in Part D and it suffices here to mention again that the Chinese Government
introduced the Customs Gold unit in 1930 for the collection of the import
tariff in an effort to insulate their revenue against adverse movement in
the bimetallic ratio. The foreign debt, the result of borrowing and
indemnity, had to be paid in gold, as in a sense did imports, since most
of her trading partners were still on the gold standard. China was at
this stage on silver, and with silver at the time falling rapidly against
26
gold, her revenue, in gold terms, was decreasing.
The export tariff, a smaller source of revenue, and one that rapidly
27
diminished in importance in comparison with the import tariff, remained
on silver; initially continuing in Haikwan taels and then, after 1933, in
standard dollars. China moved off silver in 1935 but the export tariff,
and export statistics, continued to be rendered, of course, in dollars.
The export and import statistics, therefore, and their relationship, the
terms of trade, were much affected by the separate fortunes of their
2 6
Arthur N. Young, China's Nation-Building Effort, 1927-1937 (Stanford
University, Hoover Institution Press, 1971), pp.45-48. Mr.Young was a
financial adviser to the Chiang Government at the time.
cf. Young, ibid., p.52, Table 2, which gives the import duty in 1927
as CN$54m. and export duty as CN$40m. Ten years later the figures are
CN$261 for imports and CN$29 for exports.
accounting units.
20
After 1937, with the opening of full-scale hostilities between China
2 8
and Japan, the Chinese dollar began an irreversible decline, one result
of which, as can be seen from Table 1-2, Fig.1-1 (the 'Fisher 13' line)
fm port
is that export prices appear to rise much more than export prices and so
29
the terms of trade seem to soar upwards. Had imports and exports been
reckoned in the same units, then the movement of that currency against
foreign currencies, or specie, would equally affect both sides, and have
no effect on the terms of trade. However, the use of different units
means that their relationship must be carefully scrutinised. Moreover,
the increasing, and uncertain, disparity between the two towards the end
28
The loss of Manchuria in 1931 had, amongst other more important
consequences, had an unknown effect on Chinese trade statistics.
29
These indexes are calculated from Customs statistics presented in
synoptic form by The China Handbook, 1937-1943, pp.540-541. This book,
which is similar to the China Yearbook, is subtitled "A comprehensive
survey of major developments in China in six years of war" and was com¬
piled by the Chinese Ministry of Information and published by Macmillan,
New York, in 1943. Bearing in mind its provenance, sections such as that
on the military situation, with its lists of Chinese victories over the
Japanese, should be approached with some caution. There is no reason to
suspect embellishment of the trade statistics, but the technical dis¬
tortions are incalculable. It is sobering to note, for instance, when
considering the 1940 statistics, that in that year between 85 and 90
per cent of "China's foreign trade" passed through J'apanese-controlled
ports (p.524). It is perhaps less than sobering to see that, as its part
of the war effort:
"The Ministry of Finance also forbade the importation of
the following: canes containing knives, pistols, air guns,
bullets for pistols and air guns, blueprints for manu¬
facturing munitions, insectile agents, counterfeit bank¬
notes, lotteries or other notes, prints of bogus money,
prints and models of coins and machinery, pistol-like
torchlight, handcuffs, propaganda material implying
ideas for the recognition of bogus regimes, matches
adulterated with yellow or white phosphorus, racing dogs
and obscene literature." (sic, China Handbook, p.529)
21
of the decade makes Chinese trade statistics of dubious value in terms
30
of trade analysis thereafter.
OTHER PRE-WAR CHINESE INDEXES
Although the Nankai team under Ho produced the major trade indexes of
the period, there had been two earlier, less ambitious, attempts.
The first was the Shanghai Export and Import Index compiled by the
31
National Tariff Commission of the Ministry of Finance. It was started
in 1925, revised in 1931 and appears to have ended after 1936. It was a
true 'price' index, rather than a unit value index. The base was the
average price in 1926 and the current prices were the wholesale prices
in Shanghai on the 15th of the month. It used as weights the arithmetic
mean of the average values in 1925, 1926 and 1927. Both exports and
imports grouped commodities into raw materials, means of production and
means of consumption, and raw materials were further subdivided into
agricultural, animal, forest and mineral products. It incorporated all
commodities whose value exceeded Hk Tls 500,000 - sixty-six export
32
commodities and eighty-two import commodities.
The China Handbook frankly admits: "...the depreciation of the
Chinese legal tender has caused values of exported commodities to sky¬
rocket whereas actual quantities exported decreased." (p.524). The
Chinese standard dollar, which had been worth 14.3d (sterling) as late
as 1937 (China Yearbook, 1939, p.40), had fallen to 6.5d in June 1939
and 4d in August of that year (.China Handbook, p.528) .
"^The description of this and the following index comes from Ch'en
and Liu, pp.318-324. The actual Shanghai indexes come from Young,
China's Nation-Building, p.172, Table 16 and labelled for brevity in
Table 1-1, Fig.1-1, as 'Young'. Elsewhere in the same book, Young gives
another, slightly different, version of the Shanghai series (p.499).
Ch'en and Liu unfortunately do not give any of the series they discuss.
32
cf. the indexes constructed in Appendix J. The series for 1936-41
has no (additional) entry qualification, thirteen utilisable import
commodities and twenty-three utilisable exports. The series for 1925-36
is constructed from more detailed data and has an entry qualification
of Hk Tls 1 million, thirty-nine import commodities and forty exports.
The main indexes in this study are of quite a different order of com¬
plexity; they use a total of 637 commodities. See Table 1-10.
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The next investigation was made by the Ministry of Industry and
Commerce in 1928. This was done on the basis of customs records and was
considerably larger in scope, running from 1912 to 1927, with 1926 as
base. Like the Shanghai and Ho indexes, this was of the chained form. The
links were first readjusted to fixed base 1912 and then subsequently to
1926. The formulae were:
Price Index I PcQm
E PoQm
where
Pc prices (really unit values) in current year
Po prices in base year
Qm weights. For the period 1912-20, the average
quantities of 1923, 1924 and 1925. From 1921





where Qc quantity in current year
Qo quantity in base year
Pm weights. 1912-20: average prices of 1912, 1913





(this presumably refers to
total values rather than
sample values)
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Ch'en and Liu do not state the entry qualification, merely saying that
"Commodities selected for the index were those with high import or
export values in the various years." However, since the export index
had seventy-six commodities and the import one seventy-two, it was
probably, like the Shanghai index, of the order of Hk Tls 500,000. The
average annual coverage was 76 per cent for imports and 63 per cent for
exports, while, regarding composition, forty-one of the seventy-six export
commodities were raw materials and thirty-six of the seventy-two imports
were 'means of consumption'.
Ch'en and Liu argue that since the Shanghai index "was based on the
wholesale prices in Shanghai... this could not adequately reflect the
34
price movement of foreign trade." On the other hand, Hou argues:
There is evidence that the prices used by the customs
returns in Shanghai followed closely the prices that
prevailed in the wholesale market in Shanghai with
regard to Chinese imports and exports. Furthermore,
there is evidence to discount Condliffe's suspicion
that the local divergencies of products and prices
would make any index of import or export prices a
less meaningful average than is usually the case.
Despite serious transportation difficulties, price
changes in China followed quite a similar pattern
all over the country, at least in the 1930's.
How far Shanghai's prices were representative of China's prices is
thus a matter of dispute. Shanghai was by far the largest port. In 1929,
for instance, some 43 per cent of China's foreign trade was cleared
through it, while the next largest, Darien (LUDA), soon to be lost to
36
the Japanese, accounted for only 10 per cent. It would seem plausible
that, whatever the uniformity or otherwise of prices, indexes would be
affected by the local composition of the trade. Whilst it is likely that
the composition of imports would be fairly standard, that of exports
would vary - tea through Shanghai, soya beans through Darien, etc. - and
this would make the Shanghai export index unrepresentative.
33
Ch'en and Liu, p.319.
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Ch'en and Liu, p.324.
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Hou, Foreign Investment, p.196.
36 .
China Yearbook, 1931-2, p.243.
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Ch'en and Liu were not happy again about either of the weighting
systems. They argued that the weighted arithmetic mean of the Shanghai
index, like the Fisher formula that Ho used, was not able to move freely
from the link index to the fixed base form. As for the Ministry of Industry
and Commerce index, although it could "theoretically have its base
period changed, there were changes in the fixed weights in the process
of compilation. Intertemporal comparison was, therefore, equally un-
POST-WAR STUDIES
Ch'en and Liu are the sole source for what appears to have been the
only post-war Chinese attempt at gauging the country's terms of trade.
This was carried out by the Customs Administration of the recently
established Chinese People's Republic in 1951. The problems they faced
were undeniably formidable.
Internally, the inflation that had ravaged the Chinese economy since
the late thirties (and had virtually destroyed the credibility and
usefulness of foreign trade statistics) and which was, as Walt Rostow
notes, "the symbol and cause of so much KMT weakness, was brought under
3 8
control by March 1950." Externally, the Korean War was producing a
boom in world commodity prices.
07
Ch'en and Liu, p.324.
38
W.W. Rostow, The Prospects for Communist China (Camb.,Mass., M.I.T.,
1954), p.66. Rostow quotes the following table from R. Hsia (Price Control
in Communist China, N.Y., Institute of Pacific Relations, 1953, p.81) in
support of his dating:
MONTHLY AVERAGE VALUE OF STANDARD COMMODITY UNIT* IN SHANGHAI
reliable."
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(IN YUAN PEOPLE'S CURRENCY) [Renminbi]




December 1949 2,861 December 1950
September 1950
March 1950 6,229
*Each commodity unit consists of 1.56 catties of medium
grade rice, 1 'chih' (0.4 yard) of cotton fabrics, 1 'liang'
25
The price problem was, in theory, tackled by using both the new
39
Chinese currency, the 'Renminbi' and the US$ for customs statistics
from 195040 - a practice not without its irony under the circumstances.
This seems to have led to less trouble than might have been supposed.
Ch'en and Liu only mention that:
The quantity index, the price index, and the value
index of imports (and exports) were computed in the
JMP and the U.S. dollar. Among them, the quantity
index computed from U.S. dollar unit price was slightly
different from that computed from the JMP unit price.
This discrepancy was a result of the fact that the JMP
unit price was rounded to the nearest 1,000 yen (sic)
and the U.S. dollar unit price was rounded to the
nearest cent. The index based on the U.S. dollar was
therefore more accurate.4"'*
Had 'real' US$/Renminbi values been entered in the customs documentation,
the indexes would have differed (not merely because of rounding) and
the divergences between them would have been indicative of a realistic
US$/Renminbi rate, and the discrepancy between that and the official rate.
As it is, it seems that Mah Feng-hwa's assumption is correct:
I have assumed that in the Chinese official reports,
the values of Communist China's trade with the Western
countries, using Western currencies as units of account,
(1.33 ounces) of peanut oil, and 1 catty of coal
briquettes.
Inflation is dealt with in more detail in Chapter Six, but it is interest¬
ing to note in passing that a prime component of the Communist strategy
was an 'Incomes and Prices Policy' (the order is relevant).
39
Literally, 'People's Currency'. It is abbreviated in the Wade-Giles
transliteration as JMP (Jen-min-pi), and its unit, by which it. is often
called, is the 'Yuan' - not, as the translation of Ch'en and Liu has it,
'Yen'. That is, of course, Japanese. Both Chinese and Japanese use the
same original character, although the modern simplifications are slightly
different. The Japanese 'ON' (or Chinese) reading for the character is,
in fact, EN; 'Yen' being presumably an Anglicisation of the Japanisation
of the Chinese.
40
Ch'en and Liu, p.326.
41




































































































































are all converted into dollar figures by the Chinese
Maritime Customs. These dollar values of China's
trade with Western countries, and the ruble values
of its trade with the [Soviet] bloc countries, are
then translated into yuan figures at the official
(and disequilibrium) yuan-dollar and "trade ruble"-
yuan exchange rates respectively. A global yuan
figure will then be released as the official foreign
trade volume.^2
Mah concludes that the official rate overvalues the Renminbi against the
43
dollar. So, as described by Ch'en and Liu, the dual currency computation
44
seems to have served no useful purpose.
The problems of temporal comparison were found insoluble:
As the customs statistics of 1949 were incomplete
because not all regions were liberated at the same
time and there was no unified currency, 1949 could
not be used as the base period. In the preliberation
1932-1948 period, customs statistics did not include
the customs stations in the northeast [Manchuria]
and thus were not comparable with postliberation data.
Before 1931, although the northeastern region was
included, customs statistics were also not suitable
for comparison because it was too far back and the
FOB price was calculated differently. Therefore, 1950
4K
was finally chosen as the base period.
In fact, it is unlikely that the past was quite so much a different
country. Although the Manchurian (Northeastern) Custom Houses were
AC
officially closed by the Chinese Government in September 1932, they
must, of course, have continued to have functioned for 'The State of
42
Mah Feng-hwa, The Foreign Trade of Mainland China (Edinburgh, 1972),
pp.88-89. cf. Ch'en and Liu, p.277, on recording prices in customs
statistics.
43
Mah Feng-hwa, Foreign Trade, pp.89-90.
44
The question is, perhaps, where the conversion into and out of
Renminbi takes place. If it happens at commodity level (as Ch'en and Liu
imply on p.277), then there should be meaningful differences between the
indexes; if it takes place at the end of the process, then the indexes
will, by definition, correspond to each other.
45
Ch'en and Liu, p.326.
Customs Notification no.1241, Shanghai, September 23, 1932; text
in China Yearbook, 1939, pp.102-103.
28
Manchukuo', and unless the format was completely incompatible, or the
records lost, it is difficult to see why they could not be re-incorporated
to some degree, and with due allowance for double entry (Manchuria was,
47
for customs purposes, considered foreign). However, this means that
unless the problem of temporal comparability has been solved since,
any foreign trade indexes that might have been constructed in the
Chinese People's Republic have no link with the past - an essential
feature of the indexes calculated in this study.
Ch'en and Liu this time approve of the computational formulae which










where P and Q signify unit value and quantity, respectively, and the
subscripts o and c, base year and current year, respectively. They
claim that:
Where these formulae were used, the following
relation held among the three indices:
48
Price Index x Quantity Index = Value Index
Chinese trade statistics are distorted by "Coastwise" trade anyway:
what is 'exported' at one port is often 'imported' at another. The
surprising degree of identity between import and export commodities in
Appendix J illustrates this. The pre-war Chinese indexes do not seem to
have faced up to this problem.
Ch'en and Liu, p.326.
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As the formulae stand, that is not so. The value index should express
total import or export value relatives, not just sample value relatives,
and the quantity index must be similarly corrected for inconsistent
coverage, otherwise they are merely measuring the movements of the sample.
The position of the price index is somewhat different, and this is
discussed in Chapter Three under "Adjustment for Incomplete Coverage".
If the coverage were the same every year its incompleteness would not,
of course, affect the value and quantity indexes, but since the chances
of it not fluctuating year-by-year are very slim, this must be taken
into account. Fortunately, this is a simple matter since:
Coverage = Value of sample at current prices
Value of trade* at current prices
*i.e., imports or exports, as appropriate
or, in the abbreviations used in this study,
cov . E Pc(|c
VAL
Thus, the quantity index is corrected by dividing both numerator and
denominator by the appropriate coverage. Thus, (where subscripts o and c
again denote base and current year respectively):
__ £ PoOc . VALc
Qi =
EPcQc





When this is multiplied by the Price Index,
EPoQc . VALc £PcQc
QI x PI =
EPcQc . VALo EPoQc
VALc
VALo








the first part of which (the sample VI) is Ch'en and Liu's 'Value Index'.
The data was compiled in the usual way:
Only representative commodities were included in the
index. 9 Because new tariffs were adopted in 3.951, there
were major changes in the classification of commodities.
The selection of representative commodities for the
index was based on the major imports and exports in
1951. The selection criteria were as follows: (1) commo¬
dities whose classifications were comparable over time;
(2) commodities that had fixed units of quantity;
(3) commodities whose values were high.
In all, 67 exports and 118 imports were selected.
Presumably this means that commodities with abnormal fluctuations
in unit value were excluded.
31
Those imports and exports whose units of quantity changed
over the years, such as silk pongee and silk goods, were
converted to the same units to facilitate comparison. If
fixed units of quantity were not available or if con¬
versions were not possible, these commodities were
excluded. The selected 67 exports represented 81% of
the total export value in 1950 and 76% in 1951. There
were great changes in the 1951 tariff classification
for imports. Frequent discrepancies in classification
made commodity selections more difficult. The selected
118 imports represented 79% of the total import value
in 1950, and 73% in 1951. Judging from these percentages,
the index was still quite representative.5®
Again, they do not say what the entry qualification was, but since it
had virtually the same number of export commodities as the pre-war
Shanghai index, it would have presumably been somewhat the same in real
terms. It is interesting to note, however, the much larger number of
import commodities which exceed this value - from 82 in the Shanghai index
to 118. This may merely be the result of changes in classification, but
it is more likely that it indicates, in some way, changes in terms of trade
and composition.
Regrettably, this index construction was suspended after a year: "The
Customs Administration expanded its statistical coverage from 1952 on and
51
was too busy to compile indices." Ch'en and Liu assure us that the
statistical documentation continued and was getting better:
But the customs statistical records for various years
were complete. And since 1953, quantity and value
data for each and every commodity in. the customs
statistics have been available. Thus favourable
conditions exist for the compilation of a more
accurate foreign trade index based on all commo¬
dities.5^
Ch'en and Liu, p.325. Just how representative would depend on the
correspondence between the sample composition and the composition of the
trade.
"^Ch'en and Liu, p.327. To cap it all, they do not even tell us what
the indexes revealed.
52
Ch'en and Liu, pp.327-330.
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That was some thirty years ago and the Customs Administration (or
State Statistical Bureau) no doubt has found time since then to
recommence compilation of foreign trade indexes. However, as far as one
53
can tell, such indexes, if they exist, have not been published.
STATISTICS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
The paucity of consistent, compatible and comprehensive statistics
published by the Chinese People's Republic has long vexed foreign
students*^ and, one might surmise, many Chinese themselves. The situation
was rather better in the 1950's than later, but even then, as Walter
Galenson put it in the forward to Chen Nai-ruenn's authoritative compendium,
Chinese Economic Statistics: "...apart from one fairly slender statistical
handbook, Ten Great Years, published in 1959, the data [that Dr. Chen
collected] have appeared in a great variety of books, journals and
newspapers. The handbook, Ten Great Years, itself gave few details of
foreign trade: "Official statistical information on Chinese foreign trade
is very scanty. Ten Great Years gives figures on the total combined
volume of import and export trade in yuan for 1950 through 1958 without
detailed breakdowns." Chen continues by describing his other sources:
It is quite possible that a careful scrutiny of the mountains of
fragmentary data that is available (see below) would reveal allusions to
such indexes and.even some useful shards. This sort of archaeology is,
of course, the method of much quantitative research on China. However,
in view of the specific alternatives open to foreign trade research,
this did not seem a profitable strategy.
54
See, for instance, Alexander Eckstein, Communist China's Economic
Growth and Trade (N.Y., McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp.91-92. Robert Blum, in
the forward to the same volume (p.viii), complains: "Statistical
information is often unavailable or slanted and unsatisfactory for
analytical purposes."
Published by Edinburgh University Press, 1966 (p.v).
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In 1956, in the Chinese Export-Commodity Fair held
at Canton, there was an exhibit of some figures on
import and export trade indices8^ and on the
percentage distribution of imports and exports in
the total volume of Chinese foreign trade for 1950
through 1955. These figures were published in a
Japanese periodical in 1957 and have become the chief
source used for estimating the volume of import and
export trade for those years.
There are some other official data on foreign
trade which can be found in print. Included are:
1. Figures on the percentage distribution of
exports among industrial and mining products,
processed products of agriculture and subsidiary
occupations, and products of agriculture and
subsidiary occupations for 1950-58.*
2. Figures on the percentage distribution of
imports between producer and consumer goods for
1950-58.*
3. Figures on the percentage distribution of
imports and exports by customs house for 1952-54.
4. Figures on the export of food grains and
soybeans in tons for 1953-57*
5. Figures on the import of cotton in tons for
1949-56.* 58
[^references to Chen's tables omitted]
5q
Scarcely a great haul, but the situation became even worse after 1960,
when there was a further severe curtailment of published statistics. A
recent and authoritative comment by Professor K. Walker and Dr. C. Howe
These are no more than value indexes.
58
Chen Nai-ruenn, [Ten Great Years], p.79. All these sources together
only yield seven tables, covering three pages out of some 370.
59
Following the inflated statistics of the Great Leap Forward and the
subsequent swing to the right, cf. Chen, [Ten Great Years], p.vii. For
a balanced assessment of Chinese (agricultural) statistics, see Jack
Gray's comments in Jack Gray and Patrick Cavendish, Chinese Communism
in Crisis (London, Pall Mall, 1968), p.28. For a salutory reminder that
Chinese peasants are not alone in making a mess of statistics, consider
this comment by some British Government statisticians:
"From the time when figures are first entered on a form
in a local Government or business office, until the
statistics are published in statistical volumes and
reports, data processing is highly sensitive to many
34
perhaps best sums up the current (late seventies) position:
Between 1949 and 1960, the Chinese published a vast
mass of economic materials. Newspapers, for example,
are full of national and local reports produced by
planning and other economics agencies. (About seventy
daily newspapers are available in the West for this
period.) Also, the major planning agencies, Ministries,
educational institutions, etc. provided their own
journals and monographs. After 1960, there was a
drastic reduction in the range of materials published;
restrictions were placed on export; and the statistical
and qualitative content of publications declined
sharply. All this reflected the downturn in China's
economy that occurred at this time. By the mid 1960s,
publications were picking up again, but during the
Cultural Revolution the last extant economics journal
(Economic Research) disappeared.
mundane sources of error - misunderstood instructions
of forms, misreading of hastily written figures, mis¬
placing a decimal point, losing one's place in copy¬
ing, accidental 'corruption' of data in computer
files, or printing errors. It is quite possible for
a mistake anywhere along the line to go undetected
and work its way through into published figures.
"One example was when, following the accidental
omission of a zero by an Olivetti employee reporting
the firm's exports, an underestimate of national
exports...generated a phoney balance of payments
crisis. Another was when the trade figures went
haywire over a period of many months because a
clerk at one point copied two lines of figures onto
a coding sheet in the wrong order."
Government Statisticians' Collective, "How Official Statistics are
Produced: Views from the Inside", Chapter lO of John Irvine, Ian Miles
and Jeff Evans, eds., Demystifying Social Statistics (London, Pluto,
1979), p.144.
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K.R. Walker and C.B. Howe, End of Grant Report to the Social Science
Research Council, HR 2916, London, September 1977. The grant was for
research for A Documentary Analysis of the Chinese Economy, 1949-1965,
scheduled (then) to be published by Cambridge University Press, October
1980. See also Dr. Howe's comment on the Chinese statistical network in
his article "Economic Trends and Policies", The Political Quarterly,
Vol.45, No.1, January-March 1974, pp.13-14.
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Since the Cultural Revolution the flow of publications has resumed,
but when this study commenced there were no suitable detailed statistics
available, there was no likelihood of them becoming available, and as far
61
as I know, up to the time of writing no such statistics have appeared.
The Chinese, traditionally, have not been very forthcoming about their
62
affairs - had not Sun Tzu stressed the importance of secrecy? "All
warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity;
when active, inactivity. When near, make it appear that you are far
o q
away; when far away, that you are near." In respect of foreign trade,
the experience of the guerrilla days, and the wiles it taught, must have
64
been reinforced by the imposition of an economic embargo by the West;
and embargoes, as the experience of Rhodesia showed, are meant to be
broken - surreptitiously.®® Moreover, it ill behoves an Englishman to be
61
According to newspaper reports, one consequence of China joining the
International Monetary Fund would be that she would be required to publish
internationally-compatible trade statistics.
6 2
See, for instance, Arthur Waley on the 'Han-chien', the 'Chinese
traitors', who gave information to the foreigner during the Opium War
(Arthur Waley, The Opium War through Chinese Eyes, London, Allen & Unwin,
1958, pp.222-244).
63
Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated with an introduction by Samuel
B. Griffith (Oxford University, Clarendon Press, 1963), p.66. See also
Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1966), pp.158-159,
for Sun Tzu's influence on Mao. General Griffith's The Chinese People's
Liberation Army (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967) also brings out
this point.
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Chapter Two looks at unreported British trade via Hong Kong, some of
which in the early fifties may well have been in contravention of the
embargo. It is interesting to note that Emile Savundra, the Sri Lankan
'financier' who gained some notoriety in Britain in the sixties, first
cut his teeth on this sort of 'China Trade'.
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Ankie M.M. Hoogvelt and David Child have suggested that sanctions
forced Rhodesia into 'self-reliance' and in so doing restructured the
economy in such a way that fostered development. ("Rhodesia: Economic




too complacently critical of others secrecy. Nevertheless, despite
the sympathy one might have with a Chinese Revolution struggling to
survive in a hostile world (this goes back to Sun Yat-sen), the
unnecessary and extravagant suppression of information by the Chinese
Government should be strongly criticised. Since concealment is the
shield of the weak, it should be laid aside when the situation changes
or else it becomes a hindrance. It is clear that the time is long since
past when this should have been done.®^
Two recent newspaper reports bring this home. Firstly, a British
publisher, utilising the American 'Freedom of Information Act', has
secured a copy of a Defence Intelligence Agency manual, hitherto classi¬
fied, on the Chinese armed forces. He has published it in Britain and
has exported copies to the United States. Not merely is the information
unavailable in China, but had it been compiled by a British intelligence
agency, it would have been kept under wraps by the Official Secrets Act
(The Guardian, 22nd March, 1980, p.3). Secondly, Frances Morrell,
Political Adviser to Tony Benn for five years, recalled that she and
the other PA, Francis Cripps, once wrote a paper for the Minister which,
when it was re-typed as an official departmental brief, was classified
too secret for her to have access to it (The Guardian, 25th March, 1980,
p.8) .
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A point that Mark Elvin makes, although in doing so he exaggerates
the threat to 'the Chinese Communist regime':
"The technological creativity of the Chinese people
has deep historical roots, and slumbered for a while
mostly for practical considerations. As it slowly re¬
awakens, we may expect it to astonish us. Chinese
agriculture, however, can only grow fast by using a
vast and ever increasing quantity of industrial outputs,
and can therefore never be a leading sector. If industry
is to advance rapidly enough to let agriculture, and the
economy as a whole, break out once and for all from the
old high-level trap, it almost certainly needs to enter
the international market to a far greater extent than
hitherto. It is capable of doing this with an effective¬
ness that will come as a shock, if the decision to do
so is taken. The consequence, however, will be a dis¬
ruption of the control over information and thought
which is essential to the survival of the Chinese
Communist regime. Whether this latent contradiction is
potentially lethal or merely troublesome is perhaps the
riddle of the longer-term future of the country.
"Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas..."




With foreign trade research the solution to the dearth of adequate
Chinese statistics is obvious - one turns to the statistics (usually,
but not necessarily, customs returns) of her trading partners. This was
the course pursued by Mah Feng-hwa in his pioneering study, The Foreign
Trade of Mainland China.®8 He was primarily interested in Sino-Soviet
trade and so his main source of statistical information was Soviet trade
returns supplemented, for comparative purposes, by data compiled by the
69
United States Department of Commerce.
Mah examined the question of price discrimination in Sino-Soviet
trade and, inter alia, constructed unit value (and terms of trade)
indexes for the period straddling the Sino-Soviet split - 1955 (when
detailed Soviet data became available) to 1964. He used a sample of
70
forty-three imports and fifty-five exports which, in his base year,
1955, gave coverage of 26 per cent for imports and 77 per cent for
71
exports. His computation formula is:
Mah Feng-hwa, The Foreign Trade of Mainland China (Edinburgh
University Press, 1972). This is based on an earlier study for the Rand
Corporation - Communist China's Foreign Trade: Price Structure and
Behavior, 1955-1959 (RM-3825-RC, Santa Monica, California, Rand
Corporation, October 1963). (The change from 'Communist China' to
'Mainland China' is perhaps significant.)
69
Mah (1972), p.viii, p.96 and Appendix G, pp.208-209. The USDC
statistics (International Economic Analysis Division, Free World Exports
to (Imports from) Communist Areas in Eastern Europe and Asia by
Commodity Groups. Country-by-Commodity Series) were not available to
me in Sheffield.
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Tne source is Soviet but the direction of trade is Chinese; that
is, 'imports' refers to commodities imported by China from the Soviet
Union. Mah uses four samples in all, A, A', B and C, but it is the







where P^ and P55 are the unit values of commodity n for current year
t and base year 1955, respectively, and V55 is the base year value of
the commodity. Re-written in the simplified convention used in this study












which is the Laspeyres formula.
LIMITATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL STATISTICS
The first place to look for statistics with which to construct unit
value indexes for China's trade as a whole is clearly 'international'
series compiled by various (usually supra-national) agencies. Unfortunately,
these have their drawbacks. The USDC data that Mah had recourse to, apart
from other considerations such as level of detail or period covered, was
not practically available - it will be appreciated that data of requisite
size and complexity needs to be readily and physically accessible for a
long period of time. United Nations statistics are accessible but are
39
not given in sufficient detail. Statistics compiled by the Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are presented in
adequate detail from the early sixties, but they concentrate on the trade
of member states, thus excluding many of China's most important trading
partners: Japan does not appear in the statistics until 1964, Australia
until 1972, and as late as 1977 (the most recent year published) Hong
Kong was still omitted. Nevertheless, it is probable that the OECD
statistics would furnish an adequate base for a reasonably comprehensive
investigation of the price movement of China's foreign trade. Thus, it
seemed that what was most needed was a bridge between the pre-war indexes
and the appearance of suitable OECD statistics in the mid-sixties, and
it was considered that British trade returns offered the most suitable
source for this.
ADVANTAGES OF THE BRITISH DATA
The British trade returns offer several attractions. Firstly, there
72
is an aptness about using them. The famous Prebisch report, Relative
73
Prices of Exports and Imports of Underdeveloped Countries, used
74
indexes that were based, until 1929, on British data. As Theodore
72
Any idea of using prices rather than unit values from Customs records
was soon dismissed. Apart from the problem of continuity and coverage,
they would riot lead to reconciliation with the OECD statistics, cf.
C.P.K. Kindleberger, The Terms of Trade, A European Case Study (New York,
M.I.T./John Wiley, 1956), pp.317-318.
^New York, United Nations, 1949.
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Series A (1876-1929) is based on a League of Nations study,
Industrialization and Foreign Trade (New York, 1945). This used a com¬
bination of a British wholesale price index for primary products and data
compiled by Werner Schlote (Entwicklung und Strukturwandlungen des
englischen Aussenhandels von 17OO bis sur Gegenwart, Jena, 1938,
translated by W.O. Henderson and W.H. Chaloner as British Overseas Trade
from 1700 to the 1930's, Oxford, Blackwell, 1952). See also Albert H.
Imlah, "The Terms of Trade of the United Kingdom 1798-1913", Journal of
Economic History, Vol.10, No.2, November 1950, pp.170-194. Imlah had
previously covered the first part of the period in an earlier article:
"Real Values in British Foreign Trade, 1798-1853", Journal of Economic
History, Vol.8, November 1948, pp.133-152. Taussig covered the period
1880-1913 in indexes compiled by A.G. Silverman (F.W. Taussig,
International Trade, New York, Macmillan, 1927, Appendix I, pp.411-413) .
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Morgan commented: "British data have considerable attractions for this
purpose [he was referring to the League of Nations and U.N. studies];
they are available over a long period; Britain has had a large share of
world trade; and British imports have had the convenience of being
75
mainly primary products, its exports mainly manufactured goods."
76
Secondly, the British statistics are reasonably accessible. Thirdly,
using single-country statistics avoids the problems of currency conversion
77
and reconciling different national commodity classification systems.
Fourthly, although Britain has long ceased to be the power on the China
coast, and in Britain itself the old expression "Not for all the tea in
78
China" is perhaps no longer used, the old relationship has left its
heritage; Hong Kong, of course, but also a certain, often latent and
perhaps dying, consciousness of the other. A Chinese slogan of the
75
Theodore Morgan, "Long-Run Terms of Trade", pp.1-2.
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Not quite as widely available as one might think. Neither of the
university libraries used during this study (Edinburgh and Sheffield) have
complete sets. The Sheffield Central Public Library has a better collection,
but much of it is stored in a warehouse on the other side of town. This
frequently entailed waiting up to a week to check illegibly written
figures in my notes.
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The advantage of using international statistics (U.N., OECD, etc.)
is that the data has usually already been converted into a common currency
(US$). In times of rapid fluctuations between currencies the dollar
figures may not be quite so firm as they appear, although if the figures
are translated on a monthly basis (as presumably they are) the distortions
would not be severe. Using British data does not entirely avoid the
problems of differing national classifications since serious discontinu¬
ities are introduced by British adjustments to new international classi¬
fication systems (see below). There are also difficulties in reconciling
Soviet and U.N. classifications; see, for example, Mah (1972), p.113.
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If, in fact, it ever was. I had presumed that the expression was
English since I remember my mother using it, but on checking in Partridge
(Eric Partridge, A Dictionary of Slang and Unconventional English, London,
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961, Vol.1, p.148) I found that he ascribes its
origins to Australia in the 1890's. The reference in that case may not be
very apt, but I let it stand because I mean no more than to suggest, that
the consciousness of China baulked rather larger than actual contact and
trade might seem to justify, (cf. Raymond Dawson, The Chinese Chameleon;
An Analysis of European Conceptions of Chinese Civilization, London, OUP,
1967.)
fifties was 'to catch up with Britain' (in steel production, etc.) within
fifteen years, and on the British side the prospects of the China market
frequently make banner headlines.
However, the main advantage of British trade statistics is the position
that Britain has occupied in the China trade over the period. As Tables
1-4 to 1-9 illustrate, no other country has had such a consistently sub¬
stantial and balanced share of China's trade. Table 1-4 shows that
Britain accounted for some 10 per cent on average of China's trade in
the thirties, fell to around 2 per cent during the fifties, when much of
China's trade was with the Soviet bloc, and was roughly double that
percentage during the sixties. China, of course, occupies a much smaller
part of Britain's trade, which in total is much larger than China's, and
this leads to problems of visibility in the statistics, which is dis¬
cussed below. Turning in Table 1-5 to Britain's share of China's trade
with the West since 1950, we get a rather enhanced picture of Britain's
role. Since Mah has already dealt with Sino-Soviet trade, and we need a
Western source to tie in with the OECD statistics, the position of
Britain in the context of China's trade with the West is very relevant.
Table 1-6 compares Britain's share of China's imports, exports and
total trade with that of her principal Western trading partners for
seven years covering the period. It can be seen how constant is Britain's
share compared with that of the others, and how the share of imports and
exports are evenly matched. Finally, and most graphically, Tables 1-7,
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1-8 and 1-9 plot the ranks (note, not the shares) of eleven major
trading partners in five years over the period. The United States and
Japan are dominant before the war but fade in importance in the fifties
and, for the United States, the sixties as well; Japan is number one
trading partner by the end of the sixties, but it is not until the early
seventies, just beyond our period, that there is a revival of United
States trade. In counterpoint is the course of Sino-Soviet trade: from
eleventh place in 1938 it becomes the leading trading partner through the
fifties, and then, after the split, reverts to roughly its former
position (tenth in 1967). Hong Kong is a leading partner throughout in
terms of total trade, but this is partly due to the high level of exports;
Counting Singapore and Malaya/Malaysia as one.
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Britain China Britain China Britain China
1833 58.1 XX 10.5 XX 33.3 XX
1867 66.6 XX 41.3 XX 52.8 XX
1905 7.0 0. 4X 23.5 2. 8X 17.8 1.5*
1930 7.0 0.9 8.2 1.5 7.6 1.1
1931 7.1 0.9 8.3 2.0 7.8 1.2
1932 7.8 0.9 11.2 2.1 9.8 1.3
1933 8.0 XX 11.3 1.2 10.3 XX
1934 9.3 XX 12.0 0.8 10.3 XX
1935 12.5 XX 7.2 11.4 XX
. 1936 9.2 0.9 11.7 1.2 11.4 XX
1937 9.6 XX 11.7 XX 10.9 XX
1938 7.4 XX 7.9 XX 7.7 XX
1939 8.8 XX 5.8 XX 7.2 XX
1946 na 0.2 4.6 0.8 na 0.5
1947 6.6 0.4 6.9 1.1 6.7 O. 7
1948 3.9 0.4 8.0 0.5 5.8 0.5
1949 na 0.2 na O.l na O. 1
1950 4.3 0.4 1.2 O. 2 2.8 0.3
1951 2.6 0.2 0.7 0.1 1.5 0.2
1952 1.0 O.l 1.2 0.2 1.1 0.1
1953 2.7 O. 3 1.4 0.2 2.0 0.3
1954 2.2 0.3 1.5 0.2 1.8 O. 3
1955 2.5 0.3 1.4 0.3 1.9 0. 3
1956 1.9 0, 3 2.0 O. 3 1.9 0.3
1957 2.3 0.4 2.3 O. 4 2.3 0.4
1958 2.7 0.5 4.2 O. 8 3.4 O. 4
1959 2.5 O. 5 3.4 0.7 2.9 0.6
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Britain China Britain China Britain China
I960 3.5 O. 5 4.6 0.9 4.1 O. 7
1961 5.9 0.7 2.6 O. 3 4.3 0.5
1962 4.4 0.5 2.2 0.2 3.5 O. 4
1963 3.4 0.4 3.3 0.3 3.3 0.4
1964 3.9 0.5 3.6 0.4 00ro 0.4
1965 4.4 0.5 4.2 O. 5 4.3 0.5
1966 4.4 0.6 CO 0.6 4.6 0.6
1967 . 4.4 0.5 5.8 0.7 5.1 O. 6
1968 5.2 O. 4 4.1 0.5 4.6 0.4
1969 4.5 O. 5 7.0 O. 8 5.7 0.6
x: 1913
This table merely conflates Tables 1, 5 and 17 of my Dissertation
(Tim Beal, A Preliminary Study of Britain's Trade with China since
the War, University of Edinburgh, 1974; hereafter referred to as
Dissertation) which gives more details, and sources,
xx: indicates where data was not available from those tables,
x : indicates supplementary data from CY1934, p.137.
"Westwards' means trade towards Britain; that is, Britain's imports/
China's exports. The 'Britain' column then shows this trade as a'
percentage of China's total exports (1969: 4.5%) and the 'China'
column as percentage of Britain's total imports (1969: 0.5%), and
similarly for Eastwards, and Total,trade.
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1950 2.2 7.1 4.5
1951 1.3 6.8 3.2
1952 4.2 3.1 3.7
1953 4.8 7.7 6.2
1954 6.1 8.5 7.2
1955 6.2 8.1 7.2
1956 6.4 6.0 6.1
1957 6.1 7.5 6.8
1958 10.5 7.9 9.2
1959 lO.O 9.0 9.5
1960 12.1 11.1 11.6
1961 4.7 15.4 9.2
1962 3.7 10.7 7.0
1963 4.9 6.9 5.9
1964 4.6 6.6 5.6
1965 5.4 6.0 5.7
1966 6.1 5.8 6.0
1967 6.7 5.6 5.7
1968 4.7 5.7 5.6
1969. . 8.6 5.9 7.2
Source: Trade with West: JEC (1972), p.343.
j Trade with Britain: Annual Statement
Tables 9,12,





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































by 1959 Hong Kong's trading role has changed and her exports to China
have dwindled away (see Chapter Two). A similar disparity between
imports and exports is evident in the trade of Canada and Australia,
though this time it is exports of grain which produce the imbalance.
Surprisingly, exports of grain have featured strongly in France's
China trade, though that does affect the trade balance very much.
Neither France nor Italy, in these years at least, have as large a
share as Britain, and two countries which do at times have a larger
share - Singapore/Malaya and Germany - at other times are quite insigni¬
ficant. Moreover, they are, of course, not really two countries at all;
by 1967 Singapore and Malaysia had split up (again), while 'Germany'
refers, in the pre-war statistics, to the Third Reich whilst these post¬
war figures only cover West Germany. So it is clear that if any one
country is going to present a picture of China's trade which, if not
necessarily 'typical' or 'representative', is at least balanced and
stable - a basis for cautious extrapolation - then it is Britain.
However, if the British trade is to serve as a base, it is imperative
that the data be meticulously arranged and the indexes rigourously
constructed in such a way that its components and internal dynamics can
be identified. Thus, much trouble is taken to structure the data pro¬
cessing and index construction so that, as far as possible, comparability
over time is achieved, both for the total trade and its constituent parts,
either particular major commodities or standard commodity groups.
Moreover, all commodities are clustered, not without difficulty, into the
most recent international classification so they can be slotted into
current statistics, be they British or international (TJ.N. , OECD) .
PERIOD EXAMINED
The actual starting and end points of the study were largely decided
by the format of the data. Before 1962 British annual trade statistics
were grouped in four- or five-year periods, so the thirties can be
covered in two segments, 1935-9 and 1930-4. Although it was tempting to
go back before the Depression, say to 1925-9, a stop had to be made







































































































































linkage with the pre-war indexes. On the other end of the period there
was a further, albeit slight, change in classification in 1970, so 1969
seemed a convenient and suitable year to stop. Furthermore, the seventies
ushered in great changes in China's foreign trade - the American
rapprochement, oil, etc.; 1969 had a very strong claim to be considered
the end of an era.
Between the beginning and the end the War intervened and it was
necessary to decide what to do about it. It was decided to exclude the
period 1940-45 - Britain's War (not contemporaneous with China's War
which started, perhaps,in 1931, certainly in 1937, and continued in a
sense up to 1949). Flying silk (solely for parachutes it was claimed) and
metals 'over the Hump' from Free China to India, or transporting it by
road to the Soviet Union, carriage by the Northwest Transportation
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Office and its 1,000 rubber-tyred carts, was magnificent, was indeed
war, but was scarcely trade. Even the data on the edges, 1939 and 1946,
can be very suspect and the indexes for those years should be treated
with some scepticism.
THE CHINA TRADE IN BRITISH STATISTICS
As Table 1-4 indicated, trade with China has occupied but a small
share of Britain's foreign trade over the period and it is to be expected
that any attempt to compile adequate data will face serious problems of
visibility. Moreover, the statistics are naturally reported from the
perspective of Britain. Thus it is rather like looking at a very small,
moving, object through the wrong end of a telescope, a problem exacerbated,
to continue the metaphor, by the movement of the telescope itself. I
have not come across any other attempt to focus on trade with any
particular country in the detail needed for the construction of unit
value indexes. The reason for this is obvious. Virtually all countries
except China, and certainly all major ones, issue trade statistics. It
China Handbook, pp.532-535.
is thus only with attempting to determine China's terms of trade that the
problem is likely to rise. The obstacles tackled (I hope successfully)
in this study are often specific to it, and so both the terrain and the
route need to be mapped out in some detail. The rest of this chapter
briefly describes the terrain, the British trade returns. Chapter Two
illustrates various aspects of it (and trade data in general) in
examining the question of indirect trade through Hong Kong, while the
final chapter in this part returns to the other problems of methodology
and ends with a detailed annual synopsis of the sample, its coverage,
composition, etc.
THE ANNUAL STATEMENT
The principal source of data used in this study is The Annual
Ol
Statement of Trade of the United Kingdom. This is, of course, not the
only published source of British foreign trade statistics (there are,
for instance, monthly figures), but it is the most detailed and, for the
present purposes, the most appropriate one. Although it is relatively
detailed, it is, of course, merely a synopsis of the primary data
collected and collated by the Statistical Office of Customs and Excise;
that is, not all commodities are given for all countries.
The Annual Statement of Trade is published in four volumes (with an
occasional supplemental volume). Volume I gives aggregate and summary
tables. Volume II (for imports and re-exports) and Volume III (for exports)
give figures by commodity, with details for the principal countries in¬
volved in that particular item of trade. Volume IV gives details by
country, itemising or aggregating the principal commodities traded. It
^Statistical Office of Customs and Excise, Annual Statement of the
Trade of the United Kingdom. The title of this publication varies slightly
over the years, and is hereafter referred to merely as the Annual
Statement. Similarly, there are changes in the introduction over the
period. Where these changes are substantive, the year and page number is
quoted (the introduction is common to all volumes). In other cases,
where a change is merely one of wording, or the reference is general,
the specific details are omitted.
will be obvious that, because of their different purposes, the information
given in Volumes II and III does not interlock with that in Volume IV; and
this is principally because Volume IV often aggregates commodities in a
way that is not strictly comparable with the by-commodity tables of
Volumes II and III. For example, Volume IV reports that in 1939 Britain
exported to China ("exclusive of Hong Kong, Macao, Manchuria and Leased
Territories"; the elasticity of the definition of 'China' is a problem
which will be discussed in Chapter Two) £5,469 worth of "Brass and alloys
of copper, other than nickel alloys". Table 1-11 illustrates how this
appears in Volume III. Thus we have 'lost' some £4,000, and the £1,766
turns out to be not utilisable because the description "Other manufactures
of brass and alloys of copper, not elsewhere specified" is not used in
the base year; but that is a problem which will be covered later.
Another characteristic of the Annual Statement, which follows
reasonably enough from its function of describing Britain's foreign
trade, is the lack of continuity of recording trade with a particular
country. For example, China may have imported widgets for every year
during the period under consideration, but trade will only be recorded
for those years in which China was an important customer. This has not
been much of a problem when looking at Britain's imports from China since
there the trade has been relatively stable and the 'package' of important
commodities has remained fairly much the same. This is not so, however,
with exports. It perhaps follows from the very nature of trade between an
industrialised country and, from the viewpoint of Britain's trade at least,
an agricultural country that the (British) export trade has been much
more diffuse. This is in a way, of course, merely because of the manner
in which commodities are classified. Manufactured goods tend to be
itemised much more specifically than primary goods. Thus the Annual
Statement may distinguish only one or two varieties of maize, but give
many different types of machine tool. The farmer, on the other hand, may
think that all machine tools look the same, but be able to distinguish
many varieties of maize. The result of this, however, is that the export
trade is spread over many more commodities and so the chances of exports
to China being too small to be reported are much greater. And so there
is not one single export commodity for which we have recorded figures for
the whole of the period, or indeed for anything like the whole of the
period. This affects not merely single commodities but also commodity
54
Table 1-11 Illustration of limited compatibility between




Brass and alloys of copper, other than
nickel alloys £5,469
VOL.Ill (by-commodity)
Brass and alloys of copper, other than nickel
alloys -
Ingots, blocks, slabs, billets, bars
(including wire bars) not elsewhere
specified
NS
" Plates, sheets, strip, discs and circles - NS
" Wire, in coils -
" " Of Brass - NS
" " Of other alloys of Copper - NS
" Rods, sections, shapes and angles, and
wire not in coils -
NS
" Cocks and valves, other than for motor
vehicles -
NS
" Tubes - NS
" Other manufactures of brass and alloys of
copper, not elsewhere specified - £1,766
LOSS OF COVERAGE £3,703
Source: Annual Statement, 1939, Vols.Ill and IV
"
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groups. The single exception is "Iron and Steel", which is discussed in
Appendix E.
Changes in classification have been a major hindrance. These changes
have been of two kinds. The first arises from Britain's attempts to
conform to international procedures. Following the International
Convention relating to Economic Statistics in Geneva, 1928, a 'Minimum
List of Commodities for International Trade Statistics' (based on the
League of Nations 'Draft Customs Nomenclature') was drawn up. In 1948 the
United Nations Statistical Commission recommended that this 'Minimum
List' be revised and the new 'Standard International Trade Classification'
(SITC) was recommended to governments by the U.N. in 1950. The effect of
the introduction of SITC on the classification of commodity classes can
be seen by looking at Britain's imports from China for 1951 classified
in both the old and new system (Table 1-12).
In May 1960 the United Nations Statistical Commission approved a
revision of this classification - the Standard International Trade
Classification, Revised. The SITC,R is also a re-arrangement into
statistical order of the items of the 1955 Tariff Nomenclature (BTN) of
the Brussels Customs Co-operation Council. Under SITC,R commodities are
grouped into ten Sections (0 to 9), which are in turn divided into up
to ten Divisions (00 to 09, etc.) which are further subdivided into
commodities up to five digits.
The SITC came into effect in 1954, but since at that time every year's
Annual Statement gave details of up to five of the previous years for
comparison, the edition for 1954 covered the years from 1951 and so the
data was re-classified into SITC from that year. Unfortunately, this
excellent practice of including previous years ceased after 1962. The
1963 edition saw the introduction of SITC,R and further changes were
made in 1967 and 1970. This last change in 1970 was an important reason
for terminating this study in 1969.
However, changes in classification have been by no means confined to
the overall structure. Had this been all, it would have presented no great
































































































re-classified again, as the changes in the classification of eggs (an
important part of imports from China) illustrates (Table 1-13).
To anyone who might have thought that eggs came in large, medium and
small, boiled, poached or fried, these changes in classification might
seem to serve no great purpose; and there are other cases of this kind.
However, there are obviously many occasions where changes in classification
are inevitable - in machinery, in chemicals, in electronics and so on.
Whether changes in classification are occasioned by new international
procedures, by new or changing commodities, or for administrative
reasons, they do cause a break in continuity and a loss of comparability.
Further illustrations of discontinuities and attempts to circumvent them
are discussed in Chapter Three.
The Annual Statement deals only with merchandise trade and it excludes
things like services, insurance, manufacturing licences, investment and
return on investment - all the additional items that go into the construction
of a balance of payments account. It will be readily appreciated what a
difference this makes when we consider that in 1950, when British invest¬
ments in China were expropriated, they were worth roughly £200 million;
and yet, in the thirty-four years that we are looking at, Britain's
82
total imports from China were only in the region of £280 million.
There are also a number of goods which are excluded from the accounts.
These cover things like personal effects, goods imported by ambassadors
accredited to the United Kingdom, military and naval stores, and so on;
but these exclusions have little effect on this study.
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"The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in a written
answer to a Parliamentary Question on 24 October 1949, stated: 'The value
in 1941 of the direct British business investment in China represented by
physical properties, excluding ships, was estimated in 1947 at about £124
million. To this must be added the capital represented by Chinese Government
and railway bonds quoted in London. This amounts to £53 million. I would
add that unofficial estimates that have been made exceed these figures.'"
Allen and Donnithorne, Western Enterprise in Far Eastern Economic
Development, China and Japan (London, Allen and Unwin, 1954).
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1 Eggs, in Shell 30-33, 35-9
Eggs, in Shell -
"
Poultry -
2 " " Not exceeding 14 lbs in weight per 120 34, 46-56
3 " " Over 14 lbs but less than 17 lbs in weight
per 120 34, 46-56
4 " " Over 17 lbs in weight per 120 34, 46-56
5 " Other sorts 34, 46-56
Eqgs, in Shell -
6 " Not exceeding 14 lbs in weight per 120 57-69
7 " Over 14 lbs but less than 17 lbs per 120 57-69
8 " Over 17 lbs in weight per 120 57-69
Eggs, not in Shell -
9 " Liquid or Frozen (Whole, Yolk or White) 30-34
lo " Albumen 30-34
11 " Dried (except Albumen) 30-39
12 " Liquid or Frozen, including Glycerinated (Whole,
Yolk or White) 35-39, 46-47
13 " Dried Albumen 35-39
14 " Dried, Whole 46-47
" Dried -
" " Whole -
15 " " " Spray dried, containing sugar 48-54
16 " " " Other 48-54
17 " " Yolk 48-54
18 " " White (Albumen) 46-50
19 " Frozen (Whole. Yolk or White) 48-49
For notes see final page of table.
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Eggs, not in Shell -
" Frozen -
20 " " Whole 50-54
21
" " Yolk 50-54
22
" " White (Albumen) 1950
23 " Liquid, including glycerinated
(Whole, Yolk or White)
48-54
" Whole -
24 " " Dried 55-69
25 " " Frozen 55-67
26 " " Liquid* 55-67
27 " " Frozen and liquid 68-69
28 " Yolks 55-69
Chemicals -
" Albumen -
?q " " Dried 51-8
30 " " Frozen and Liquid* 51-8
" Albumin -
31 " " Dried 59-62
32 " " Frozen and Liquid 59-62
" Chemical materials and products,
not elsewhere specified -
" " Albumins, albuminates and other
albumin derivatives -
" 11 11 Albumins -
33 11 11 11 n Drie(j 63-69
34 11 11 11 11 pr0zen and Liquid 63-69
35 " " " Other 63-69
for notes see over
BO





Note in the Annual Statement: "...prior to 1957 the figures are not
completely comparable."
This table has been kept in rough chronological order in an attempt to
make it more comprehensible, but this has led to virtual duplications
where the change has been due to layout rather than definition. Thus,
for example, "Whole, Dried" (no.24; 1955-69) follows on from "Dried,
Whole" (no.14; 1946-47). The rearranging and linking of these classi¬
fications will be discussed later. After 1963 Eggs are further defined
as: "Birds eggs and egg yolks, fresh, dried or otherwise preserved,
sweetened or not".
It will be noticed that egg white is transferred from "Eggs" to
"Chemicals" with the introduction of SITC in the 50's, and that the
spelling changed from 'albumen' to 'albumin'. Webster's Dictionary
(1958 edition) gives the following definitions:
ALBUMEN n. (L. albumen, from albus, white)
1. the white of an egg.
2. in botany, the nutritive matter in seeds of plants
between the skin and embryo; the endosperm, or
perisperm.
3. albumin (Rare).
ALBUMIN n. a protein substance found in animal tissue, blood, milk,
egg, muscle, and in plant tissue. Heat coagulates it;
water dissolves it. Nitrogen, hydrogen, carbon, oxygen,
and sulfur are its component elements. It was formerly
called albumen.
Although egg white is only one form of 'albumin' it is assumed for our
purposes (under the 'assumption of continuity' which will be discussed
later) that imports from China of 'egg white', 'albumen' and 'albumin'
are the same thing.
In the import sample, albumin, in its variations, has been kept with
eggs; that is, in terms of the SITC classification, it has been
retained under Section 0.
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Gold bullion and coin are not included in the general schedule of
imports and exports but are shown separately. This was true of silver
bullion and coin, but in later years silver bullion and coin not of legal
tender in the U.K. has been included as commodities. There has been a
considerable movement (in relation to the level of trade) of gold and
silver bullion and coin between Britain and China during this period, and
care must be taken in noting whether a particular item is included or
83
excluded from the general schedule of trade. To clarify the ambiguous
role of silver bullion and coin for the purposes of this study, they have
been isolated from the main body of imports throughout the period. It has
thus been possible to clearly distinguish between 'imports including
bullion' and 'imports excluding bullion'. Identifying the effect of
bullion is especially important for the mid-thirties and 1959-63 when, at
times, bullion amounts to nearly half of total imports from China.
Diamonds and other precious stones are included, but as the Annual
Statement rather coyly puts it: "...so far as they are declared on entries,
but the great bulk of such goods is not so declared and the figures shown
in the tables represent, therefore, only a small proportion of the actual
84
Imports and Exports." Some £15 million's worth of (presumably industrial)
diamonds are in fact shown in the accounts as having been exported to
China between 1967 and 1969, but unfortunately for our purposes, no
quantities are given.
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cf. A. Maizels, "Coverage", Chapter 3 of International Trade
Statistics, edited by R.G.D. Allen and J. Edward Ely (New York, John Wiley
and Sons, 1953), p.31: "Separate statistics of the movement of silver
bullion and specie are usually available, but the importance of such move¬
ments is nowadays relatively very small, though before the war there were
some big movements from China to the United States, partly via the United
Kingdom."
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"The United Kingdom, for example, included diamonds and other
precious and semi-precious stones in its import statistics up to 1949,
insofar as they were declared on Customs entries, but no record was kept
of their export. Since this record of imports covered only a small part
of the trade, diamonds and other precious stones have been excluded
altogether since the beginning of 1949." ibid., p.41.
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Britain values imports c.i.f. (cost, insurance and freight) and
exports f.o.b. (free on board) unlike, for instance, the United States
85
which reports both imports and exports f.o.b. In the words of the
Annual Statement:
The value of the Imports represents the open market
value as defined by Section 10 of the Finance Act, 1935.
Briefly stated, this value is the price which the goods
would fetch on a sale in the open market at the time of
importation, if the goods were delivered to the buyer
at the port or place of importation, freight, insurance,
commission and all other costs, charges and expenses
incidental to the making of the contract of sale and the
delivery of goods at that port or place (except any
duties of Customs) having been paid by the seller.
The value of the Exports represents the cost of the
goods to the purchaser abroad, including packing, inland
and coastal transport in the United Kingdom, dock dues,
loading charges, and all other costs, profits, charges
and expenses (e.g. insurance and commission) accruing
up to the point where the goods are deposited on the
exporting vessel.... and is known as the "free on board"
value.
The difference between c.i.f. and f.o.b. values is generally considered
to be roughly 10 to 12 per cent, but clearly freight and insurance
charges vary very much with the type of cargo. Kindleberger suggests that
freight costs vary from one. or two per cent for high value commodities
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up to 40 to 50 per cent on bulky commodities such as coal. This
problem of the difference between c.i.f. and f.o.b. values is something
to which we will return in the next chapter.
We should, of course, not forget that the declared values in the
accounts are subject to error, conscious or otherwise. Relative Prices
— 87of exports and Imports of Underdeveloped Countries issues the caveat
q r
See J. Edward Ely and Nicholas M. Petruzzelli, "Valuation", Chapter
Five of International Trade Statistics.
Bo
Charles P. Kindleberger, The Terms of Trade, A European Case Study
(New York, M.I.T./John Wiley and Sons, 1956), p.337.
87
United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, Relative Prices of
Exports and Imports of Under-developed Countries (Lake Success, New York,
1949), p.136.
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that when there is an ad valorem tariff there is an inducement to
understate values, and that "...where foreign exchange controls exists,
exporters may understate the prices obtained in order to avoid the
surrender of foreign exchange earned." On the other hand, where no
tariff exists, there is no inducement to check figures. Import and
export controls and licences introduce further inducements for mis¬
statements. It would be useless to speculate to what degree factors
like these might have affected reported values of British trade over
forty-odd years, but it is always salutary to remember that figures
are never quite as precise as they appear.
However good or bad the British trade statistics are, they are
necessarily limited to recording trade with what is defined as 'China'.
What this definition encompasses and, more important, what it leaves out,
and the changes in it over this long period, are the subject of the next
chapter.
CHAPTER TWO
Determining Britain's China Trade
THE DEFINITION OF CHINA
As Table 2-1 (Fig.2-1) shows, the definition of China in the British
trade statistics has been very elastic; so much so that even up to the
late sixties the Annual Statement hastened to tell its readers every
year that "China includes Manchuria but excludes Hong Kong", even though
Manchuria had been returned to China in 1945 and Hong Kong ceded by
China a hundred years previously. Curiously, the Mongolian People's
Republic was included under China up until 1963 even though it had been
separated from China some fifty years before.
It should also be remembered that China suffered other, de facto,
if not de jure, contractions during the period. Sinkiang, for instance,
whilst officially under Chinese jurisdiction, was in fact virtually in¬
dependent of the Central Government until 1949 and the region's trade
went principally to the Soviet Union:
Trade between the two regions (Soviet Central Asia and
Sinkiang) was encouraged by Sino-Soviet treaties of 1920
and 1924. Consulates were reopened on either side. Com¬
pletion of the Turk-Sib Railway in 1930, another trade
agreement, and reduced customs duties further facilitated
the drainage of Sinkiang's commerce to the USSrA
In the thirties, Aitchen K. Wu described a Chinese trader in Sinkiang
telling him:
Our products were limited to cotton, wool and some furs,
and the Soviet Trading Company was fast securing a mono¬
poly which must result in lower prices as time went on.
Our gold production must be increased; for the Chinese
John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, East




The Definition of China in this Study
'China' excludes:- Years affected
Kong Kong and Macao throughout




Kwarttung Peninsula (Liaodong) 1933-1939
Formosa (Taiwan)3 throughout
'China' includes:- Years affected
Mongolian People's Republic prior to 1964
Notes:
1. Leased Territories: It is not clear what this covers. The
most important leased area was (and is) the "New Territories", the
islands and mainland adjacent to Kowloon which were leased to
Britain in June 1898 for 99 years but these, being administratively
part of Hong Kong, would presumably be included in the Kong Kong
returns. In practice, the category "Leased Territories" appears to
have no effect on the trade returns as Table 2-2 shows.
2. The import index uses soya beans from Manchuria for 1934-1939 and
from Kwantung Peninsula 1933-1939.
3. Taiwan is included with Japan until 1947 and shown separately
thereafter. It is called by its Portuguese name 'Formosa' until
the late sixties in the Annual Statement.
In accordance with current Chinese practice, when Chinese words































































































































trade was dwindling owing to transport difficulties and
the insecurity of the interior, while even at its best
it had consisted only in sheep-gut export, fine furs,
and a little gold.2
Similarly, virtually all of Tibet's trade, small though it might have
been,3 was with (British) India, and it was not until Chinese control
was re-imposed in 1950, and more practically with the construction of
highways since then, that Tibet would have been brought into the Chinese
economy. Also during the thirties it is likely that much of the trade of
Yunnan and Kwangsi would have been drawn down into French Indo-China.
However, it was of course the Japanese invasion which had by far the
greatest effect on the definition of the 'China trade'. The loss of
Manchuria and the Kwantung Peninsula is explicitly shown in the Annual
Statement (Table 2-1); the rapid erosion of Chinese territory by the
Japanese, especially from 1937 onwards, is reflected by the plummeting
of her trade and currency, shown in Tables 2-3 and 2-4. The slump in
exports from £73 million in 1937 to £2 million in 1943 is clearly a
better measure of the deterioration of the Chinese economy than imports.
British trade with what, for convenience, is called here 'Core China'
and 'Greater China' is shown in Table 2-5 (Fig.2-2). 'Core China' is the
fluctuating China of the Annual Statement and hence the China on which
this study is based. 'Greater China' includes in addition those areas
which are separately identified in the British trade returns and which
for part or whole of the period have been out of the control of the
Chinese Central Government, but which we can properly think of as being
in some sense part of China. Mongolia is slightly different in that,
although China had acquiesced in its independence in 1946 (its de facto
independence dated from the Revolution of 1911) , British Customs and
Excise did not give its benediction until 1964. We could, of course,
construct an even larger 'Sinica Irredenta' by including Korea, parts of
the Soviet Far East, Vietnam, etc. - Chinese territory and tributaries
2
Aitchen K. Wu, Turkistan Tumult (London, Methuen, 1940), p.125.
^Fairbank, et al, East Asia, p.797.
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Table 2 -3





Value in $m Value in £m
1930 1,878 .4999 8.2401 938.81 113.93
1931 2,114 .3676 7.6134 777.11 102.07
1932 1,602 .3573 5.9221 572.40 096.65
19 33 1,426 .3473 5.6002 495.25 088.43
1934 1,040 .3403 5.0887 353.91 069.55
1935 0,930 .3675 4.9275 341.78 069.36
1936 0,946 .2979 4.9766 281.81 056.63
1937 0,954 .2933 4.9470 279.81 056.56
1938 0,886 . 2108 4.8904 186.77 038.19
053.74***
1939 1,334 .1187 4.4590 158.35 035.51
094.24***
1940 2,027 .0600 4.0250 121.62 030.22
1941 2,400 .0531 4.0250 127.44 031.66
1942** 4.0250 161.70 040.17
1943 4.0250 169.20 042.04
1944 4.O250 220.90 054.88
1945 4.0250 710.0,0 176.40
1946 4.0250 560.60 139.28
1947 4.0274 451.10 112.Ol
1948 (Jar uary to Jul^ ) 4.0300 140.30 034.81
*Gross imports less re-exports. Silver excluded.
**
From 1942, values are also given in US$ ... CN$ values are omitted.
***U.N. Yearbook note: "The import values, shown in CN dollars for
1938 and 1939 were obtained by converting values recorded in
Customs Gold Units at official rates of exchange. For balance of
trade purposes,these values should be increased 44% for 1938 and
166% for 1939." (No information is available relating to other year:
Source: U.N.,Yearbook of International Trade Statistics,1950 (New York,
1951) ,p.53. The conversion rates used are those given by the Yearbook.




China's Exports of Merchandise* f.o. b. 1930-1948
Conversion rates
Year CN$m. lCN$=x$ l$=x£ Value in $m Value in £m
X X
19 30 1,000 .4999 8.2401 499.90 60.67
1931 0,962 .3540 7.6865 340.55 44.31
1932 0,676 .3542 5.9350 239.44 40. 34
1933 0,707 .3463 5.6017 244.83 43.71
1934 0,803 .3398 5.0857 272.86 53.65
1935 0,646 .3584 4.9267 231.53 46.99
1936 0,960 .2975 4.9780 285.60 57.37
1937 1,237 .2931 4.9453 362.56 73.32
1938 0,843 . 2012 4.8865 169.61 34.71
1939 1,029 .1187 4.4590 122.14 27.39
1940 1,987 .0600 4.0350 119.22 29.55
1941 2,905 .0531 4.0350 154.26 38.23
1942** 4.0350 021.50 05.33
1943 4.0350 008.20 02.03
1944 4.0350 049.80 12.34
1945 4.0350 224.20 55.56
1946 4.0350 148. 20 36.73
1947 4.0326 215.70 53.49
1948 (Ja auary to Ju] y) 4.0300 103.90 25.78
*Gross exports less re-imports. Silver excluded.
**From 1942, values are also given in US$; therefore, CN$ values
have been omitted.
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics,











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































at the apogee - but that would serve little purpose. Nor can we lump
together the trade of 'Greater China' and say that that is the 'real'
China trade. The size, direction and composition of the foreign trade
of these areas has been determined by their very separation from the
core Chinese economy and connection with other economies. If Hong Kong
had not been ceded to Britain it would probably still be a fishing
village; Canton might be larger but, in economic impact, not enough to
compensate for the non-existence of Hong Kong. Similarly, Hong Kong's
rapid growth after the war and the transformation of its economy from
entrep&t trade to manufacturing centre was mainly due to the revolution
in China and the ensuing enmity of the United States. Hong Kong was
drawn into the vacuum caused by the American embargo on trade with China;
instead of Chinese raw materials being made up in Shanghai for the
American market, they were made up in Hong Kong.4 Less dramatically, if
Taiwan had remained part of the Chinese economy, rather than being in¬
tegrated into the Japanese economy (1895-1945) and subsequently the U.S.¬
Japanese-Western economic system, its exterior trade would no doubt have
been very much smaller, whatever the complexion of the Chinese government.
INDIRECT TRADE VIA HONG KONG
So far we have dealt with trade that is separately distinguished in
the trade returns and so is easily quantified. However, the British
system of accrediting trade to the country of consignment adds a further
definite limitation to the Sino-British trade we are considering; that
is, the actual trade without doubt has been to varying degrees greater
than that which has been recorded, the difference being accredited to
other countries.
Devons identifies four main systems in use for classifying trade
by country:-
4
Hong Kong Government, Hong Kong Annual Report, 1968, p.49.
5
E. Devons, An Introduction to British Economic Statistics (Cambridge
University Press, 1956), p.144.
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Import Export




The British system is described in the Annual Statement as follows:
Imports are classified as received from the place or
country of consignment; that is, the place or country
from which the goods were originally despatched to the
United Kingdom, with or without breaking bulk in the
course of transport, but without any commercial trans¬
action in any intermediate country. The place or country
of consignment is not necessarily the place or country
of shipment, origin or manufacture. Exports are classi¬
fied as despatched to the place or country of consignment;
that is, the last place or country to which tfc»e goods are
consigned, with or without breaking bulk in the course of
transport, but without any commercial transaction in any
intermediate country. The place or country of consignment
is therefore not necessarily the place or country of un-
shipment or consumption.
Hong Kong is the main and most obvious source of distortion. The
colony was, after all, specifically created as an entrepot for the China
trade and there can be no doubt that (for earlier years at least), as
Devons says, "...an appreciable amount of our (Britain's) exports to
China will be shown as exports to Hong Kong".® Unfortunately, it is
only since 1959 that Hong Kong has distinguished re-exports from
domestic exports and only since 1967/8 has the Census and Statistics
Department published detailed accounts showing re-exports by country of
O
origin and destination. By this time, as Tables 2-6 and 2-7 show, Hong
Kong's role as entrepot in Sino-British trade was very small. In 1969
Hong Kong's re-exports of goods of China origin to Britain is reported
at only HK$ 5.4 million, a mere 0.04 per cent of Hong Kong's total
^Ibid., p.145.
7
Hong Kong Government, Hong Kong Annual Report, 1959, p.69.
8
Hong Kong Government, Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong





































































































































































































exports and re-exports ('general exports') and less than 1 per cent of
Britain's imports from China. But if the amount of extra Sino-British
trade that flowed through Hong Kong (and was accredited to Anglo-Hong
Kong trade in the Annual Statement) was virtually negligible by the late
sixties, there is every indication that it had been quite substantial
during certain earlier periods.
Before 1909 the British trade returns credited exports to "country
of ultimate destination" (as later) but imports "were generally
classified as received from the countries v/hence they were shipped
direct to the United Kingdom". In 1909 this was changed to the present
system of accreditation by country of consignment, but classification
by the two systems was given in supplementary volumes from 1904 to 1915.
The data for 1906 for imports from China and Hong Kong (imports from
Macao and Weihaiwei are nil) are given in Table 2-8. It will be seen
that, under the old system, £151,859, or some 5 per cent of British
imports from China, were mis-accredited to other countries. (Consignments
from China did, on the other hand, pick up £727 of Philippines trade.)
Hong Kong, during the same year, was over-credited by £64,244, of which
£45,747 had come from China, some 7 per cent of British consignments
from the colony.
Apart from such curiosities as Austria-Hungary, scarcely a great
maritime trading power, re-exporting twice as much Chinese produce to
Britain as Japan, and ten times as much as Russia, this table undoubtedly
still does not reveal the true extent of Hong Kong's entrepot role.
For instance, the imports initially consigned from Hong Kong, half a
million pounds, are at the same level as during the middle thirties; at
that time, however, imports from China are around six million, twice the
1906 level. It would seem likely that the explanation for the fluctuation
in the ratio of imports from Hong Kong as against those from China, 1:6
in 1906 to 1:12 in the mid-30's, was due more to the varying proportion
of Chinese re-exports through Hong Kong rather than to changes in the
level of Hong Kong's domestic exports.
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Table 2-8
British imports, from & via, China & Hong Kong, 1906
CHINA
Consigned direct























Total 3,314,453 Total 3,466,312
HONG KONG
Consigned direct
from Hong Kong 573,276
Imported direct from
Hong Kong 573,276











Japan (including Formosa) 24
U.S.A. 390
Cuba 10 British India 43
Australia 1,339 Straits Settlements and
dependencies 6
Ceylon & Dependencies 13
Australia lo
Total 638,507 Total 574,263
Source: Annual Statement , Suppleme nt, 1906.
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The Origins and Development of Hong Kong
Hong Kong appears to have been inhabited since prehistoric times but
the area was not brought under Chinese suzerainty until 221-214 B.C.;
Chinese migration to the surrounding region did not start until the Tang
dynasty (620-907 A.D.) and it was not until the Song dynasty (960-1279)
that this happened on a large scale.® In 1278 the penultimate Song
emperor, Di Bing, retreating before the Mongols, made his capital in
Kowloon and died there. Apart from this Hong Kong was of no great
importance until it was occupied by the British during the Opium War of
1840-42. Hong Kong island was ceded to Britain by the Convention of
Chuenpi on January 20, 1841, and proclaimed a British colony by Captain
Charles Elliot, the British plenipotentiary, shortly afterwards. Palmerston,
the Foreign Secretary, scathingly dismissed it as "a barren island with
hardly a house upon it", but Elliot's successor, Sir Henry Pottinger,
"found so much evidence of its progress since its occupation that he
determined to retain it despite Palmerston's strictures".10 The Treaty
of Nanking reaffirmed the secession and in June 1843, after ratification
in both countries, the island was again declared a British colony and
the settlement called "Victoria".
Hong Kong was declared a free port and Chinese traders welcomed.
Partly because of the problems caused by typhoons and disease, but
mainly because of the rapid progress of Shanghai, which was situated
strategically at the mouth of the Yangtze, Hong Kong failed to fulfill
the early hopes of its becoming a booming emporium for the China trade.
"In 1847 a Parliamentary committee of enquiry into the China trade went
so far as to express doubts that Hong Kong would ever develop into an
important commercial centre..."11 Hong Kong did grow, however, especially
when (as during the Taiping Rebellion) there was unrest in China.
9
The Hong Kong Annual Report has a chapter on the history of Hong
Kong every year.
10




The Convention of Peking, 1860, following the second Anglo-Chinese
war, ceded Kowloon peninsula, and the Convention of Peking in 1898 gave
Britain a 99-year lease on a relatively large area of the mainland north
of Kowloon and some 235 islands in the vicinity, this new acquisition
soon being known as the "New Territories". The population also expanded;
from a few thousand in the 1840's it became 72,000 in 1855 and 120,000
in 1861.
By 1871 some 24 per cent of China's foreign trade was with Hong Kong
12
and this had increased to 34 per cent by 1884. Significantly, as Remer
points out, this rapid increase in Sino-Hong Kong trade was accompanied
by a decline in direct Sino-British trade (and an increase in Chinese
trade with the continent of Europe and with Japan). Hong Kong's percentage
of the China trade was 47 per cent in 1887, 48 per cent in 1893 and 42
per cent in 1898. Again, as Remer notes:
As the proportion of China's direct trade with Hong
Kong increased, the percentage of the trade with Great
Britain and with India fell. The decrease was from 29.7
per cent to 12.1 per cent in the case of Great Britain
and from 10.9 per cent to 5.4 per cent in the case of
India. Since it is certain that British and Indian
trade with China did not actually decrease, it is plain
that these percentages taken together show merely that
Great Britain and India made increasing use of the ware¬
houses and piers of Hong Kong.13
From the turn of the century until the First World War Hong Kong's share
of China's trade declined to 29 per cent, due primarily, suggests Remer,
to the growth of the northern and central ports; Britain's share stayed
steady at 11 per cent. During the period 1914 to 1921 Hong Kong's share
declined even further due, says Remer, to "the decreasing importance of
14
Hong Kong as a distributing centre". Britain's direct trade, which had
fallen to below 8 per cent in 1918 was nearly 12 per cent by 1921. By
1938, according to Chinese figures, Hong Kong accounted for 32 per cent
of China's exports (as against 7 per cent for Britain) and 2 per cent of
her imports (8 per cent from Britain) (Tables 2-9, 2-10). This figure for
1 9
cf. Remer, The Foreign Trade of China (Shanghai, 1926), p.57. The
periodization that follows (1871-1884/1885-1898/1899-1913/1914-1921) is
Remer's.
13

































































































































































































































































































































































Hong Kong's share of China's imports is misleading since it clearly only
takes account of Hong Kong's domestic exports and not her re-exports.
According to Hong Kong statistics, her imports from China in 1938,
£14.4 million, were virtually exactly balanced by her general exports
15
(that is, domestic exports plus re-exports) of £14.3 million. It is
likely that Hong Kong's share of China's trade had risen to slightly
over 30 per cent. A quick comparison of British, Hong Kong and Chinese
figures for 1938 indicates the difficulty of reconciling different trade
statistics, but it suggests that such a comparison may indicate the level
of indirect trade (Table 2-11).
Discrepancies between Trade Returns
There would seem to be five main reasons for these discrepancies:-
1. Compilation errors
2. Fluctuations in currency conversion rates
3. Recording leads and lags
k. Problems of valuation
5. Problems of accreditation (that is, indirect trade)
There are other minor reasons for the differences between recorded
exports and imports. Coverage and exclusions could be important, for
instance, especially if the variable commodity was something like silver.
Moreover, despite nearly a century of attempts at international standard¬
ization and comparability, import and export figures are seldom, if ever,
fully reconcilable: "In many cases discrepancies between the statistics
of pairs of countries remain inexplicable even after allowance is made
for all known differences in definitions and practices between the
countries.
Statistical Abstract for the British Commonwealth, No.70, 1950.
~^L.A. Kane and Irving Weiss, "Compilation", chapter two of
International Trade Statistics, p.24. See also William R. Leonard,






Britain's imports from China
China's exports to Britain
6.4
2.4
Britain's exports to China
China's imports from Britain
4.2
2.9
Britain's imports from Hong Kong
Hong Kong's exports to Britain
1.0
1.3
Britain's exports to Hong Kong
Hong Kong's imports from Britain
4.0
3.5
China's imports from Hong Kong
Hong Kong's exports to China
0.9
14.3
China's exports to Hong Kong
Hong Kong's imports from China
IO.O
14.4
Sources: U.K. - Annual Statement.
H.K. - Annual Abstract for British Commonwealth, No.70.
China - calculated from Tables 2-3, 2-4, 2-9, 2-10.
Table 2-12
Lead/lag conversion for U.K. - Hong Kong trade
EXPORTS "V5 of current year plus l/g of preceding year
IMPORTS ~Vg of current year plus 1/6 of following year
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Compilation errors
Errors of commission (smuggling,17 declaration of false values, etc.)
and errors of omission occasioned by the Japanese invasion would pre¬
sumably have seriously affected the reliability of Chinese statistics in
1938. Hong Kong, having a frontier with China, was no doubt far more
susceptible to smuggling than Britain - smuggling probably being a function
of differential price, proximity and accessibility. It should also be
noted that smuggling would only cause a discrepancy if the commodity is
reported at one country's customs but not at the other. For 1938 then,it
would seem fair to place the statistics in ascending order of reliability:
China, Hong Kong, Britain.18
17
"...there are difficulties arising from the fact that smuggled goods
are, of course, not included in the trade statistics. The pre-war Chinese
statistics were notoriously subject to this omission, and the Chinese
Government from 1903 on attempted estimates of the amount of unrecorded
smuggled goods. The estimates were based on the amount of trade with
China recorded in the statistics of other countries." International
Trade Statistics, pp.409-410. Also:
"Contraband trade can now be assumed to be negligible in most -
though not all - of the economically developed countries, but a thriving
trade in smuggled goods is carried on in some of the more backward
countries. The recorded trade statistics for 1948 of China, Iraq,
Uruguay,and Bolivia, for example, should be increased by approximately










The figures for China also include an allowance for the under-valuation
of trade in the official statistics." International Trade Statistics,
p. 40.
It should perhaps be remembered that Britain introduced smuggling
into Sino-British trade with the opium trade, the import of which was
banned by China. On the other hand, before the Commutation Act of
1784, which cut the tax on tea, there was a profitable (European) trade




Currency conversion is a problem at the best of times but at times
of rapid currency deterioration the difficulties become intractable. The
United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (1950, Note to
Table 2-3) gives correction factors for converting from official to market
rates of exchange of 44 per cent for 1938 and 166 per cent for 1939. Its
predecessor, the League of Nations International Statistical Yearbook,
whilst giving the same basic figures for China's imports in those years
(1938: 886 million Chinese National Dollars; 1939: CN$ 1,334 million),
suggests correction factors of 48 per cent and 197 per cent. Moreover,
even if the official exchange rates were realistic, using the mean rate
for the year will only give an accurate conversion if both the change in
exchange rate and the flow of trade have been constant or moving in
unison. If, for instance, the exchange rate had been CN$ .2900 to US$
for the first eleven months of 1938 but had slumped to .1316 in December,
the mean rate would be .2108, but if, as would be likely, the bulk of
the trade had taken place at the old rate, then the quoted imports from
Britain, CN$ 70.35 converted at CN$ 1 - US$ .29, £1 - US$ 4.9, would be
worth £4.2 million, which corresponds with the British figure for exports
to China. With such uncertainties in the exchange rates, the Chinese
figures must clearly be treated with great caution.
Recording leads and lags
Exports are recorded at time of exit and imports at time of entry. If
between these two recordings there is, as in the case of Sino-British
20
trade, a sea journey of up to two months then the same commodity appears
in the exporting country's customs statistics some two months earlier
19
See Earl Hicks, "Exchange Conversion", chapter six of International
Trade Statistics.
20
This is the lead/lag time for China/Western Europe given by The
People's Republic of China: an Economic Assessment, a compendium of
papers submitted to the Congress of the United States, Joint Economic
Committee, 18th May, 1972 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1972),
p.363. The pre-war times would presumably be about the same.
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(hence perhaps in the previous 'year') than in the importing country's
records. There is, in addition, a further complication if the date of
import/export is entered as the date when the customs papers reach the
central statistical compilation point rather than the date of customs
21
processing at the port. This problem is obviously exacerbated in the
case of a large country like China, especially if the documents are not
sent to the compiling centre until all formalities have been completed.
It may be, then, that there is a further substantial delay before imports
are registered, thus increasing the lag time by a variable and unquanti-
po
fiable amount. (The sea journey time would presumably be fairly constant,
and calculable, after differences in ships' speed and number of ports of
call had been averaged out, unless there were specific events, such as
dock strikes, which delayed loading or unloading.) On the other hand,
this delay between actual recording date and registering date would, in
the case of exports, cut down the lead time.
21
See Devons, Introduction to British Economic Statistics, p.142.
Cf. The position in post-Liberation China:
"The timing of the statistical report on commodity imports and
exports is specified as the time when the commodities are re¬
leased from customs. In China, to facilitate a speedy supply
of imported commodities for domestic needs, commodities are
released as soon as they are imported, so that material re¬
sources are never piled up. Therefore, the choice of the time
when commodities are released from customs as the time that
the statistics are recorded reflects the actual conditions of
commodity imports.
"For export commodities, the timing of the statistics-
recording is the date when the carrier vehicles are released
by customs for departure. For example, in ocean transport,
the date when the vessel is permitted by customs to leave
the port is the time that the statistics are recorded. Export
commodities should be loaded by this time. Under normal
circumstances, once a vessel is released by customs, it must
leave the port within 24 hours, without delay. Therefore,
the choice of the departure date as the time the statistics
are to be recorded also reflects the actual conditions of
commodity exports."
Ch'en Chi-shih and Liu Po-nien, Tui-wai mao-i t'ung-chi-hsueh [Foreign
Trade Statistics] (Peking, Finance and Economics Publishing Co., 1958),
translated in Chinese Economic Studies, Vol.3, No.4 (Summer 1970), p.275.
This translation, which covers chapters nine to thirteen of the book,
is referred to hereafter as Ch'en and Liu.
International Trade Statistics, pp.23-24.
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Thus, here again, the Chinese statistics are subject to more un¬
certainty than the British and Hong Kong ones. It would seem safe to
assume that, because of their size and level of bureaucratic efficiency,
the registered dates of British and Hong Kong imports/exports virtually
correspond with the actual entry/exit dates and we need only consider a
constant lead/lag time of two months in either direction. It should be
remembered, however, that this two months is doubled when we look at
total trade; that is, British exports are two months 'ahead' of Hong Kong's
imports, but her imports are two months behind. This means, of course, that
we must adjust imports separately from exports, and in the opposite
direction (Table 2-12).
Problems of valuation
Valuation involves two different but related problems. The first arises
if the countries concerned use different methods of valuation. Ely and
21
Petruzzelli give four principal methods of valuation:-
1. F.O.B. (Free on board carrier) value in exporting
country.
2. Market value in exporting country.
3- C.I.F. (Cost, insurance and freight) in importing
country.
4. Market value in importing country.
Britain, as noted in chapter one, values imports c.i.f. and exports
f.o.b.; the Chinese figures are also valued on this basis. Although the
Hong Kong figures do not state the basis of valuation, it is presumed
that they follow the usual practice of imports c.i.f., exports f.o.b..
The essential difference between c.i.f. values and f.o.b. values is the
transportation cost - freight, insurance, loading, etc.. The usual
practice is to allow approximately 10 per cent for this transportation
cost but, as mentioned in chapter one, Kindleberger has pointed out that
"freight rates as a percentage of landed costs vary from 1 or 2 per cent
on normal manufactures and primary products of great value per pound
23International Trade Statistics, p.85.
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(like tin and nickel), to 20 per cent on bulky commodities such as grain,
and 40 to 50 per cent on cheap bulky commodities like coal."24 it is not
clear whether Kindleberger is including insurance here; if he is not, it
is likely that insurance, being sensitive to other factors such as risk
of spoilage or damage, fire risk, spillage risk, etc., would act as a
dampener to the sensitivity of freight and loading costs to the bulk/value
ratio. Even so, it would seem likely that the difference between c.i.f.
and f.o.b. will be greater for China's exports to Britain than for
Britain's exports to China, and in the case of (land) trade between China
and Hong Kong, c.i.f. and f.o.b. values are virtually the same.
With such a wide variation in the contribution of freight rates to
landed costs it is necessary to see if it is possible or practicable to
establish a differential bulk/value ratio between Britain's imports from
Hong Kong and China and her exports to those countries. Firstly, it should
be remembered that bulk is but one aspect, albeit probably on balance the
main one, of freight costs. Secondly, Customs records do not give us the
bulk of commodities but a simpler measure of quantity, usually weight.
Thirdly, we must be able to use commodity groups (classes up to 1962,
sections from 1963) rather than individual commodities, partly because
commodity groups will give coverage, but mainly because using separate
commodities would be inordinately complicated.
Thus, if we are going to be able practically to estimate the different
contribution of freight costs to imports and exports, we shall need two
things:-
1. A clear (and, hopefully, consistent) difference in
distribution of commodity groups between imports and
exports.
2. A clear (and, hopefully, consistent) difference in
weight/value ratio between commodity groups.
It is usual to divide trade into two dichotomies: food and raw materials
on the one hand and manufactured goods on the other. This has been done
for trade with Hong Kong (Fig. 2-4) aiid China (Fig.2-5) for selected years
24












































































































































































































































































































































over the period (Table 2-13). For both imports and exports the group
'miscellaneous' has been omitted, and exports do not include 'imported
merchandise' (that is, re-exports) because class totals are not always
given.
The change in the composition balance of Britain's trade with Hong
Kong over the years is quite unequivocal. Britain's exports have consistent¬
ly remained approximately 10 per cent food and raw materials and 90 per
cent manufactured goods. Imports, on the other hand, have shown a complete
reversal. In 1930 food and raw materials accounted for about 82 per cent
of Britain's imports from Hong Kong. Even in the thirties this proportion
dropped substantially, and by the sixties it is only a miniscule 2 to 3
per cent. Manufactured goods, of course, have an inverse movement. Thus,
by the sixties, virtually all of British trade with Hong Kong is in manu¬
factures. -
The composition movement in Sino-British trade is rather less clear-
cut. The position is clear enough in the thirties. Britain's imports
from China are principally food and raw materials, whilst a similar pro¬
portion of exports are manufactured goods. After the war, however, the
balance shifts. In 1955 the balance of imports, 78 per cent food and raw
materials to 22 per cent manufactures, is roughly that of the pre-war
years. But in 1962, largely due to Chinese sales of silver (£9.9 million,
43 per cent of Britain's imports from China in that year), the proportion
changes to 36:64. Incidentally, had Britain continued the pre-SITC usage
and excluded silver from the general schedule of commodity trade, this
apparent change in composition would not have taken place. By the late
sixties food and raw materials return to being the major part of imports,
but their preponderance is far less marked than in the thirties. Exports
display the same cyclical movement, but to an enhanced degree. Here again,
both at the beginning of the period and at the end, the balance is
definitely to one side, with some 90 per cent of Britain's exports to
China being manufactured goods. In the middle years, however, this balance
seems to be reversed. Again, the reason for this in these particular years
is easily discernible - large British exports of wool to China (wool tops
alone are £5 million in 1955).
This fluctuation in composition balance would be a nuisance, but not
an insurmountable one, if the second condition held. We might have to
calculate the balance for every year, or for small groups of years, but
if this balance were then a good measure of the weight/value ratio (which
we might then assume approximates the bulk/value ratio, which in turn
indicates the freight cost contribution to landed cost), then all would
be well. We would still have a reasonably simple method of estimating
the freight element. However, as Table 2-14 indicates, the difference
in prices between food and raw materials on the one hand and manufactured
goods on the other is not marked, at least in the late thirties. Indeed,
some of the highest prices recorded are raw materials such as fur skins,
silk and bristles; the first two are not so important, but bristles
accounted for over 8 per cent of Britain's imports from China in 1935 and
over 7 per cent in 1939. It does not seem worthwhile to do a detailed
weighting by the ninety-odd commodities given in Table 2-14 so a rough
weighting by commodity groups is shown in Table 2-15.
In conclusion, it seems best to settle for a straight 10 per cent
differential between c.i.f. and f.o.b. values when considering the four
trade flows between Britain on the one hand and China and Hong Kong on
the other; and to assume there is no c.i.f./f.o.b. difference in China's
trade with Hong Kong.
There still remains a further problem with valuation: how 'realistic'
are the reported values? It was pointed out in chapter one that where
there is no duty payable,25 or where the duty is levied by quantity, there
is little inducement either for traders to be careful to report accurate
figures or for Customs officials to check them. If there is no export duty
in one country, but an import duty in the other, the exporter may have an
understanding with the importer to understate the value of the commodity
to alleviate the latter's payment of duty. Indeed, in the case of multi¬
national companies the importer may be the exporter, which raises the
complication of transfer pricing.
In Hong Kong, duties are only levied on imports of liquor, tobacco,
hydrocarbon oils, table waters and methyl alcohol, while exports do not
attract duty. (Hong Kong Annual Report, 1959, p.54; 1968, p.40.) The
same position holds for Britain, although, of course, the coverage of
import duties is much wider.
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Table 2-14
Relative prices of commodity groups and imports/exports
LTcacU Rc>na k&ry ctr>cl Cir>< na , 1 3 b 1^3^ J
(unit value per cwt)
IMPORTS EXPORTS
HONG KONG j 1935 1939 aver¬age HONG KONG | 1935 1939 aver¬age
Class I: Food, drink & tobacco
£ £ £
Class I: Food , drink & tobacco
£ £ £
lard 2.04 1.40 1.72 cocoa preps. . 5.99 6.83 6.41
ginger 1.28 1.82 1.55 meat 9.83 6.07 7.95
Class II: Raw materials, etc. biscuits 8.45 8.79 8.62
confectionery 5.57 4.61 5.09
hides 3.10 3.45 3.28 other food 8.86 9.15 9.00
tungsten ores 5.94 10.9 8.42 tobacco .24.08 19.89 21.99
vegetable oils 2.92 5.58 4. 25 Class II: Raw materials, etc.
bristles 26.57 30.05 28.31
feathers 4.49 4.19 4. 34 coal 0.05 0.06 0.06
Average (I, II) 7.41 iron&stl.scrap 0.20 0.34 0.27
Class III: Manufactures
linseed oil 1.38 1.66 1.52
Average (I, II) 6.77
tin 11.14 10.60 IO.87 Class III: Manufactures
essential oils 11.70 15.77 13.74
mats & matting 1.32 1.72 1.52 ammonium sulp. 0.25 0.28 0.27
Average (III) 8. 71 dyes &dye-stuffs 8.56 12.18 10. 37
cotton yarns 13. 31 12.16 12.74
CHINA 1935 1939 aver¬age machinery 6.18 6.59 6. 39
Class I: Food, drink & tobacco
iron & steel 0.93 0.80 0.87
brass, etc. 5.85 5.09 5.47
tea 6.17 7.05 6.61 paper 2.51 2.51 2. 51
eggs,n.i.shell 2.37 3.06 2.72 pottery 1.12 0.75 0.94
feeding stuffsfor animals O. 30 0.46 0.38 artf.silk yarn 31.67
value
only 31.67
nuts u/a fruit 0.75 0.85 0.80 ships & boats 1.14 - 1.14
beans,nt.fresh 0.29 O. 30 0. 30 wlln.Swrstd.yns 15.94 26.72 21.33
peas,nt.fresh 0.55 0.50 0.53 Average (III) 8.52
poult/game,dead 3.53 3.11 3. 32
bladders^casing '14.77 15:68 15.2 3 CHINA 1935 1939 aver¬age
ginger 1.48 1.78 1.63 Class I: Food, drink & tobaccoOther" oreps .mad
with sugar
'
O. 80 0.52 O.66
Class II: Raw materials, etc.
biscuits 8.09 8.49 8.29
sugar 1.65 1.14 1.40
ctn/raw&linters 2.90 2.55 2.73 confectionery 4.17 4.49 4.33
cotton waste 1.43 1.20 1. 32 other preps,made wi th suoar 7.53 5.63 6.58
fur skins, und. 52.66 52.29 52.48 other sorts 9.27 7.77 8.52
hides 3.18 3.40 3.29 tobacco 24. 78 2.91a 13.85















ground nut oil 1.22 1.19 1.21
tung oil 2.98 4.54 3. 76
other vqt.oils 1.98 2.12 2.05
silk cocoons,et : 4.26 11.87 8.07
silk, raw 38.08 50.00 44.0_4
hemp & hemp tow 1.95 - 1.95
shp.&lambs wool 5.42 4.87 5.15
camels hair 5.42 13.59 9.51
mohair 4. 29 - 4.29
bristles 15.66 24.27 19.97
feathers 5.24 4.63 4.94
raw hair 3.15 7.50 5.33
Average (I, II) 7.52
EXPORTS 1935 1939


































antimony 2.35 2.39 2.37
tin 11.09 10.95 11.02
essential oils 10.89 15.05 12.97
fur skins,other
thsn r^VVhi h 16.13 34.75 25.44
plaitg.of straw 12.84 8.63 10. 74




















































& II CLASS III AVERAGE AVERAGE
IMPORTS




CHINA 7.52 10.64 8.07
EXPORTS
HONG KONG 6. 77 8.52 7.73
AVERAGE 7.56
CHINA 5.69 9.03 7.43
a larqe amount of unmanufactured, tobacco;1935 is mainly cigarettes.
Notes:-The commodities shown in this table are all the commodities re¬
ported in Vol.IV of the Annual Statement (ie,the principal commodities
traded) for which the weight is given. The 'averages' given here are
the unweighted arithmetical means;that is,no account is taken of the
quantities traded.
-A Z test on these import & export averages gives the following:


















Imports from Hong Kong
Classes I & II 7.41 33
Class III 00 -vj 67
8.28
Exports to Hong Kong
Classes I & II 6.77 12
Class III 8.52 88 8,32
Imports from China
Classes I & II 7.52 77
Class III 10.64 23 8.24
Exports to China
Classes I & II 5.69 5
Class III 9.03 95 8.86
Sources:
Column 1 - Table 2-14
Column 2 - mean of 1935 & 1939 percentages from Table 2-13
Table 2-16









1967 2,282 613 27
1968 2,429 550 23
1969 2 ,700 724 27
Total .... 7,411 1,887 Average 25
Source: Hong Kong External Trade
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In general,
Most countries impose Customs duties of imports and
many impose duties of one sort or another on exports. While
a specific rate of duty (a specified amount of duty for
each physical unit of weight, volume, etc,,) has obvious
advantages in administration, it also has obvious weaknesses
during periods of price changes. Duties are therefore fre¬
quently (an increasing frequency since World War II) re¬
lated directly to the value of the merchandise by means of
ad valorem rates calling for a certain percentage of the
value of the goods to be paid as duty. In addition, tariffs
sometimes provide that the rate of duty at either specific
or ad valorem rates is to be higher for merchandise falling
in higher value brackets.Since the government wishes to
maximize its revenue, or at least to prevent evasion of
duties through undervaluation, and since the trader wishes
to keep his duty payments at a minimum, the valuation
assumes major fiscal imoortance and statistical significance
07
is sometimes quite lost sight of. ' Since, in addition,
international trade is carried out by traders who are subject
to the laws of each other's country only to a limited extent,
and since the value of an article is frequently a difficult
thing to determine, there is obviously a wide area for under-
OQ
valuation by traders, or indeed, overvaluation by government„£,°
[emphasis added]
One way in which governments have attempted to solve this problem is
to set arbitrary 'official price' on the commodity:
Under this procedure the valuation is determined without
reference to cost, invoice, or other value information
pertaining to the individual transaction. Changes ""n the
official values in the pre-determined price lists may in
For instance during 1955-58, apart from a proportion of Commonwealth
goods entering free of duty, Chemicals attracted differing ad valorem
rates of 5, 7%, IO, 12%, 15, 162/3, 17%, 20, 25, 30, 33L/3 per cent.
(Annual Statement, 1958, Vol.11, Supplement, p.29).
27
cf. Ch'en and Liu, p.272: "Every capitalist firm wants to hide its
business secrets. Importers and exporters try their best to compete for
excessive profit. Customs personnel artfully engage in corruption for
personal benefit. All these tend to reduce the accuracy of the raw data
of customs statistics." [in capitalist countries]
Ely and Petruzzelli, International Trade Statistics, pp.88-89.
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fact actually represent changes in rates of duty rather
than changes in the market or other prices for the
product. The valuation assigned to a particular shipment
then becomes an administrative tool for duty collection
purposes, and statistical needs are given little or no
attention.^9
It will be recalled that in Britain the reported value is supposed to be
the 'open market' value, and the same is no doubt true for Hong Kong.
It is uncertain what the procedure was in pre-war China but under the
People's Republic:
The value of imports and exports in customs statistics
is determined on the basis of the actual prices of
commodities when they cross national boundaries - that
is, import prices are calculated c.i.f. and export prices
f.o.b.
The c.i.f. and f.o.b. commodity prices are based on
the actual figures in related documents such as contracts,
invoices, exchange settlement statements, bills of
freight, bills of lading, and insurance policies.^®
[emphasis added]
So here again we have an 'actual' or 'market' rather than an 'official'
value.
However, as Ely and Petruzzelli suggest:
Even in these nations [i.e., U.K. and U.S.A.], where
import values are not officially determined, there
may be an element of official valuation. The value as
determined by Customs may contain such an element to
the extent that the United Kingdom values imports subject
to ad valorem duties at open market values and to
the extent that the imported articles do not have a well-
organized domestic market.^
To this situation, where there is no established market price for the
commodity, we can probably add the case of transfer pricing between div¬
isions of multinational companies. Thus, where there is no 'open market
29
Ibid., p.29.
^°Ch'en and Liu, p.211. Sample contracts with the foreign trade cor¬
porations of the People's Republic are given in John E. Metcalf and Vembar
K. Ranganathan, China Trade Guide (First National City Bank, 1972).
31
Ely and Petruzzelli, International Trade Statistics, p.93.
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price' it is Customs and Excise which in fact determines de facto official
price. In the words of the Annual Statement: "...the value is normally...
for goods imported otherwise (than 'under a commercial contract of sale
negotiated in fully open market conditions') - the price that would have
32
been made under such a contract..."
Problems of accreditation
The fifth main reason for discrepancies between reported imports and
exports is mis-accreditation. The clearest example of this is the dis¬
crepancy between 'China's imports from Hong Kong' in 1938, £0.9 million,
and 'Hong Kong's exports to China' of £14.3 million. We have assumed that
the c.i.f./f.o.b. differential and lead/lag distortion are negligible,
and although Chinese trade statistics in 1938 must be considered very
dubious (Canton fell to the Japanese in October of that year), if they
have any credibility at all, the difference between them and the Hong
Kong records must be largely due to the entrepot nature of Sino-Hong Kong
trade in that period. It will be recalled that Hong Kong did not distinguish
between domestic exports and re-exports until 1959: it used the 'general'
system of recording trade. The 1938 figures, then, are a combination of
domestic exports and re-exports shown together as general exports. The
Chinese Customs, on the other hand, do seem to distinguish between imports
of Hong Kong products and imports from other countries that have come via
Hong Kong. The difference between China's imports from Hong Kong and Hong
Kong's general exports to China thus gives a rough (alas, very rough)
measure of Hong Kong's re-exports to China. The difference between 'China's
exports to Hong Kong' (£10m) and 'Hong Kong's imports from China' (£14.4m),
£4.4 million, however, is only 30 per cent of the colony's imports from the
mainland; and while this corresponds with the proportion obtaining in the
late sixties, when we have official Hong Kong figures (Table 2-16), it
seems, in the light of a Hong Kong estimate of the thirties which we will
discuss later, and in view of the trend in the change in Hong Kong's
pattern of trade, to understate the level of re-exports of Chinese origin
in 1938. Clearly there is a lag between imports and re-exports so the
Annual Statement, 1958, Vol.Ill, p.iv.
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proportions shown are not exact; however, the lag distortion will be
negligible over the three-year period. Unfortunately we do not have
figures for re-exports of Chinese goods before 1967, but we do have data
for total re-exports back to 1959, and these show a fairly constant 18
per cent of Hong Kong's imports being re-exported (Table 2-17). Moreover,
during the same period, the proportion of Hong Kong's general exports
(that is, the sum of domestic exports and re-exports) accounted for by
re-exports fell from 30 per cent to 20 per cent (Table 2-18).
This decline in the importance of the re-export trade, and the corres¬
ponding growth in importance of domestic exports is, of course, the prime
characteristic of Hong Kong's post-war economy. It was no coincidence
that by 1959 re-exports were distinguished from domestic exports for,
"In the last decade there has been a fundamental change in the pattern
of Hong Kong's economy. Industry, which prior to the Second World War
33
was of minor importance, has now assumed a predominant role." We will
return to the reasons for this transformation in a moment; here, we need
only consider its effect on Hong Kong's use of imports from China. As
Hong Kong's entrepot function declines, the proportion of imports from
China that is re-exported will drop and the proportion that is used for
domestic industry will increase. From Table 2-19 it will be seen that
China's share of Hong Kong's imports reached a peak in the late thirties,
when it was nearly twice the level of the late sixties. At first sight
it might seem that this high level of imports was occasioned by the surge
of refugees that flooded the colony during these years but, as Table 2-20,
Fig. 2-6, show, that whereas the population of Hong Kong increased con¬
siderably in 1938, it was in the previous year that imports, both total
and from China, leapt upwards. Imports from China grew by nearly £1.5
million during 1938 while general imports stayed relatively static,and
no doubt much of this increase of 12 per cent in Chinese imports was due
to the refugee influx, and therefore not re-exported. Moreover, since the
population increased by over a half during that year, no doubt the pro¬
portion of Chinese imports re-exported did drop, but not in inverse ratio
to the population growth.
33
Hong Kong Annual Report, 1959, p.62.
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Table 2-17






Year Imports Re-exports Proportion (%)
1959 4,949 995 20
I960 5,864 1,071 18
1961 5,970 991 17
1962 6,657 1,071 16
1963 7,417 1,160 16
1964 8,551 1,356 16
1965 8,965 1,503 17
1966 10,097 1,833 18
1967 lO,449 2,081 20
1968 12,472 2,142 17
1969 14,893 2,679 18
96,279 •--Tot il 16,881 Average 18
Source: Hong Kong Annual Report.
Table 2-18
Hong Kong's re-exports as proportion of General
HK$m
Exports
Year General Exports Re-exports Proportion (%)
1959 3,277 995 30
I960 3,938 1,071 27
1961 3,930 991 25
1962 4,387 1,070 24
1963 4,991 1,160 23
1964 5,784 1,356 23
1965 6, 530 1,503 23
1966 7,563 1,833 24
1967 8,781 2 ,081 24
1968 10,570 2,142 20
1969 13,197 2,679 20
• 72,948 ...Toi al...16,881 Average 23
Source: Hong Kong Annual Report
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Table 2--19
Hong Kong's Total Imports and Imports from China
'6r3 3 -
Imports from China Total Imports °L/0 f
Year
HK$m £m HK$m £m from China
1933 10.5 33.8 31
1934 11.0 31.3 35
1935 12.1 35.7 34
1936 9.6 28.6 34
1937 13.0 38.1 34
1938 14.4 38.2 38
1939 13.8 36.6 38
1946 20.2 57.7 35
1947 23.3 95.8 25
1948 431 26.9 2 ,078 129.9 21
1949 593 37.1 2,750 171.9 22
1950 783 48.9 3,788 236.8 21
1951 86 3 53.9 4,870 304.4 18
1952 830 51.9 3,780 236. 3 22
1953 857 53.6 3,873 242.1 22
1954 692 43.3 3,435 214.7 20
1955 898 56.1 3,719 232.4 24
1956 1,038 64.9 4,566 285.4 23
1957 1,131 70.7 5 ,150 321.9 22
1958 1,397 87.3 4,594 287.1 30
1959 1,034 64.6 4,949 309.3 21
I960 1,186 74.1 5,864 366.5 20
1961 • 1,028 64.3 5,970 373.0 17
1962 1,213 75.8 6,657 416.1 18
1963 1,487 92.9 7,412 463.3 20
1964 1,970 123.1 8,551 534.4 23
1965 2,322 145.1 8,965 560. 3 26
1966 2,769 173.1 10,097 631.1 27
1967 2,282 142.6 10,449 653.1 22
1968 2,429 153.1 12,472 786.0 20
1969 2 ,700 185.6 14,893 1,023.8 18
Sources: Conversion rates :*
1933-47; Statistical Abst.of the 1948-67: HK$16 - £1
British Commonwealth,No .70; 1948-67: 1968: U/12 @ HK$16 - £1;
H.K. Statistics,1947-67 ,-1967-68 : "Vl2 @ HKS14.55 - £1
H.K. Annual Report. 1969: HK$14 .55 - £1
Source: H.K. Annual Report. Note: U.N. Yearbook of International
Jrade Statistics,1951 gives imports from China in 1950 as HK$m858(£53.6
Presumably the figure given in H.K.Stats.1947-6/ is a revised,and more




1. During the late sixties, Hong Kong re-exported 25 per
cent of its imports from China.
2. By this time the proportion of re-exports to imports
had declined considerably.
3. More of Hong Kong's imports came from China in the
late thirties, and only part of this increase was due
to population growth.
It seems likely, therefore, that at least 30 per cent of Hong Kong's
imports from China in 1938 were re-exported, but that the actual pro¬
portion was probably much higher.
A comparison of Chinese and Hong Kong figures for 1938, then, does
seem to give a rough measure, at least in the case of trade into China.
The question arises, can a similar comparison of Hong Kong and British
statistics indicate how much of U.K.-Hong Kong trade is unrecorded
(entrepot) trade with third countries, more particularly, China?
Unfortunately, as Tables 2-21 to 2-25 indicate, there does not seem
to be any connection between the discrepancy between Hong Kong and British
figures and any probable movement of re-exports.
Table 2-21 deals with trade in the direction of Hong Kong; that is,
Hong Kong's imports from the United Kingdom, or, British exports to Hong
Kong. Hong Kong imports are given c.i.f. and accredited to "the country
of production"; British exports are f.o.b. by "country of consignment".
Since the Hong Kong figures classify by country of production only, the
exports of produce and manufactures of the United Kingdom are included;
that is, British re-exports of imported merchandise are excluded. 10 per
cent is deducted from the Hong Kong figures to allow for freight, etc.,
and the U.K. figures are adjusted on the assumption that ,there is a
two-month lag between the recording of exports at the U.K. port and their
arrival in Hong Kong. The formula used for this lag adjustment, taking
five-sixths of the current year and one-sixth of the previous year, is
based, of course, on an unrealistic assumption that the level of trade is
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Table 2-21
Hong Kong's Imports from U.K./U.K. Exports to Hong Kong
Year
1 O ■A 3 4 5 6 7
HONG KONG IMPORTS FROM UK UK EXPORTS TO HK Differ¬
ence (5-3
%
(6/3 ) . 100Reported Convertec iAdjusted Reported Adjustec
HK$m £m £m £m £m £m %
19 30 n. a. n .a. n. a. 4.4 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1931 - 4.1 3.7 4.4 4.4 0.7 19
1932 - 5.1 4.6 4.8 4.7 O.l 2
1933 - 3.5 3.2 3.2 3.5 0.3 9
1934 - 2.5 2.3 2.5 2.6 0.3 13
1935 - 2.3 2.1 2.4 2.4 0.3 14
1936 - 1.8 1.6 2.1 2.2 0.6 38
1937 - 2.9 2.6 3.4 3.2 0.6 23
1938 - 3.5 3.2 3.9 3.8 0.6 19
1939 - 2.5 2.3 2.8 3.0 O. 7 30
1946 - 2.7 2.4 6 .O n.a. n.a. n.a.
1947 - 10.2 9.2 12.7 11.6 2.4 26
1948 301 18.8 16.9 20.6 19.3 2.4 14
1949 388 24.2 21.8 27.9 26. 7 4.9 23
1950 405 25.3 22.8 27.8 27.8 5.0 22
1951 619 38.7 24.8 35.4 34.1 -0.7
- 2
1952 470 29.4 26.5 28.8 29.9 3.4 13
1953 474 29.6 26.6 27.0 27.3 O.l 3
1954 369 23.1 20. 8 23.8 24.3 3.5 17
1955 441 27.6 24.8 25.5 25.2 O. 4 2
1956 513 32.1 28.9 32.8 31.6 2.7 9
1957 667 41.7 37.5 36.3 35.7 -1.8 - 5
1958 531 33.2 29.9 30.6 31.6 1.7 6
1959 574 35.9 32.3 35.2 34.4 2.1 7
1960 664 41.5 37.4 39.8 39.0 1.6 4
1961 757 47.3 42.6 43.7 43.1 O. 5 1
1962 760 47.5 42.8 46.4 45.9 3.1 7
1963 860 53.8 48.4 52.5 51.5 3.1 6
1964 838 52.4 47.2 55.1 54.7 7.5 16
1965 962 60.1 54.1 65.0 63.3 9.2 17
1966 1,011 63.2 56.9 64.9 64.9 8.0 14
1967 984 61.5 55.4 61.0 61.6 6.2 11
1968 1,083 68.3 61.5 76. 3 73. 7 12.2 20
1 96.9 .1.201 . 82.5 74.. 3 87.1 85.3 11.0 15
Sources: Hong Kong - 1931-32 Statistical Abstract of British Empire*
1933-47 Statistical Abstract of the British Commonwealth, No.70, 1948-
69 U.N. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics; U.K. - Annual
Statement.
*Note - Hong Kong Custom's statistics were suspended between 1925& 30
For conversion rates see Table 2-19.
Adjustments: H.K. imports - less 10% c.i.f.
U.K. exports - 5/g current year plus */g preceding year.
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steady throughout the year. It might have been more satisfactory (but
disproportionately time consuming) to use the monthly figures: January
to October of the current year with November and December of the preceding
year.
The two sets of adjusted figures are compared and the differences,
both absolute and relative, computed. If the British figures include
goods which the Hong Kong Customs distinguish as entering for transit of
transshipment to third countries, then ideally the difference between the
two will display a plausible variation over time (that is, rising in the
late thirties and forties during times of disturbance in China) and
finally correspond with the figures for Hong Kong re-exports of goods of
U.K. origin in the late sixties, when these statistics begin to be
published.
At first the differences are promising. They rise during the thirties
both absolutely and, to some extent, relatively (the percentage differ¬
ence is not very accurate since the absolute figures are only taken to
the first decimal place), as might be expected. After the war the
difference rises again, in line with expectations, reaching a peak in
1950; but then during the fifties it displays a bewildering fluctuation
(Fig. 2-7) followed, in the sixties, by an undulating rise which ends up
considerably above the Hong Kong figures for re-exports of goods of U.K.
origin (Table 2-22). Since two years is not much to go on, Table 2-23 goes
beyond the chosen period up to 1973, but here again the difference does
34
not correspond with known re-exports.
Trade in the direction of the United Kingdom, that is Hong Kong exports/
U.K. imports, is slightly different, since Hong Kong distinguished re¬
exports by country of destination from 1959, which gives a spread of
eleven years to test correspondence between the difference and re-exports.
Again, as Table 2-24 shows, there is no correlation. Finally Table 2-25,
using this time a three-year moving average instead of an arbitrary lag
Because of conversion from US$ this table produces slightly
different results for 1968 and 1969.
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Difference between H.K. imports






Columns 1,3 and b - United Nations Handbook of International


















































































































































































































































Hong Kong Exports to U.K./U.K. Imports from Hong Kong
Comparison of Three-Year Moving Averages,1932-68
1 2 3 4 5
Year
Hong Kong U.K. Imports from H.K. Difference (3 - 1)
Exports
to U.K. 3 yr. m.a. less 12% absolute % of 3
3 yr. m.a. c. i . f .
£m %
1932 .272 . 302 .266 _ .006 - 2
1933 .340 .309 .272 - .068 -25
1934 .510 .413 .363 - .147 -41
1935 .686 .572 .503 - .183 -36
1936 .956 .741 .652 - .304 -47
1937 1.147 .884 .778 - .369 -47
1938 1.327 .935 .823 - .504 -61
1947 2.7 2.6 2.3 - .4 -17
1948 5.3 5.9 5.2 - .1 - 2
1949 8.0 9.2 8.1 .1 1
1950 10.9 12.1 10.7 - .2 - 2
1951 9.7 10.7 9.4 - .3 - 3
1952 8.7 9.5 8.4 - .3 *—
1953 7.6 8.4 7.4 - .2 - 3
1954 10.9 11.9 10.5 - .4 - 4
1955 14.6 15.8 13.9 - .7 - 5
1956 18.3 20.0 17.6 - .7 - 4
1957 21.4 23.5 20.7 - .7 - 3
1958 24.9 27.9 24.6 - .3 - 1
1959 30.5 34.4 30. 3 - .2 - 1
I960 35.0 40.4 35.6 .6 2
1961 40.7 47.5 41.8 1.1 3
1962 46.9 55.9 49. 2 2.3 5
1963 55.6 66.8 58.8 3.2 5
1964 59.2 71.9 63.3 4.1 7
1965 61.5 76.0 66.9 5.4 8
1966 64.7 79. 7 70.1 5.4 8
1967 75.3 94.7 83.3 8.0 10
1968 89.3 109.5 96.4 7.1 7
Sources: As Table 2-21.
Note: Column 2 retained imports up to 1964.
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adjustment, and deducting 12 per cent for c.i.f. instead of 10 per cent,
looks at the whole period from 1932 to 1968. As with Table 2-21, there is
considerable difference between the decades. In the thirties the British
figures are considerably, and increasingly, below the Hong Kong ones,
even without allowing for c.i.f.. After the war, the balance changes
(the c.i.f. adjustment delays this in column 4 until the end of the
fifties) and the U.K. figures become larger than the Hong Kong ones. We
seem to have come to a dead end.
China and Hong Kong: Comparison of Trends
There are many reasons for discrepancy between different country's
accounting of the same trade, so the failure of a comparison to reveal
one particular cause, concealed re-exports, is not unexpected, although
35
regrettable. An alternative approach is to compare Britain's trade
with Hong Kong with her trade with China, bearing in mind Hong Kong's
trade with China, her trade in general and Britain's total trade, and
making use of a Hong Kong estimate of the pattern of trade of the thirties.
Periodisation
Table 2-26 (Fig.2-9 for imports and Fig. 2-10 for exports, both on the
same scale for ease of comparison) presents a simple comparison of trade
with Hong Kong and China over the whole of the period. The most obvious
thing about both sets of figures is the change in relative importance to
British trade of the two countries. This change is most marked in the
case of imports where, in 1930, British imports from China were some
twenty times her imports from Hong Kong but, by the end of the sixties,
imports from Hong Kong are three times imports from China. Apart from
this dramatic reversal, it can be seen that (a) Hong Kong rises in
importance through the thirties (imports from China falling from 2475
per cent of Hong Kong's in 1930 to 578 per cent in 1939); (b) after the
war China initially takes the lead but slumps at the time of Liberation,




Britain's trade with China & Hong Kong
/ qr 30 - iq ^
Imports Exports
from from Ratio to to Ratio
Hong Kong China China/HK Hong Kong China China/HK
£m % £m %
1930 0.4 9.9 2475 4.5 8.7 193
1931 0.4 7.8 1950 4.5 8.0 178
1932 0.3 6.2 2067 4.9 7.9 161
1933 0.3 5.1 1700 3.3 6.4 194
1934 0.5 6.1 1220 2.6 6.6 254
19 35 O. 7 6.3 900 2.5 5.1 204
1936 0.8 7.6 950 2.2 5.8 264
1937 0.9 8.3 922 3.5 6.0 171
1938 1.0 6.4 640 4.0 4.2 105
1939 0.9 5.2 578 2.8 3.7 132
1946 0.4 2.7 675 6.1 7.9 130
1947 2.1 7.2 343 12.8 12.8 IOO
1948 5.5 8.2 149 20.7 8.7 42
1949 10.3 3.6 35 28.0 2.4 9
1950 12.1 10.3 85 28.1 3.6 13
1951 14.5 7.7 53 36.1 2.7 8
1952 6.4 3.0 47 29.0 4.6 16
1953 8.3 10.2 123 27.3 6.3 23
1954 11.1 9.0 81 24.1 6.9 29
1955 16.6 12.3 74 25.9 8.0 31
1956 20.2 12.6 62 33.1 10.8 33
1957 23.6 14.2 60 36.6 12.2 33
1958 27.1 18.5 68 31.0 27.2 88
1959 33.5 19.7 59 35.6 24.8 70
I960 43.0 24.8 58 40.2 32.1 80
1961 45.3 30.9 68 44.4 13.1 30
1962 54.8 23.2 42 47.0 8.6 18
1963 68.2 18.5 27 53.1 13. 3 25
1964 78.2 24.6 32 55.6 17.8 32
1965 70.2 29.7 42 65.6 25.8 39
1966 80.6 33.8 42 65.7 33.5 51
1967 89.5 29.6 33 62.4 38.8 62
1968 115.3 34.3 30 77.9 29.1 37
1969 125.4 37.7 30 88.6 54.7 62





whereas Hong Kong continues rising rapidly; (c) both countries are
affected by the mid-fifties depression (of prices) but Hong Kong's re¬
covery and growth soon outstrips China's.
In the case of exports the difference in importance to Britain of the
two markets is far less pronounced. After the war, exports to Hong Kong
catch up with those to China by 1947 and surpass them every year there¬
after. The difference between the two is boosted by the drop in exports
to China occasioned by the Civil War and the Korean embargo and again,
in the early sixties, during China's 'Bad Years'. It is clear that both
imports and exports can be divided into three periods:-
1. The thirties.
2. Civil War, Korean War and aftermath, 1946-58.
3- Late-fifties onwards.
Final period
The last period can be disposed of first because it does not concern
us here; by then Hong Kong's growth is secular and not dependent on the
China trade in the sense that it was previously. In 1952-53 it could still
be written: "The prosperity of Hong Kong depends on its entrepQt trade.
Though no separate records of its value can be kept, it probably repre¬
sents the bulk of the total imports and total exports of the colony."3®
By 1959, as we have already noted, Hong Kong had discovered it could
keep separate records and re-exports were distinguished for the first
time from domestic exports, to reveal that the latter were already twice
the value of re-exports (Table 2-18). For convenience (despite some
duplication), Hong Kong's trade with China, the United Kingdom, and her
total trade, is shown in sterling for the period 1933-69 in Tables 2-27
and 2-28. Estimates of China's total exports and imports are given in
Tables 2-29 and 2-30, and estimate of her trade with the West in Table
2-31. This distinction between total trade and trade with the West is
International Trade Statistics, p.348.
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Table 2 -27
Hong Kong's Imports ■fr, j 9 2> ^ -
Year Imports from U.K. Imports from China
Total
Imports
£m % £m % £m
1933 3.5 lo 10.5 31 33.8
1934 2.5 8 11.0 35 31.3
1935 2.3 7 12.1 34 35.7
1936 1.8 6 9.6 34 28.6
1937 2.9 8 13.0 34 38.1
1938 3.5 9 14.4 38 38.2
1939 2.5 7 13.8 38 36.6
1946 2.7 5 20.2 35 57.7
1947 lO.l 11 23.3 24 95.8
1948 18.8 15 26.9 21 129.9
1949 24.2 14 37.1 22 171.9
1950 25.3 11 48.9 21 236.8
1951 38.7 13 53.9 18 304.4
1952 29.4 12 51.9 22 236.3
1953 29.6 12 53.6 22 242.1
1954 23.1 11 43.3 20 214.7
1955 27.6 12 56.1 24 232.4
1956 32.1 11 64.9 23 285.4
1957 41.7 13 70.7 22 321.9
1958 33.2 12 87.3 30 287.1
1959 35.9 12 64.6 21 309.3
1960 41.5 11 74.1 20 366.5
1961 47.3 13 64.3 17 373.1
1962 47.5 11 75.8 18 416.1
1963 53.8 12 92.9 20 463.3
1964 52.4 10 123.1 23 534.4
1965 60.1 11 145.1 26 560.3
1966 63.2 io 173.1 27 631.1
1967 61.5 9 142.6 22 653.1
1968 68.3 9 153.1 20 786.0
1969 82.5 9 185.6 18 1023.8
Sources: As Table 2- 19.
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Table 2 -28
Hong Kong's Exports i q 3. "3 - I
(General exports, f.o.b. )
Year
Exports to U.K. Exports to China
Total
Exports
£ra % £m % £m
1933 .3 1 15.3 56 27.2
1934 .5 2 11.8 48 24.5
1935 .7 3 13.0 49 26.6
1936 .8 4 9.5 43 22.2
1937 1.3 5 11.8 41 28.9
1938 1.3 4 14.3 45 31.7
1939 1.4 4 5.6 17 32.9
1946 l.O 2 18.6 39 47.4
1947 2.4 3 16.4 22 75.3
1948 4.7 5 17.5 18 98.9
1949 8.7 6 36.5 25 144.9
1950 10.5 5 78.8 34 232.2
1951 13.4 5 lOO. 3 36 277.1
1952 5.2 3 32.5 20 181.2
1953 7.4 4 33.8 20 170.9
1954 lO.l 7 24.4 16 151.1
1955 15.7 10 11.4 7 158.4
1956 18.6 9 8.5 4 200.6
1957 21.1 11 7.7 4 188.5
1958 24.6 13 9.8 5 186.8
1959 28.9 14 7.1 4 204.9
I960 38.0 15 7.5 3 246.1
1961 38.0 16 6.2 3 245.6
1962 46.1 17 5.3 2 274.2
1963 56.7 18 4.4 1 311.9
1964 64.0 18 3.8 1 361.5
1965 56.8 14 4.5 1 408.1
1966 63.6 14 4.3 1 472.7
1967 73.6 13 3.0 1 548.8
1968 88.7 13 2.8 .4 666.1
1969 105.6 12 2.5 .3 907.0
Sources: As Table 2- 19.
120
Table 2-29
Estimates of China's exports, 1950-69
Year Estimate Average Estimate Average
Source $m $m. £m Source $m $m £m
1950
JEC 620 JEC 1,530
MA 699 1961 MA 1,531
SBTC 720 680 243 SBTC 1,320
1951




SBTC 740 817 292 MA 1,534
1952
JEC 875 SBTC . 1,262
MA 940 U 1,525 1,462 522
SBTC 810 875 313 JEC 1,570
1953
JEC 1,040 1963 MA 1,557
MA 1,099 SBTC 1,464





MA 1,197 MA 1,812
SBTC 1,140 1,132 404 SBTC 1,672
1955




SBTC 1,378 1,393 497 MA 1,809
1956
JEC 1,635 SBTC 1,854
MA 1,691 U 1,955
SBTC 1,883 CA 1,853 1,901 679




JEC 1,615 MA 2,105
MA 1,651 SBTC 2,170
SBTC 1,584 U 2,245
U 1,595 CA 2,016 2,149 768
c 2,280 1,745 623
1967
JEC 1,945
JEC 1,940 MA 1,863
1958 MA 1,973 SBTC 1,915
SBTC 1,890 U 1,890





MA 2,253 SBTC 1,890
SBTC 2,150 U 1,860





MA 2,009 SBTC 2 ,020
SBTC 1,930 U 2,060
U 1,945 FETD 2 ,000 2,028 845
K 1,980 1,965 702
Sources: See list of Abbreviations
Conversion rates: 1950-66 $2.80=£1; 1967 $2.75; 1968-9 $2.40
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Table 2-30
Estimates of China's Imports, 1950-69
Year
Estimate Average Year Es timate Average
Sm $m £m $m $m £m
JEC 590 JEC 1,495
1950 MA 854 1961 MA 1,370
SBTC 742 729 260 SBTC 1,230
JEC 1,120 U 1,495 1,398 499
1951 MA 1,035 JEC 1,150
SBTC 1,055 1,070 382 1962 MA 1,075
JEC 1,015 | SBTC 940
1952 MA 989 U 1,150 1,079 385
SBTC 1,100 1,035 370 1 JEC 1,200
JEC 1,255 1963 MA 1,139
1953 MA 1,188 SBTC 1,046
SBTC 1,304 1,249 446 U 1,200 1,146 409
JEC 1,290 JEC 1,470
1954 MA 1,301 1964 I MA 1,392
SBTC 1,250 1,280 457 SBTC 1,243
JEC 1,660 U 1,475 1.395 498
1955 MA 1,307 JEC 1,845
SBTC 1,724 1,564 559 1965 MA 1,756
JEC 1,485 SBTC 1,690
1956 MA 1,446 U 1,740
SBTC 1,520 1,484 530 CA 1,690 1,744 623
JEC 1,440 JEC 2 ,035
1957 MA 1,407 1966 MA 1,902
SBTC 1,450 SBTC 2,035
U 1,730 1,507 538 U 2 ,045
JEC 1,825 CA 1,717 1,947 695
1958 MA 1,861 JEC 1,950
SBTC 1,800 1967 . MA 1,774
U 1,825 1,828 653 SBTC 1,945
JEC 2 ,060 U 1,920
1959 MA 2 ,036 CA 1,586 1,835 667
SBTC 2 ,050 JEC 1,820
17 2 ,060 2 .052 733 1968 SBTC 1,820
JEC 2,030 U 1,760
1960 MA 1 ,926 CA 1,499 1,725 719
SBTC 1,840 JEC 1,830
U 2,030 1969 SBTC 1,835
K 1,980 1,961 loo U 1,825
FETD 1,880 1,843 768
Sources and conversion rates as Table 2-29.
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Table 2-31
China's trade with the West, 1950-69
Year
Exports to West Imports from West
US$m £m US$m £m
1950 410 146 450 161
1951 315 113 605 216
1952 270 96 305 109
1953. 370 132 370 132
1954 295 105 320 114
1955 425 152 360 129
1956 590 211 475 170
1957 530 189 560 200
1958 660 236 725 259
1959 615 220 695 248
I960 625 223 745 266
1961 560 20O 775 277
1962 605 216 660 236
1963 755 270 770 275
1964 1,040 371 1,080 386
1965 1,385 495 1,330 475
1966 1,625 580 1,530 546
1967 1,460 530 1,605 584
1968 1,445 602 1,480 617
1969 1,540 642 1,535 J 640
Source: JEC, p.343, converted at rates shown in Table 2-29.
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most important because of the dramatic changes in the direction of China's
trade over the period (Fig.2-11, JEC estimate). It must be stressed that
these estimates of China's trade are subject to a fair degree of un¬
certainty since they are all constructed from the returns of trade
partners, and we have already seen in the case of Hong Kong-British
trade how hazardous that can be.
Finally, Table 2-32 (Figs. 2-12, 2-13) shows Hong Kong's share of
China's trade with the world, and with the West. The general pattern
over the period is for Hong Kong's share of both imports and exports to
rise as China suffers invasion and civil war, and then to fall back as
peace is restored. In the case of exports, the reversion is to the mid-
thirties level, which is due to the large proportion of foodstuffs. Most
of Hong Kong's foodstuffs have to be imported and in 1968, for instance,
this accounted for 20 per cent of all imports, and 49 per cent of these
37
foodstuffs came from China. A rough breakdown of Hong Kong's imports
from China in 1968 shows this predominance of foodstuffs (Table 2-33).
The percentage of Hong Kong's imports of foodstuffs coming from China
increased from 41 per cent in 1959 to 49 per cent in 1968 (Table 2-34),
while these foodstuffs remained a constant proportion of imports from
China (49 per cent in 1959 against 50 per cent in 1968), although their
actual growth in value was 138 per cent. Population, on the other hand,
only increased 35 per cent during the decade; that is, Hong Kong's
demand for foodstuffs, whether for consumption or for processing, was
considerably greater than population growth but matched total growth in
imports.
During the period 1959-69 Hong Kong's share of China's exports to the
West stayed relatively steady, around 30 per cent, while her share of
total exports roughly doubled. The picture is somewhat complicated by
the surge of exports to Hong Kong in 1957 and 1958 caused by good harvests,
followed by slump after 1959. This seems to suggest that exports to Hong
Kong were more sensitive to the harvest and economy than the average. This
is probably.true in view of the importance of foodstuffs, much of which
37




Hong Kong's share of China's trade i 9
Year
China's Exports China's Imports










1948 n. a. n.a.
1949 n.a. n.a.
1950 20 34 30 49
1951 19 48 26 46
1952 17 54 9 30
1953 14 41 8 26
1954 11 41 5 21
1955 11 37 2 9
1956 10 31 1.6 5
1957 11 37 1.4 4
1958 13 37 1.5 4
1959 8 29 l.O 3
1960 11 33 1.1 3
1961 12 32 1.2 2
1962 15 35 1.4 2
1963 17 34 1.1 1.6
1964 20 33 .8 l.O
1965 21 29 .7 .9
1966 23 30 .6 .8
1967 21 27 .5 .5
1968 23 25 .4 .5
1969 22 29 .3 .4
Sources: Calculated from Tables 2-27 to 2-31.
Note: Percentages under 2% have been taken to the first decimal
point to show Hong Kong's declining share even though the un¬




















Composition of Hong Kong's imports from China, 1968
HK$m %





FRUIT AND VEGETABLES 261
CEREALS AND CEREAL PREPARATIONS 167
MEAT AND MEAT PREPARATIONS 165
FISH AND FISH PREPARATIONS 150




TEXTILE YARNS, FABRICS &
MADE-UP ARTICLES 430 18
MISCELLANEOUS MANUFACTURED ARTICLES, NES 127 5
CRUDE ANIMAL &
VEGETABLE MATERIALS 88 4
CLOTHING 87 4
Source: Hong Kong Annual Report, 1968, pp.56-57, 327.
Table 2-34
Hong Kong's Population & Imports of Foodstuffs, 1959 & 1968
1959 1968










FOODSTUFFS FROM CHINA AS % OF:-
TOTAL IMPORTS FROM CHINA 49% 50%
TOTAL IMPORTS OF FOODSTUFFS 41% 49%
POPULATION OF HONG KONG 2. 9m 3. 9m
Source: Hong Kong Annual Report, 1959 & 1968.
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must come from limited catchment area, but it is also this high degree
of localism which presumably causes exports to Hong Kong to be out of
phase with the general movement of exports (Fig. 2-14) and which
exacerbates the swings in Hong Kong's share of exports.
The movement of Hong Kong's share of China's imports is quite clear-
cut and incontrovertibly shows not merely the demise of Hong Kong's
general exports to China but, without doubt, her re-exports in particular.
By 1955 Hong Kong only provided 2 per cent of China's imports, and whilst
this still represented a substantial part of Hong Kong's exports, by 1959
even this was no longer so. Whilst we do not have a breakdown into
domestic exports/re-exports prior to 1959, there is no doubt that the
overwhelming part of Hong Kong's general exports to China were re-exports.
From Table 2-35 it can be seen that, whilst domestic exports fluctuate,
the trend is fairly horizontal; re-exports on the other hand display an
unmistakable decline. If we presume, as seems reasonable to do, that
this level of domestic exports roughly obtained in the fifties, then all
but a thin layer at the base of the pinnacle in Fig. 2-FSt will be re¬
exports .
Taken together, this data on Sino-Hong Kong trade shows that by the
late fifties, "The traditional entrepot trade in the exchange of China
produce against the manufactures and chemicals of Europe has given way to
an inter-Asia trade through Hong Kong."^® And even in the 'inter-Asian'
aspect of Hong Kong's trade the importance of China diminished. Domestic
imports to China had been negligible in 1959, although she was still the
third largest market for re-exports; by 1968 Japan had overtaken China as
principal supplier to Hong Kong and China had fallen to sixteen on the
re-exports table.
The Pre-War years
The second period to consider is the pre-war one, and specifically the
years 1935-39 when the Japanese invasion dislocates China's trade and we




might expect an increased role for Hong Kong. The relevant figures and
indexes for this period are presented in Tables 2-36 and 2-37. Indexes
for eastwards trade are plotted in Fig.2-16 and indexes for westwards
trade in Fig.2-17. Figs.2-20 and 2-22 show Britain's exports and imports
respectively, while Fig.2-21 plots Hong Kong's trade, both imports and
exports.
Eastwards-trade (Fig.2—16).— Britain's total exports (line A, Table 2-36)
show a rise to 1937 and a fall thereafter, while China's total imports
(line B, Table 2-36) fall until 1938 and then rise rapidly in 1939.
However, it must be remembered that these Chinese figures are dubious and
1939 is especially affected by the uncertainties of currency conversion.
Lines D and F are of course different versions of the same trade and,
whilst there are differences in the absolute figures, as we have already
discussed, their movements are, as one would expect, much the same. Line
E, Hong Kong's exports to China, and line C, Britain's exports to China,
are not the same; rather, the opposite, in that they display an inverse
movement. As Britain's exports rise in 1936, Hong Kong's fall, but by
1938 the position is reversed with Hong Kong's exports up to 110
(Table 2-37) and Britain's down to 82 (Table 2-36). Exports to China
from both countries fall in 1939, Britain's less so than Hong Kong's.
This apparently greater resilience of British exports is probably an
optical illusion caused by recording lag. If we presume that exports
were bunched in the earlier part of the year, then a two-month recording
lag will bolster Britain's exports as against Hong Kong's. (If the
trade had been rising the reverse would have happened.) The relative
movements of lines C and E suggest there is a degree of inverse relation¬
ship between exports of the two countries to China. This supposition is
reinforced by the similarity between line E and lines F and D. Thus it
seems likely that in 1936 more British exports to China went direct,
but that by 1938 there had been a shift towards more re-export trade via
Hong Kong. However, this inverse relationship may also be due to com¬
petition between Britain and Hong Kong as entrepot for other countries.
That is, Britain's exports of widgets to China may have suffered from
Hong Kong's re-exports of German or Japanese widgets.
Moreover, the inverse relationship is not the only one. We must also






A:BRITAIN'S TOTAL IMPORTS B:BRITAIN'S IMPORTS FROM CHINA
£m INDEX £m INDEX
1935 757 100 6.3 100
1936 847 112 7.6 121
1937 1,028 136 8.3 132
1938 920 122 6.4 102
1939 885 117 5.2 83
Year
C BRITAIN'S IMPORTS FROM H.K. D:CHINA'S TOTAL EXPORTS
£m INDEX £m INDEX
1935 O. 7 1O0 47 100
1936 O. 8 114 57 121
1937 0.9 129 73 155
1938 1.0 143 35 75
1939 0.9 129 27 58
Year
E:BRITAIN'S TOTAL EXPORTS F:BRITAIN'S EXPORTS TO CHINA
£m INDEX £m INDEX
1935 481 loo 5.1 100
1936 502 104 5.8 114
1937 596 124 6.0 118
1938 532 111 4.2 82
1939 485 lOl 3.7 73
G:BRITAIN'S EXPORTS TO H.K. H:CHINA'S TOTAL IMPORTS
Year
£m INDEX £m INDEX
1935 2.5 lOO 69 lOO
1936 2.2 88 57 83
1937 3.5 140 57 83
1938 4.0 160 54 78
1939 2.8 112 94 136
Sources: British figures - Annual Statement of Trade of U.K.
Chinese figures - U.N.Yearbook of Internat'1.Trade Statistics,1950.
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Table 2-37
Indexes & Percentages of Hong Kong's Trade with U.K. & China,1935-9
Year
A:IMPORTS FROM U.K. B:IMPORTS FROM CHINA
£m INDEX £m INDEX
1935 2.3 loo 12.1 100
1936 1.8 79 9.6 80
1937 2.9 123 13.0 108
1938 3.5 149 14.4 120
1939 2.5 105 13.8 114
Year
C:TOTAL IMPORTS D:TOTAL EXPORTS
£m INDEX £m INDEX
1935 35.7 lOO 26.6 100
1936 28.6 80 22.2 84
1937 38.1 107 28.9 109
1938 38.2 107 31.7 119
1939 36.6 102 32.9 124
Year
E:EXPORTS TO U.K. F:EXPORTS TO CHINA
£m INDEX £m INDEX
1935 0.7 lOO 13.0 lOO
1936 O. 8 114 9.5 73
1937 1.3 174 11.8 91
1938 1.3 178 14.3 HO
1939 1.4 187 5.6 43
GrPERCENTAGE OF TOTAL IMPORTS H:PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPORTS
from U.K. from China to U.K. to China
1935 7 34 3 49
1936 6 34 4 43
1937 8 34 5 41
1938 9 38 4 45
1939 7 38 4 17
Source: Statistical Abstract for the British Commonwealth, No.70,




in the sense that China's demand for widgets might be such that both
Britain's direct exports and re-exports through Hong Kong may rise, or
fall; alternatively, both China and Hong Kong may be secular markets for
British widgets. The commodities shown in Table 2-38, Figs.2-18 and
2-19, display these possible explanations.
Drugs, beer, and (between 1935 and 1936) spirits,linseed oil and
confectionery as well suggest an inverse relationship, whilst arms, iron
and steel scrap until 1938 move in unison, as do spirits, linseed oil and
confectionery after 1936. It is to be expected that diverse commodities
will be more unambiguous in their particular movements and more ambiguous
in their totality to the degree that the extraneous pressure is less
pronounced. This will be clearer when we look at the post-war period,
when the influence of political forces is stronger and individual commo¬
dities move more in unison with each other and the general trend.
In Fig.2-20 we can see again how British exports to China and Hong Kong
move together through the thirties until 1937-38 when there is a clear
shift towards Hong Kong. Looking at this from the viewpoint of Hong Kong
in Fig.2-21 we see that Hong Kong's exports to China parallel her total
exports (and being such a large part of them do much to determine them)
until 1939, when exports to China slump while total exports continue to
rise strongly. Again, as we have seen in Fig.2-16, imports from Britain
move in the same direction as exports to China until 1939, but here we
can also see that these imports from Britain match the movement of total
exports. This is to be expected, because Hong Kong's re-exports of
British goods did not merely go to China.
Westwards-trade (Fig.2-17)• " Britain's imports from China (C), China's
total exports (B) and Britain's total imports all display roughly the
same movement over the years 1935-39, rising to a peak in 1937 and falling
thereafter, although the China trade, partly because it is just smaller
but principally of course because of the Japanese invasion, shows a much
greater decline. In 1939, Britain's total imports are still above the 1935
level, while imports from China have fallen to 83 per cent of 1935 and
China's exports in general have slumped to nearly half their level of five
years previously. Again, lines D, Britain's imports from Hong Kong, and
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Table 2-38
British exports of selected commodities to China & Hong Kong,
1935-9
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
Beer
China 10.0 4.7 2.2 1.4 .9
Hong Kong 16.2 15.9 15.0 17.8 19.3
Spirits, Home-made
China 64.8 43.1 46.2 52.7 72.7
Hong Kong 59.5 58.5 71.4 68.8 87.2
Confectionery
China 4.9 4.5 2.2 3.1 1.5
Hong Kong 5.5 4.5 6.5 8.5 5.8
Iron & Steel Scrap
China 31.2 37.6 46.3 8.7 19.6
Hong Kong 12.3 6.8 10.3 7.5 2.0
Linseed Oil
China 12.1 4.6 5.1 6.0 2.1
Hong Kong 11.1 6.6 6.4 6.3 4.8
Drugs, Medicines & Medicinal Preparations
China 67.7 63.7 55.8 40.6 44.1
Hong Kong 28.9 32.9 42.7 46.6 49.6
Arms, Ammunition & Military and Naval Stores
China 83.1 141.9 155.0 284.2 1.9
Hong Kong 15.9 12.0 15.8 219.5 55.3






F, Hong Kong's exports to Britain, are different records of the same
trade. In 1936 Hong Kong's imports from China drop, while both its exports
to Britain and Britain's direct imports from China rise. In 1937 there
is a general rise, but again in 1938 the lines diverge, with Britain's
imports from China falling while her imports from Hong Kong and Hong
Kong's imports from China continue to rise. In 1939 Hong Kong's exports
to Britain rise while Britain's imports from the colony fall, but this
divergence is again probably due to bunching and time lag; in any case
the physical discrepancy, some £70,000 in either direction, is not large.
Apart from this, both Hong Kong's and Britain's imports from China drop
in that year in line with the general fall in China's exports. It would
appear that Hong Kong's re-exports of Chinese goods to Britain rose in
1938 and 1939, but it must be remembered that the level of trade from
Hong Kong to Britain was very low before the war compared with Britain's
direct imports from China, so the effect would have been slight (Fig.
2-22).
Quantification:- Hong Kong's pre-war trade was composed of four parts
1 . Domestic imports and exports
2. Chinese external entrepot trade
3. Chinese coastal entrepot trade
k. Non-Chinese entrepSt trade
Whilst the Hong Kong trade returns do not distinguish between these four
components, a government report of 1938 estimated that, prior to July
1937:
One third of the imports into Hong Kong was of goods
intended for retention in Hong Kong, coming from
Chinese and non-Chinese countries in the proportion
of one to three; and a tenth or less of the exports
was of goods originating in Hong Kong (e.g. refined
sugar, rubber shoes, etc.). Re-exports constituted
two-thirds of the imports and nine-tenths of the exports.
Of them 10 per cent consisted of "Chinese coastal trade",
20 to 25 per cent consisted of non-Chinese entrepot trade
and the remainder, nearly 70 per cent, was made up of
goods passing between China and the rest of the world
via Hong Kong.39
39
"Extracts from Hong Kong Administration Reports, 1938" in
G.B. Endacott, An Eastern Entrepot (London, HMSO, 1964), p.186.
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On the other hand, Lennox A. Mills, writing in 1941, whilst agreeing
that re-exports comprised 90 per cent of exports, suggested that only
10 per cent of imports were retained for consumption or manufacture,
the other 90 per cent being re-exported.^® Although it is likely, as
Table 2-39 suggests, that the percentage of imports re-exported rose in
the latter years, it could not have been the same as the proportion of
re-exports to total exports, since imports were always considerably
larger than exports. In Table 2-39 we assume that the estimated 90 per
cent contribution of re-exports to total exports remains constant, and
ignore problems of valuation and lag, to calculate roughly the percentage
of imports that are re-exported. It is noteworthy that the average for
1931-36 is 69 per cent, which corresponds closely enough with the
government estimate of two-thirds, and that the average for 1937-39 rises
to 78 per cent.
It seems, then, that the 1938 government report estimate for the
pre-1937 proportions is at least internally consistent. However, these
estimates cover trade with all countries, and whilst Britain and China,
accounting as they do for the bulk of the trade, are unlikely to deviate
too much from the average (had they done so the report would have
mentioned it), there will be differences in the proportion of their trade
composed of re-exports. Thus, it is to be expected that a larger pro¬
portion of imports from China would be retained for consumption and
manufactures than would be from Britain, and this must influence our
estimate.
It will be recalled that Hong Kong trade statistics were discontinued
between 1925 and 1930, so 1931 is the first full year for which we have
Hong Kong figures. In addition there are at times quite considerable
discrepancies between different (official) sources of Hong Kong data
during this period, amounting at one time to £700,000.^ Part of the
reason for this was the fluctuation of the Hong Kong dollar, caused
largely by the variation in the price of silver to which it was tied until









as % of imports
£m Era Em
1931 28.4 25.6 38.7 66
1932 31.2 28.1 41.3 68
1933 27.2 >4.5 33.8 73







1937 28.9 26.0 38.1 68
1938 31.7 28.5 38.2 75
1939 32.9 29.6 36.6 81
Sources: Statistical Abstract of British Empire;subsequently .
British Commonwealth
Table 2-41
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Em Em Of10
1931 16.761 15.442 109
1932 5.858 18.509 32
1933 2.980 15.311 20
1934 1.991 11.759 17
1935 1.506 13.004 12
1936 1.064 9.476 11
1937 1.138 11.751 io
1938 1.082 14.270 8




So far we have a reasonably acceptable estimate of the re-export/
residual proportions of Hong Kong's imports and exports up to July 1937
(or 1936, since we are only dealing in full years). At that time, the
Report continues:
The latter half of the year 1937 shewed, in spite of the
general decline in China's trade, a considerable increase
in the proportion of that trade passing through Hong Kong.
The proportion of China's imports credited to Kowloon in¬
creased from 3% in July, 1937 to 45% in January, 1938. The
proportion of China's exports returned as going to Hong
Kong increased from 12% in July, 1937, to 41.3% in
January, 1938. At the same time the absolute amount of
Hong Kong's trade with China also increased.
This state of affairs with regard to the Colony's
China trade, accompanied by a steady increase in general
trade, continued during the first three quarters of 1938.
In October of that year an abrupt downward movement in all
trading figures was shewn as the Japanese extended their
operations to South China. As a result of the military
occupation of Canton and the closure of the Pearl River
the normal trade routes between the Colony and the South
China delta regions were almost entirely disrupted, and
at the close of the year there were no signs of any early
appreciable resumption of the South China trade. In the
first nine months of 1938 the import, and export trade with
South China averaged $70.9 millions [£4.43m at 16 HK$ to
the pound] in each quarter. In the final quarter of the
year the total was $32.6 millions [£2.04m].
In terms of the analysis of Hong Kong's trade before
the Sino-Japanese hostilities, given above, the position
at the end of the year was that, though categories (a)
(domestic imports and exports) and (d) (non-Chinese
entrep8t trade) were only indirectly affected, categories
(b) (Chinese external entrepot trade) and (c) (Chinese
coastal trade) had, with the exception of air transport
and minor attempts at avoiding the Japanese blockade of
the Pearl River delta, come to a virtual standstill.42
42
See: "Report of the Currency Committee, July 14, 1930: Hong Kong
Sessional Papers 1930", Document No.38 in Endacott, Eastern Entrepot, .
pp.222-233; G.B. Endacott, A History of Hong Kong (Oxford University
Press, 1958), pp.291-292; Mills, British Rule in Eastern Asia, p.541 and
pp.451-452.
Quoted in Endacott, An Eastern Entrepot, p.187.
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This passage requires some comment. Firstly, it is difficult to
reconcile the percentage in paragraph one with either Chinese or Hong
Kong statistics. These statistics are shown in Table 2-40. It will be
noted that the Chinese figures do not correspond with the United Nations
statistics (which also claim to be official Chinese customs figures)
given in Tables 2-3, 2-4, 2-9 and 2-10: the import figures are reasonably
close, but the exports diverge wildly (c.f. chapter one). That apart, it
is notable that, while the Hong Kong figures for imports and exports are
roughly in balance, the Chinese figures show exports to Hong Kong
several times greater than imports from the colony. It will be remembered
that it was earlier suggested that the discrepancy between Chinese
figures for imports from Hong Kong and Hong Kong figures for exports to
China might well be principally due to Chinese customs only recording
as imports from Hong Kong the colony's domestic exports. Bearing in
mind the 1938 Hong Kong Government report's estimate that 90 per cent
of recorded exports were re-exports, this would seem to explain the
discrepancy, as Table 2-41 indicates.
If both sets of figures are reasonably accurate, this would seem to
suggest that in 1931 the Chinese customs did not differentiate between
Hong Kong's domestic exports and re-exports (the figures for that year
are described as "net figures") but thereafter they did. Moreover, the
proportion of re-exports to domestic exports increases from 1932 to 1938,
from roughly 70 per cent to 90 per cent, which does not tally with the
report's estimate of 90 per cent "prior to July,1937". Furthermore, whilst
the statement that "The proportion of China's exports returned as going
to Hong Kong increased from 12% in July, 1937, to 41.3% in January, 1938."
is compatible with yearly percentages of 19.4 for 1937 and 31.9 for 1938,
if we presume that the monthly percentages rose from July to January and
then fell some time thereafter, it is impossible to reconcile the earlier
statement that "The proportion of China's imports credited to Kowloon
increased from 3% in July, 1937 to 45% in January, 1938." with either
Chinese or Hong Kong statistics, unless we presume that the 3 per cent
refers to Hong Kong's domestic exports while the 45 per cent covers the
colony's general exports to China. If this supposition is correct, then
China's imports of Hong Kong's general exports will have risen from 30
per cent in July to 45 per cent in January, which is much more plausible.
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Table 2-40a
China's total trade & trade with Hong Kong, 1930-9
Imports Exports Total Total % of trade with
from U.K. to H.K. Imports Exports Hong Kong
Value in thousands of Haikwan taels Imports Exports
19 30 218.370 158,018 1,328,232 894,844 1(5.9
1931 218,170+ 148,312+ n.a. n.a. 15.7
1932 60,474 75,666 1,062,617 492,989 5.7 15.4
Value in Standard Dollars
1933 48,287 120.955 1,359 612,293 3.6 19.8
1934 29,639 101,001 1,038,979 545,733 2.9 18.9
1935 20,359 94,893 924,695 576,298 2.2 16.5
1936 17,755 106,547 944,523 706,791 1.9 15.1
19 37 19,078 162,904 956,234 838,797 2.0 19.4
1938 24,589 243,395 89 3, 500 763,732 2.8 31.9
19 39 35,416 222,099 1,343,018 1,030,498 2.6 21.6
+net fiaures. n,a.: not available.
Source: Chinese Maritime Customs, quoted in G.B. Endacott, An Eastern
Entrepot p.192.
Table 2-40b
China 's total trade & trade with Hong Kong, 1930--9
£m
CHINA HONG KONG
Imports Exports Total Total Exports Imports
from H.K. to H.K. Imports Exports to China from China
19 30 20.643 14.938 125.559 84.591 n.a. n.a.
19 31 16.761+ 11.394+ n.a. n.a. 15.442 10.492
1932 5.858 7.330 102.941 47.758 18.509 11.245
1933 2.980 7.465 83.874 37.790 15.311 10.468
19 34 1.991 6.786 69.806 36.666 11.759 11.026
1935 1.506 7.018 68.389 42.622 13.004 12.075
1936 1,064 6.382 56.573 42.334 9.476 9.621
1937 1.138 9.715 57.025 50.022 11.751 13.042
1938 1.082 10.712 39.323 33.612 14.270 14.427
19 39 .885 5.553 33.576 25.759 5.556 13.747
Sources: Chinese figures as Table 2-40, converted at rates shown there-
in; Hong Kong figures, Statistical Abstract of British Empire (sub¬
sequently, ....British Commonwealth), various years.
+net figures. n.a.: not available
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Secondly, the statement that by the end of 1938 Hong Kong's China
trade had "come to a virtual standstill" seems to be an exaggeration.
The Japanese capture of Canton in October 1938, and with it the inter¬
diction of the Kowloon-Canton-Hankow railway, the "main artery" of Hong
Kong-South China trade, certainly dealt a blow to trade (which dropped
from an average of £4.43m each way in the first three quarters to a
total of £2.04ra for the final quarter) but it did not kill it off entirely:
It survived, however, to an extent not generally
realized, for a large part of the trade which had passed
through Canton was diverted to the South China ports of
Swatow, Wenchow and Ningpo. By feverish efforts the
Chinese linked them by road and railways with the lines
still in their hands. It has been estimated that 80 per
cent of the munitions which passed through Hong Kong on
their way to China were German, while the other sources
of supply were Italy, Belgium, the United States and
the United Kingdom - a topsy turvy situation, when
Japan's associates armed her enemy and Chiang Kai-shek's
well-wishers, the United States and Great Britain,
provided Japan with the bulk of her military raw
materials, [cf. Table 2-38, Fig.2-17]
In the summer of 1939 the Japanese occupied or
mined the principal ports of South China and very
greatly cut down the trade of Hong Kong. The merchants
of the Colony promptly opened up alternative routes
and still contrived to retain an important though
unknown percentage of the trade. A large part of the
munitions landed at Hong Kong were transshipped to
Haiphcag in French Indo-China and thence by railway
to Yunnan; and shipments were increased to Portuguese
Macao and the French leased port of Kwong Chow Wan.
A flourishing smuggling trade was also built up, the
junks being manned by the former pirates. Cargoes of
arms, kerosene, etc. were landed at fishing villages
or empty beaches and vanished into the interior,
while the junks brought back tea and other products
of China, Japan could not stop the traffic by imposing
a blockade since she had not declared war and, more
important, Great Britain and the United States re¬
fused to agree with it. The alternative was to
blockade Macao and the other ports by land and to
place detachments at every fishing village and
stretch of unoccupied beach in South China. This
meant a large number of small and isolated garrisons,
a risky move when the Japanese controlled only as
much of Kwantung Province as came within the range
of their guns. Owing to the Chinese scorched-earth
policy the troops could not live off the country
and would have to receive all supplies from the
Japanese bases. This meant a very large number of
convoys and small detachments on lines of communi-
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cation which in the aggregate would lock up far more
troops than they could spare. The shipment of arms
through Hong Kong finally ceased in January, 1940.
This description of the trade continuing, albeit at a lower level,
seems to be borne out by both Chinese and Hong Kong statistics, unreliable
as they must be considered (Table 2-42, Fig.2-23). It is interesting to
compare the movements of these two sets of figures. Exports to Hong
Kong drop by half while imports from China, that is theoretically the
same trade, fall only slightly, and for Chinese imports/Hong Kong exports
the situation is reversed. Mills, in a continuation of the passage quoted
above, may give a clue to this discrepancy:
The present situation [presumably 1940] is that the
Japanese have ruined the South China trade for everyone,
including themselves. The capture of Canton and the
closing of the river, cut Hong Kong's principal means
of communication with the interior. Only Japanese goods
are sold in the ruined city which, however, has a
population of about 25,000 in place of its former
1,500,000. Most of them are coolies with very little
to spend, since all the well-to-do Chinese fled.
Upriver from Canton are Chiang Kai-shek's troops, who
do not allow Japanese goods to pass inland. ...The
Hong Kong dollar is no longer widely used in Kwangtung
Province: in the unoccupied areas the currency is the
Kwangtung dollar, and in Canton and the towns where
there is a Japanese garrison the Chinese are forced
to accept military yen, an inconvertible, fiat
currency.^5 [emphasis added]
It seems likely that, initially, the Japanese advance affected movement
/ess
of goods from China mixta than movement from Hong Kong into China; by
the end of 1939, the trade in both directions was "ruined".
Estimate of Hong Kong's re-exports of Chinese goods to Britain:- It is
assumed that between 1931 and 1936 two-thirds of Hong Kong's imports
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Mills, British Rule in Eastern Asia, pp.476-477. The China Handbook,
1937-1943 notes that: "Because of the war, the center of the tea export
trade was transferred from Shanghai to Hong Kong. The British Crown
Colony became the chief transit market of tea either for cash export or
for the fulfilment of barter agreements." The proportion of China's
exports of tea going to Hong Kong increased rapidly - 1936: 5 per cent,
1937: 9 per cent, 1938: 53 per cent, 1939: 60 per cent, 1940 (January -





were re-exported and 10 per cent of these went to (North) China (column 2,
Table 2-43). The percentage that these re-exports outside of China com¬
prise of total exports other than to China is calculated in column 4. It
is presumed that these proportions hold for exports to Britain, and the
amounts of re-exports of Chinese origin and 'residual exports' are cal¬
culated from both Hong Kong and British statistics in columns 5 to 8. It
is then presumed that the amount of residual exports followed the 1931-35
trend during 1937-39; that is, most of the increase in imports from
China was re-exported.^® 1936 is omitted from the trend because the slump
in imports from China in that year would distort the trend. The trend
of residual exports is extrapolated to 1937-39 with the difference between
reported Hong Kong exports (Table 2-44) and British imports (Table 2-45)
and the trend being the estimate of re-exports of Chinese goods. Finally,
these estimates are brought together and averaged in Table 2-46. The
process is illustrated by Fig.2-24, using the Hong Kong statistics.
Estimate of Hong Kong's re-exports of British goods to China:- It is
presumed that the report's estimate that two-thirds of imports are re¬
exported holds true for non-Chinese imports until the end of the decade.
This gives column 2 of Table 2-47. It is also assumed that the estimates
of the composition of exports also held until 1938 and, faute de mieux,
this estimate is applied to 1939 as well. This gives us, in column 4, an
estimate of re-exports of non-Chinese origin to China. Column 5 then
gives us the proportion of re-exports of non-Chinese goods into China to
the total of re-exports of all non-Chinese goods.
The average percentage for 1931-36 is 71, which corresponds with the
report's estimate of 70 per cent. The percentages are applied to the
're-exported element' (that is, two-thirds) of British trade into Hong
Kong (both Hong Kong and British figures) and the two estimates averaged
in column 12.
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There is a difference of opinion on the course of Hong Kong's
domestic exports. Endacott ( A History of Hong Kong , p.293) implies that
their importance was increasing, but Mills (British Rule, pp.453-458)
does not; in fact, Mills makes the unfortunate prediction that: "it
seems clear that industry will always be of subsidiary importance in

















































































































Estimate of Hong Kong's re-exports of goods
of Chinese origin to Britain, 1937-9
Linear trend of exports of non-China origin to U.K., 1931-35:
Yt = 90 & 53Xt where Yt is £'000, Xt years
1 2 3








1937 408 1288 880
1938 461 1312 851
1939 514 1381 867
*Linear extrapolation of Table 2-43, Column 6.
Table 2-45




Linear trend of Britain's imports from Hong Kong of goods of
non-China origin, 1931-35:







origin (2 - lj)
1937 330 935 605
19 38 363 1002 639
1939 396 944 548
*Linear extrapolation of Table 2-43, Column 8.
Table 2-46
g's re-exports of Chinese goods to
Britain, 1931-9
£'000
Estimate of Hong Kon
Hong Kong figures British figures Rounded average
1931 131 195 160
1932 120 128 120
1933 163 147 160
1934 247 217 230
1935 392 373 380
1936 377 338 360
1937 880 604 740
1938 851 638 750
1939 867 547 710












































































































































































































Post War to late fifties
This third period marks the transformation of Hong Kong's economy from
an entrepot with a minor manufacturing sector to a manufacturing centre
with a subsidiary entrepQt sector. In respect of China the change is even
more pronounced; by the late fifties Hong Kong was no longer a "transit
centre" for "China's trade", as the Currency Committee had described it
in 1930,47 and the China trade passing through the colony was fairly small
beer for both countries.
The transformation of the Hong Kong economy was very much the result
of the transformation of China itself, and yet the connection between the
two was a paradoxical one. It is perhaps commonly supposed that the
Communist victory in the civil war imperilled Hong Kong; it is more likely
that Liberation saved the colony. It is often argued that Hong Kong is
the last bastion of laissez-faire in the world - "John Stuart Mill's
Other Island", where there is "absolute freedom of trade"4® - and yet its
post-war development (let alone its creation) is very much the result of
intervention by governments.
At the end of the war "it was by no means certain that British rule in
Hong Kong would be restored".49 But British authority was re-imposed, and
the Japanese surrender received by a British admiral against the protests
of Chiang Kai-shek." Not merely were there fears of a Chinese take-over,
there were more fundamental doubts about its ability to survive economical
in the post-war world. "The problem was to maintain Hong Kong as a viable
community, now that the forces which had brought it into existence and
5*1
nourished it for nearly a century were passing away."
47
Quoted in Endacott, An Eastern Entrepot, p.221.
A 0
Henry Smith, John Stuart Mill's Other Island, A Study of the
Economic Development of Hong Kong (London, Institute of Economic Affairs,
1966)
49






Hong Kong had to a large extend thrived on China's troubles, ^ and
if China were now united and peaceful, and under a government which was
intent on wiping out the unequal treaties, then there would be little
future for the small entrepot on the south coast. The advantages it
offered trade - a fine harbour, bunkering, insurance facilities, etc. -
might help stem the tide, but trade would naturally (with perhaps a
little help from Nanking) flow instead to Shanghai, Tientsin, Darien,
Nanking, Canton and so on. With Britain no longer a power of importance
on the China coast, and the United States keen to dismember the European
empires, it would not be too fanciful to envisage Chiang Kai-shek
squeezing Hong Kong, economically and politically, out of existence.
The civil war and the communist victory changed all this. Already by
1947 "Chinese industrialists and capitalists, especially from Shanghai,
had started to move themselves and their money into Hong Kong."5^ In the
next few years this influx of refugees, and capital, became a flood. One
estimate has Hong Kong's population rising from 600,000 in August 1945
to 1,800,000 at the end of 1947, and 2,360,000 by the end of 1950.54
Whilst there were border incidents when the People's Liberation Army
arrived on the borders and there have been times of great stress sub¬
sequently, it is likely that, in the end, a Communist government was
less liable either to want, or to be able, to take over Hong Kong than
its Nationalist predecessor.
Economically, the immediate effect of the civil war and Liberation
was to boost Hong Kong's China trade. Then China "leaned to one side" in
trade as well as international relations, and the direction of trade
swung to the East (Fig.2-11). The new regime's attempts to 'organise*
the bourgeoisie also affected trade. The 'Five Anti Campaign' (against
bribery, avoiding taxes, stealing of state property, poor work using bad
materials and theft of state economic information) of early 1952 brought:
52
As an entrepQt for the China trade it had, of course, also suffered
when China's trade declined.
53Hong Kong Annual Report, 1957, quoted by Smith, John Stuart Mill's
Other Island, p.18.
54
Hong Kong Annual Report, 1959, p.77.
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"Private trade and commercial activities in China's large cities...to
almost a complete halt during the peak of the campaign, and as a
consequence Hong Kong's trade with the mainland dropped from $HK148
million in December 1951 to HK$68 million in March.""
Meanwhile,in May 1951,the United Nations adopted the American-sponsored
5 6
embargo on 'strategic' trade with China. On top of this, the United
States had its own Battle Act which, in addition, banned "American
economic aid to foreign countries shipping designated strategic goods to
Communist China".57
The embargo "fell with particular weight on Hong Kong, which was
regarded almost as part of China for this purpose.The result of all
this was a dramatic slump in Hong Kong's trade. There were, however,
other results, one of which was that Hong Kong stepped into the place,
in the U.S. and other markets, vacated by China. This was especially
so for textiles which, being additionally helped by restrictions on
Japanese imports into the United States, rapidly became Hong Kong's
leading industry. But Hong Kong's exports to the United States had to
be proven to be of 'non-Communist Chinese origin' and so, "certification
of the origin of the products which it sells has become increasingly a
CQ
matter of importance." This certification was not needed only for the
American market and is, in fact, a development of the pre-war attempts
to verify Hong Kong's exports qualification for Imperial (subsequently
Commonwealth) Preference
Doak Barnett, Communist China: The Early Years, 1949-55 (London,
Pall Mall, 1964), p.136.
56
T.J. Hughes and D.E.T. Luard, The Economic Development of Communist
China, 1949-58 (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1959),
p.124.
-^Mah Feng-hua, The Foreign Trade of Mainland China (Edinburgh
University Press, 1972), p.21.
^^Endacott, A History of Hong Kong, p.305.
59
Hong Kong Annual Report, 1959, p.77.
^°See Mills, British Rule, p.454, for pre-war certification.
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Thus, Hong Kong's economy was forced into a new mold by exterior
political forces and policies - laissez faire within a dirigiste frame¬
work, with most of the dirigisme coming paradoxically from the United
States and its policy of hostility towards the new Chinese regime.
The movement of Hong Kong's trade over the whole of the post-war
period (1946-1969) with reference to China is presented in Figs.2-25
to 2-27. The data for these graphs is to be found in Tables 2-27 and
2-28. In Fig.2-25 imports from China and total imports move fairly much
in unison: imports from China are a significant and reasonably constant
proportion of total imports (the actual percentages are given in
Table 2-27) irrespective of whether Hong Kong re-exports or consumes
these imports. The situation is quite different for exports (Fig.2-26),
where the civil war/Liberation boom in exports to China is very pronounced;
and, as pointed out earlier, this means re-exports to China. Fig.2-27
plots total exports with (when the data becomes available) re-exports
and re-exports of China origin; but as we know, it is the earlier period
for which the data is not available that is the interesting one.
Figs.2-28 to 2-32 concentrate on this earlier period. Figs.2-28 and
2-29 again show the proportion of China trade in Hong Kong's total trade;
the boom in exports to China against the constant, or rather slightly
increasing, proportion of imports. (The space between the 'Total' and
'Rest of World' lines shows the China element.) Fig.2-30 again illustrates
that exports to China during the boom were in fact re-exports - today's
re-exports are yesterday's imports. No such connection is evident from
Fig.2-31, which is to be expected, since we know that during this period
there is a shift in the Hong Kong economy away from re-exporting imports
from China to consuming and manufacturing them. Nevertheless, we will
attempt in the next section to identify when this shift takes place, and
to estimate the value of re-exports of China origin to Britain.
Trade from China:- In Appendix I we look at some commodities imported
into Britain from China and Hong Kong which indicate the movement of
re-exports of China origin through Hong Kong. The general impression
gained from comparing the import of these commodities from China and







that is, when imports direct from China fell during the civil war and early
post-Liberation years, imports from Hong Kong rose, strongly suggesting
a movement of Chinese produce through Hong Kong. The general procedure
was to take commodities for which imports from China were considerably
more than imports from Hong Kong in the pre-war period (that is, 1935-39),
but for which imports from Hong Kong rose significantly during the boom
years. Often the relative position of the two countries reverted to the
pre-war one by the late fifties, indicating that the transit trade
through Hong Kong was a transitory phenomenon occasioned by the unsettled
conditions in China. Other commodities, however, do not revert, and
China appears to lose the British market to Hong Kong. This may merely
mean that China is not exporting that particular commodity any more, or
that she is exporting it elsewhere. On other occasions imports from both
countries increase or decline. In brief, the general thrust of the com¬
parison is a temporary surge of re-exports of China origin through Hong
Kong, but that each of the commodities displays different characteristics
and is looked at individually.
Quantification:- Fig.2-32 plots Britain's total imports and imports from
China and Hong Kong for the crucial years 1946 to 1958. There is a
definite surge in Hong Kong imports but no clearly discernible, counter¬
balancing, dip in imports from China. This is partly due to the rise in.
1950, but it is also probably due to the shift in China's direction of
trade which suppressed exports to Britain during the fifties.
Hong Kong's domestic exports are officially distinguished from 1959
fil
(HK$ 2,282m), and there is an estimate of HK$ 864 million for 1954.
Fitting a log curve through these two figures we get a trend for domestic
exports (column 1, Table 2-48). Domestic exports to China ran at an annual
average of HK$10m frail 1959 to 1969 (Table 2-35) and it seems reasonable
to apply this average to the earlier period to give, in column 2, the
trend of domestic exports other than to China. Subtracting this from
total exports other than to China (column 3) we get, in column 4, an
estimate of Hong Kong's re-exports other than to China, which is then
61
Smith, John Stuart Mill's Other Island, p.15.
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compared to imports other than from China to give, in column 6, the
relationship between imports and re-exports which (if we presume that
there is no longer any China coastal trade through Hong Kong) excludes
trade with China. It will be noticed that the percentages for 1947 to
1950 and, to a lesser degree, to 1952 correspond with the pre-war
estimate that two-thirds of imports were re-exported.
The next question to be asked is whether Hong Kong's China trade
followed the same pattern as her non-China trade. Table 2-49 compares
the relationship between imports and re-exports for China and 'non-China'
from 1967 to 1969 when the figures become available. It can be seen that
the relationship is higher for China but not exceedingly so. The
'non-China' percentages from Table 2-48 are then applied to imports from
China in Table 2-50 to give an estimate of Hong Kong's re-exports of
China origin (column 3).
There is a further problem of the increase in Hong Kong's population,
which might be presumed to especially affect imports from China because
of the high proportion of foodstuffs. An estimate of population growth
is therefore tested against the derived estimate of retained imports
from China, and it can be seen that this latter estimate comfortably
copes with the population increase (columns 4 to 6).
We now need to estimate the mix of domestic exports/re-exports to
Britain during these years. Table 2-51 calculates Britain's share of
Hong Kong's general exports (that is, domestic plus re-exports) from
1946 to 1969, Two things stand out. Firstly, there is a rise during the
Liberation period which is probably caused, in part at least, by an
increase in re-exports of China origin. Secondly, there is a rapid rise
after the 1952 slump to a distinctly new level. It would seem likely that
this leap is caused by the rapid expansion of domestic exports to Britain
attracted by Commonwealth Preference, The timing of this presumed growth
in domestic exports corresponds, it will be noted, with the estimate in
column 2 of Table 2-48. The supposition that there was an above-average
growth of domestic exports to Britain is borne out by Tables 2-52 and
2-53 which show that by 1959, and thereafter, Hong Kong's re-exports to




Estimated relationship between Hong Kong's
(non-China) imports and re-exports,1946-59






























1946 182 172 460 288 600 48
1947 222 212 950 738 1,168 63
1948 269 259 1,302 1,043 1,647 63
1949 327 317 1,734 1,417 2,157 66
1950 39 7 387 2,456 2,069 3 ,005 69
1951 482 472 2,829 2,357 4 ,007 59
1952 586 576 2,379 1,803 2,950 61
1953 711 701 2,194 1,493 3,016 50
1954* 864 854 2 ,026 1,172 2,743 43
1955 1,049 1,039 2,351 1,312 2,821 47
1956 1,274 1,264 3 ,074 1,810 3,528 51
1957 1,547 1,537 2,893 1,356 4,019 34
1958 1,879 1,869 2,833 . 964 3,197 30
1959** 2,282 2,272 3,162 890 3,915 23
Sources: 1946 - Statistical Abstract of the British Commonwealth,
No..70, converted from sterling @ HK$16 to the pound.
1947-67 - Hong Kong Government, Hong Kong Statistics,1947-67.
1967-9 - Hong Kong Annual Report.
Note: The trend for domestic exports is log Yt = 2.2601 & 0.0846Xt




Hong Kong: Proportion of re-exports to imports ^




















HK$m % HK$m %
1967 613 2,282 27 1,468 8,167 18
1968 550 2,429 23 1,592 10,043 16
1969 724 2, lOO 27 1,955 12,193 16
Source: Hong Kong External Trade.
Table 2-50
Estimate of Hong Kong's use of imports from China icfcpta-f <75°?



















HK$m % HK$m millions HK$m
1946 324 48 156 168 1.600 125
1947 382 63 241 141 1.800 141
1948 431 63 272 159 (1.830) 143
1949 593 66 391 202 1.860 146
1950 783 69 540 243 2.360 185
1951 863 59 509 354 (2.383) 187
1952 830 61 506 324 (2.405) 188
1953 857 50 429 428 (2.429) 190
1954 692 43 298 394 (2.452) 192
1955 898 47 422 476 (2.475) 194
1956 1,038 51 529 509 2.500 196
1957 1,131 34 385 746 (2.613) 205
1958 1,397 30 419 978 (2.733) 214
1959 1,034 23 238 796 2. 857 224 .
Sources: Trade figures - as Table 2-48.
Population:- 1946,1949,1956 - Hong Kong Annual Report,1959,p.3
/1947,1950 - Hong Kong Annual Report, 1968, p.279/1959 - Hong
Kong Annual Report, 1968, p.341.
Years in parentheses by log extrapolation. *78.3 per capita.
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Table 2-51
The proportion of Hong Kong's non-China general
exports going to Britain /
General exports






1946 460 16 3.5
1947 950 38 4.0
1948 1,302 75 5.8
1949 1,734 140 8.1
1950 2,456 168 6.8
1951 2,829 215 7.6
1952 2,379 83 3.5
1953 2,194 119 5.4
1954 2,026 162 8.0
1955 2,351 251 10.7
1956 3,074 298 9.7
1957 2,893 337 11.7
1958 2,833 393 13.9
1959 3,163 462 14.6
1960 3,818 608 15.9
1961 3,831 608 15.9
1962 4, 302 737 17.1
1963 4,921 907 18.4
1964 5,724 1,024 17.9
1965 6,-458 908 14.1
1966 7,494 1,017 13.6
1967 8,733 1,178 13.5
1968 10,525 1,407 13.4
1969 13,160 1,537 11.7
Source: As Table 2-59.
-15%
-10%
. 5%/ \ /
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Table 2-52









1959 889 23 2.6
1960 964 23 2.4
1961 900 19 2.1
1962 993 23 2.3
1963 1,098 43 3.9
1964 1,309 55 4.2
1965 1,449 47 3.2
1966 1,779 30 1.7
1967 2,039 31 1.5
1968 2,106 64 3.0
1969 2,649 72 2.7
Source: As Table 2-48
Table 2-53 Britain's share of Hong Kong's domestic exports









1959 2,274 439 19. 3
1960 2,854 585 20.5
1961 2,931 589 20.1
1962 3,309 714 21.6
1963 3,823 864 22.6
1964 4,415 968 21.9
1965 5 ,009 861 17.2
1966 5,715 987 17.3
1967 6,694 1,147 17.1
1968 8,419 1,343 16.0
1969 10,511 1,465 13.9
Source: As Table 2-48.
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It seems that 1952 is the turning point,and that from that year on
the proportion of re-exports remains fairly static while the proportion
of domestic exports expands to the level of the sixties. In Table 2-54,
therefore, we apply the average re-export proportion of the sixties,
2.7 per cent, to our earlier estimate of total re-exports other than to
China to give an estimate of re-exports to Britain from 1952 to 1958.
These re-exports are then subtracted from general exports to give an
estimate of domestic exports. It will be seen that the proportion of
domestic exports to Britain in column 6, plausibly, rises rapidly to
the sixties level.
We now take the derived proportion of domestic exports exported to
Britain in 1952, 5.9 per cent, and assume that this was constant from
1946 to 1951 (Table 2-55). Again it will be seen that the proportions
in column 6 correspond with the proportions for those years in Table
2-51.
Finally, in Table 2-56, these estimates are brought together and
converted into sterling. Column 5 indicates that these estimates are
plausible.
By the end of the sixties, as we have already seen, Hong Kong's
recorded re-exports of Chinese origin to Britain, HK$5.4 million
(£370,000), were quite negligible in terms of Hong Kong's total exports
to Britain (0.35 per cent) and Britain's imports from China (0.98 per
cent). Since Britain's share of Hong Kong's general exports during the
sixties is relatively stable compared with the preceding period, and the
same, we have argued, applies to the mix of re-exports/domestic exports,
it is arbitrarily assumed that the proportions obtaining at the end of
the decade shown in Table 2-57 held throughout the decade, and so the
resulting average proportion is simply applied to imports from China to
give a rough measure of re-exports of Chinese origin to Britain (Table
2-58), The estimate for 1969, HK$5.6 million, is very close to the
recorded figure of HK$5.4 million.
Trade towards China:- Because of the diffuseness of British exports to
China it is not practical to examine individual commodities as in
Appendix I. However, bearing in mind the huge surge in Hong Kong's
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Table 2-54
Hong Kong's domestic exports & re-exports to Britain, 1952-8























1952 1,803 49 83 34 576 5.9
1953 1,493 40 119 79 701 11.3
1954 1,172 32 162 130 854 15 .2
1955 1,312 35 251 216 1,039 20.1
1956 1,810 49 298 249 1,264 19.7
1957 1,356 37 337 300 1,537 19.5
1958 964 26 393 367 1,869 19.6
Source: See text.
Table 2-55
Hong Kong's domestic exports & re-exports to Britain,1946-51























1946 172 10 16 6 288 2.1
1947 212 13 38 25 738 3.4
1948 259 15 75 60 1,043 5.8
1949 317 19 140 121 1,417 8.5
19 50 387 23 168 145 2,069 7.0




Estimate of Hong Kong's re-exports of China origin
to Britain, 1946-58









HK$m % HK$m £m %
1946 156 2.08 3.25 .2 20
1947 241 3.39 8.17 .5 22
1948 272 5.66 15. 40 l.O 21
1949 391 8.54 33.39 2.1 24
1950 540 7.01 37.85 2.4 23
1951 509 7.93 40.36 2.5 19
1952 506 2.7 13.66 .9 17
1953 429 2.7 11.58 . 7 io
1954 298 2.7 8.05 .5 5
1955 422 2.7 11.39 . 7 5
1956 529 2.7 14.28 .9 5
1957 385 2.7 10. 40 .7 3
1958 419 2.7 11.31 .7 3
Conversion rate: HK$16 = £1/ *Proportion: Re-exports of China origin
as percentage of total Hong Kong exports to Britain.
Table 2-57
Hong Kong's re-exports of China origin to U.K. as
proportion of imports from China,1967-73














HK$m % HK$m %
1967 613 NS •? 2,282 27
1968 550 MS o 2,429 23
1969 724 5.40 .75 2,700 27
1970 688 6.45 .94 2,830 24
1971 759 5.85 .77 3,330 23
1972 983 7.45 .76 3,847 26
1973 1,589 13.07 .82 5,634 28
Average .... .81 Average... 25.4
Source: Hong Kong External Trade.
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general exports to China, the bulk of which was re-exports (see Fig.
2-26), it seems reasonable to assume that there was a significant move¬
ment of British goods through Hong Kong to China during the early part
of the period. This assumption is reinforced by comparing the relative
movements of Britain's exports to Hong Kong and China (Fig.2-10, Fig.
2-34). It would seem that there is an inverse relationship between 1948
and 1954 but thereafter there is a largely secular growth in Britain's
exports to Hong Kong,which fits in with our conclusions in the previous
section about the transformation of Hong Kong's trade.
In Table 2-59 we assume that British exports to Hong Kong and China
would have been in a straight line between 1948 and 1954 had it not been
for Hong Kong's re-exports of British goods to China (dotted lines in
Fig.2-34). It will be seen that the percentage deviations from the linear
trend for both countries mirror each other, indicating that there was an
inverse relationship during this period (Fig.2-35).
It is assumed in Table 2-60 that the proportion of British goods in
Hong Kong's re-exports to China is the same as the proportion of her
imports from Britain to total imports other than from China. The result¬
ing calculation for re-exports of British origin is shown in columns
5 and 6. How accurate is this assumption of proportionality? Returning
to Table 2-7 (column 2),we see that the estimate seriously overstates
re-exports of British origin for the years 1968, 1969, for which we
have official figures. This, however, does not necessarily invalidate
the assumption for the earlier, crucial, period up to the mid-fifties.
To test the estimate for these years, it is added to direct exports in
Table 2-61 to calculate the proportion of 'total' British imports in
China's imports from the West. Table 2-62 then shows Britain's direct
share of China's imports from the West over a wider span. This share
rises from 8 per cent in 1948 to 10 per cent at the end of the fifties.
Indeed, if we take the figure for China's total imports for 1947 in Table
2-3, £112 million, then Britain's direct exports to China in that year,
£12.8 million, are 11.5 per cent of what is virtually China's imports
from the West. In any case, a figure of seven to nine per cent for the
combination of direct and indirect exports seems plausible.
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Table 2-58













HK$m £m HK$m £m
1959 1,034 2.1 .1 1965 2,322 4.8 .3
I960 1,186 2.4 .2 1966 2,769 5.7 .4
1961 1,028 2.1 .1 1967 2,282 4.7 • 3
1962 1,213 2.5 .2 1968 2,429 5.0 .3
1963 1,487 3.1 .2 1969 2,700 5.6 . 4
1964 1,970 4.1 .3
Conversion rates as Table 2-19.
*Imports x 25.4% x 81%.
Table 2-59










1947 12.8 12.8 0 O
1948 8.7 12.0 -3.3 -27
1949 2.4 11.1 -8.7 -78
1950 3.6 10.3 -6.7 -65
1951 2.7 9.4 -6.7 -71
1952 4.6 8.6 -3.0 -47
1953 6.3 7.7 -1.4 -19
1954 6.9 6.9 O O
HONG KONG
1947 12.8 12.8 0 0
1948 20. 7 14.4 6.3 44
1949 28.0 16.0 11.0 75
1950 28.1 17.6 10.5 59
1951 36.1 19.3 16.8 87
1952 29.0 20.9 8.1 39
1953 27.3 22.5 4.8 21




Estimate of Hong Kong's re-exports of British origin to China








China0/T CHINA BRITAIN Britain
HK$m % HK$m £m
1946 600 44 7.3 288 21.1 1.3
1947 1,168 163 14.0 257 35.9 2.2
1948 1,647 301 18.3 271 49.5 3.1
1949 2,157 388 18.0 575 103.4 6.5
1950 3,005 405 13.5 1,250 168.5 10.5
1951 4 ,007 619 15.5 1,594 246.3 15.4
1952 2,950 470 15.9 510 81.2 5.1
1953 3,016 474 15.7 530 83.3 5.2
1954 2,743 369 13.5 381 51.3 3.2
1955 2,821 441 15.6 172 26.9 1.7
1956 3,528 513 14.5 126 18.3 1.2
1957 4,019 667 16.6 113 18.8 1.2
1958 3,197 531 16.6 146 24.3 1.5
1959 3,915 574 14.7 106 15.5 1.0
1960 4,678 664 14.2 107 15.2 l.O
1961 4,942 757 15.3 91 13.9 .9
1962 5,444 760 14.0 77 10.8 .7
1963 5,925 860 14.5 62 9.0 .6
1964 6,581 838 12.7 47 6.0 .4
1965 6,643 962 14.5 54 7.8 .5
1966 7,328 1,011 13.8 54 7.5 .5
1967 8,167 984 12.1 42 5.1 .3
1968 10,043 1,083 10.8 36 3.9 .2
1969 12,193 1,201 9.9 30 3.0 .2
Note: Re-exports to China prior to 1959 have been estimated by deduct¬
ing HKlOm (the average for domestic exports, 1959-69) from




Britain's 'total' exports to China as proportion of China's
















1950 3.69 10.5 14.1 161 8.8
1951 2.7 15.4 I—100rH 216 8.4
1952 4.6 5.1 9.7 109 8.9
1953 6.3 5.2 11.5 132 8.7
1954 6.9 3.2 10.1 114 8.9
1955 8.0 1.7 9.7 129 8.5
1956 10.8 1.2 12.0 170 7.1
1957 12.2 1.2 13.4 200 6.7
1958 27.2 1.5 28.7 259 11.08
Source: See text.
Table 2-62
Britain's share of China's imports from the West -(9^?
1938 7.9 1952 4.2 1958 10.5 1964 4.6
1947 6.9 1953 4.8 1959 lO.O 1965 5.4
1948 8.1 1954 6.1 I960 12.1 1966 6.1
1949 na 1955 6.2 1961 4.7 1967 6.7
1950 2.2 1956 6.4 ■ 1 96? 3.7 1968 4.7
1951 1.3 1957 6.1 196 3 4.9 1969 • 8.6
Sources:
1938, 1947, 1948: Calculated from figures in Yearbook of
International Trade Statistics, 1950 (N.Y., United Nations, 1951) .
[This covers total imports, but since imports from the 'Soviet Bloc'
were very small in these years, this is virtually the same as imports
from the West.]
Other years: Estimate of China's imports from the West (in US$) from
U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The People's Republic of
China: an Economic Assessment (Washington, 1972). British figures are
converted from sterling at the following rates:- 1950-66; 2.80/
1967; 2.75/ 1968, 1969; 2.40.
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The Genera] Perspective
Finally, Table 2-63 gathers together the estimates for the whole
period and calculates the proportion of presumed indirect trade through
Hong Kong to direct Sino-British trade, and Figs.2-36, 2-37 plot direct
and indirect trade via Hong Kong for the period.
This substantial, indeed at times quite massive, unreported
indirect trade via Hong Kong is intrinsically significant, of course,
but in the context of this study it is especially so. It is obviously
very important to be clear precisely what 'China' means in the British
statistics if we are going to extrapolate from them to China's trade
with the West in general. At the same time, it is vital to have a
fairly full and reliable picture of China's trade with Hong Kong since,
even when the indirect trade is discounted, she was, on average, the main
trading partner for most of the period under examination.
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Table 2-63
Britain's direct trade with China and estimated indirect trade
via Hong Kong -1 Cj
IMPORTS EXPORTS
Direct via H.K . % via HK Direct via H.K. % via HK
£m % £m %
1930 9.889 na na 8.660 2.090 24
1931 7.773 .160 2 7.973 1.900 24
1932 6.163 . 120 2 7.926 2.500 32
1933 5.095 . 160 3 6.413 1.820 28
1934 6.142 .230 4 6.593 1.170 18
1935 6.260 . 380 6 5.058 1.080 21
1936 7.618 . 360 5 5.836 0. 800 14
1937 8.249 . 740 9 5.976 1.210 20
1938 6.409 . 750 12 4.147 1.530 37
1939 5.147 . 710 14 3.655 0.520 14
1946 2.697 .2 7 7.856 1.3 17
1947 7.172 .5 7 12.824 2.2 17
1948 8. 201 1.0 12 8.717 3.1 36
1949 3.622 2.1 58 2.406 6.5 270
1950 10.324
. 2.4 23 3.591 10.5 292
1951 7.670 2.5 33 2.697 15.4 571
1952 3.012 .9 30 4.581 5.1 111
. 1953 10.222 .7 7 6.267 5.2 83
1954 8.959 .5 6 6.919 3.2 46
1955 12.302 .7 6 7.947 1.7 21
1956 12.549 .9 7 lO.782 1.2 11
1957 14.225 .7 5 12.195 1.2 10
1958 18.541 .7 4 27.167 l.O 4
1959 19.687 neg neg 24.825 1.0 4
1960 24.719 neg neg 32.075 neg neg
Indirect trade through Hong Kong is negligible from now on, both in




Problems of Constructing the Indexes
In the previous chapter we have seen that direct Sino-British trade is
but a part of Britain's China trade. It will be apparent that the indexes
in this study are necessarily derived from a further diminution of the
trade.
Had data been available for every commodity traded during the period,
the potential number of entries would have been over 10,000 a year and
one would have to limit this to a more manageable number. If the trade
were spread fairly evenly over this large number of commodities the
normal statistical technique of random selection would have been used;-*-
if trade were consistently concentrated in a relatively small number of
commodities then one would simply have specified an acceptable coverage
and used the requisite number of commodities. It will come as no
surprise that neither of these options was possible. Data was not
available for many commodities and what data there was shows that the
trade is indeed concentrated, but not consistently.
The problem is illustrated by Table 3-l(a~g) and Fig.3-1. For three
years that span the period - 1938, 1958 and 1968 - all specified commo¬
dities in Vol.IV of the Annual Statement (the by-country tables) are
entered in descending order of value. Non-specified entries ("All other
sorts") and the few commodities which are less than £10,000 are excluded
for simplicity. Exports of iron and steel, which are given in non-
compatible groupings in 1958 and 1968, are re-totalled to preserve
The task would not be daunting if the data were in a form suitable
for random selection. To select, say, a sample of households to be inter¬
viewed from a census list, presents no great problems. The difficulty
with the data used here is that it first has to be extracted and ordered
before such a selection can be made. By then the data set is so diminished
that no further reduction is necessary.
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Table 3-1 a
Vol.IV Coverage: Imports, 1938
°L
COVERAGEMOP nTPCPRTDfTHW jp * nnnINUU L)£J O L/KI f 1 1UJN X. uuu 7b
i :otal EXV 1Y 2Y
l Eggs, not in shell 2,863 45 45 45
2 Bristles 459 7 52 52 7 7
3 Tea 410 6 58 58 14 14
4 Tung oil 392 6 64 64 20
5 Tin 312 5 69 69 25
6 Tungsten ores 226 4 73 73 28
7 Hats 139 2 75 75 30
8 Silk manufactures (V) 139 2 77 V
9 Eggs, in shell 114 2 79 77
10 Camels' hair 89 1 80 78 32
11 Silk, raw 85 1 82 79 33
12 Hair, raw 82 1 83 81
13 Carpets 81 1 84 82 34 15
14 Mats 71 1 85 83
15 Nuts 68 1 86 84
16 Silk cocoons 47 1 87 85
17 Plaiting of straw 45 1 88 86 35
18 Hides 43 1 88 86
19 Canes (V) 38 1 89 V
20 Cotton waste 34 1 90 87 35
21 Antimony 31 * 90 87
22 Manufactures of skin 31 * 90 88
23 Ginger 30 k 91 88
24 Cotton manufactures (V) 27 * 91 V
25 Essential oils 25 * 92 89 36
26 Feathers 23 * 92 89
27 Beans 21 * 92 89
28 Fur skins, raw 19 * 93 90 36 15
29 Rabbit skins 19 k 93 90
30 Curios (V) 15 k 93 V
Coverage is shown by cumulative %■
1 i
i
EXV: excluding 'value only' commodities. '
1Y : commodity obtains in one other year. i












Vol.IV Coverage: Imports, 1958
COVERAGE
NOC DESCRIPTION 0/x. UUU Jo
rOTAl EXV 1Y 2Y
1 Eggs, frozen 3,170 17 17 17
2 Cotton yarns 2,170 12 29 29
3 Bristles 1,707 9 38 38 9 9
4 Tea 1,086 6 44 44 15 15
5 Oil seeds 1,037 6 49 49
6 Eggs, dried 669 .. 4 . 53 53 19
7 Fruit. 657 4 57 57
8 Rosin 651 .4 60 60
9 Tung oil 577 3 63 63 22
10 Goat hair 549 3 66 66
11 Tin 400 2 68 68 24
12 Cotton waste 347 2 70 70 26
13 Wool, raw 309 2 72 72 27
14 Albumen, frozen and liquid 296 2 73 73
15. Fur skins, raw 281 2 75 . 75 29 17
16 Silk fabrics 277 1 76 76 30
17 Meat 247 1 78 78
18 Hats 238 1 79 79 32
19 Albumen, dried 228 1 80 80
20 Carpets 209 1 81 81 33 18
21 Silk, raw 201 1 83 83 34
22 Gallnuts 197 1 84 84
23 Miscellaneous fibres 184 1 85 85
24 Fur skins (V) 147 1 85 V
25 Paper 120 1 86 85 35
26 Linseed oil 106 1 87 86
27 Turpentine 105 1 87 86
28 Menthol 73 * 88 87
29 Drugs (V) 44 * 88 V
30 Peppermint 36 * 88 87
31 Canes (V) 26 * 88 V
32 Camels' hair 15 •k 88 87 35




Vol.IV Coverage: Imports, 1968
COVERAGE
NOC DESCRIPTION £ '000 Of%
TOTAI EXV 1Y 2Y
1 Bristles 3,119 9 9 9 9 9
2 Cotton fabrics 2,685 8 17 17
3 Diamonds (V) 1,706 5 22 V
4 Wool, raw 1,650 5 27 22 14
5 Rice 1,480 4 31 26
6 Rabbit meat 1,458 4 *35 30
7 Fur skins,, raw 1,33-9 • 4 39 34 18 ' 13
8 Fur skins (V) 1,335 4 43 V
9 Cashmere 1,229 4 47 38
10 Carpets 1,060 3 50 41 21 16
11 Castor oil seed 1,046 3 53 44
12 Tea 980 3 56 47 24 19
13 Silk fibres 961 3 58 50
14 Chemical elements (V) 858 3 . 61 V
15 Walnuts 760 2 63 52
16 Rosin 716 2 65 54
17 Basketwork (V) 710 2 67 V
18 Cotton 574 2 69 56
19 Soya beans 570 2 71 57
20 Cotton seed oil 557 2 72 59
21 Essential oils 505 1 74 60 25
22 Eggs, frozen and liquid 482 1 75 62
23 Silk fabrics 470 1 77 63 27
24 Tinned fruit 459 1 78 64
25 Shellfish 393 1 79 66
26 Prams, toys, etc. (V) 372 1 80 V
27 Tungsten ores 346 1 81 67 28
28 Non-ferrous metals (V) 332 1 82 V
29 Other meat 308 1 83 68
30 Clothing (V) 289 1 84 V
31 Crude fertilisers (V) 285 1 85 V
32 Plaiting materials 256 1 85 68 28
33 Groundnuts 254 1 86 69
34 Eggs, dried 224 1 87 70
35 Paper 219 1 87 70
36 Plywood 197 1 88 71
37 Travel goods (V) 195 1 89 V
38 Sugar 193 1 89 71
39 Apricot kernels 135
* 90 72
40 Musical instruments (V) 116 * 90 V









rOTAI EXV IY 2Y
1 Pictures 927 23 23 V
2 Machinery 800 20 43 20
103 Iron & steel 402 10 52 30 10
4 Arms & ammunition (V) 284 7 59 V
5 Linen manufactures (V) 219 5 65 V
6 Vehicles, air (V) 128 3 68 V
7 Woollen tissues 120 3 71 33
8 • •Ships (V) 117 3 74 V
9 Cotton piece goods 91 2 76 35
10 Vehicles, road (V) 74 2 78 V
11 Rail carriages (V) 65 2 80 V
12 Sodium compounds 54 1 81 36
13 Spirits 53 1 82 37
14 Locomotives (V) 47 1 83 V
15 Wool tops 43' 1 84 39 11
16 Drugs (V) 41 1 85 V
17 Cotton yarns 39 1 86
39
18 Parcels 33 1 87 40
19 Tobacco 27 1 88 41
20 Paper 27 1 89
42 12
21 Electrical wires 23 1 89 42
22 implements 22 1 90 43




25 Leather mahufactures (V) 13
* 91 V
26 Rubber manufactures (V) 13
* 91 V
27 Apparel (V) 12
* 91 V
28 Woollen yarns 11
* 92 43








TOTAI EXV 1Y 2Y
1 Wool tops 6,374 24 24 24 24
2 Copper wire
Plates, not coated
5,178 19 43 43
3 Iron & , Plates, coated ^
Steel Tubes
All other sorts
4,258 16 59 59 40 16
4 Textile machinery 986 4 63 63
5 Tractors 779 3 66 66
6 Copper, refined 602 2 68 68 42
7 Chemicals, inorganic (V) 578 2 70 V
8 Manufactures of metal (V) 577 2 73 V
9 Plastic materials 556 2 75 70
10 Penicillin (V) 396 1 76 V
11 Other anti-biotics 371 1 78 72
12 • Power generating machinery 337 1 79 73
13 Misc. textiles manufactures(V) 336 1 80 V
14 Artificial silk yarns 322 1 81 74
15 Electric cables 317 1 82 75
16 Paper 253 1 83 76 43
17 Optical instruments (V) 209 1 84 V
18 •Scientific electrical insts.(V ) 159 1 85 V
19 Sulphonamides 154 1 ' 85 77
20 Bearings 149 1 86 77
21 Radio-testing equipment 130 * 86 78
22 Instruments (V) 114 * 87 V
23 Wool noils _r 112 * 87 78
24 Synthetic rubber 104 * 88 79
25 Paper machinery 103 * 88 79
26 Road vehicles (V) 97 * 88 V
27 Lactose 94 * 89 80
28 Dyeing materials (V) 83 * 89 V
29 Machine tools 61 * 89 80
30 Formaldehyde 31 * 89 80
31 Organic dye-stuffs 10 * 89 80
32 Watches (V) 10 * 89 V





Vol.IV Coverage: Exports, 1968
COVERAGE
NOC DESCRIPTION £'000 OfJO
T0TAI , EXV 1Y 2Y




4,729 17 35 17
3 Iron & Steel{Universals }
Wire
All other sorts
3,835 13 48 30 13 13
4 Copper, refined 2,690 9 57 39 23
5 Organic chemicals (V) 2,082 7 65 47
6 Lead, unwrought 1,642 6 71 53
7 Man-made fibres 1,088 4 74 56
8 Scientific measuring equipment(V ) 955 3 78 V
9 Transport equipment (V) 496 2 79 V
10 Electrical measuring equipment(V I 379 1 81 V
11 Copper bars 345 1 82 58
12 Textile machinery (V) 324 1 83 V
13 Iron scrap 315 1 84 59
14 Nickel scrap 270 1 85 60
15 Telecommunications apparatus (V) 249 1 86 V
16 Metal working machinery 232 1 87 60
17 Nickel, unwrought 212 1 88 61
18 Manufactures of metal (V) 200 1 88 62
19 Medicines 186 1 89 63
20 Office > machinery 140 * 89 63




VOLUME IV COVERAGE: SYNOPSIS AND NOTES
Year M/X
TOTAL EXV 1 YEAR 2 YEARS
NOC COV PC NOC COV PC NOC COV PC NOC COV PC
38 X 28 92 51 15 43 25 3 12 6 1 10 3
38 M 30 93 53 26 90 48 13 36 22 4 15 8
58 X 32 89 53 22 80 42 4 43 13 1 16 4
58- M 32 88 53 29 87 50 14 35 22 4 18 8
68 X 20 89 42 14 63 30 2 23 7 1 13 4




NOC : Number of commodities
COV : Coverage
PC : Product of coverage - square
of NOC by COV
root of the product
EXV : Excluding 'value only' entries
1 YEAR : Commodity obtains in one of the other years
2 YEARS: Commodity obtains in both of the other years
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2. yrs | 1 yr | EXV
1968
Total EXV j 1 yr | 2 yrs |
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continuity with 1938. The descriptions of the commodities have been
radically abbreviated for clarity. It will ben seen that initial coverage
is high and concentrated. About 50 per cent of imports are covered by
two, five and ten commodities in 1938, 1958 and 1968 respectively and,
when iron and steel is counted as one, the same coverage is given for
exports with just three items. Approximately 90 per cent coverage is
achieved with thirty to forty import commodities and twenty to thirty-
two export commodities.
If these commodities were utilisable it would be a simple matter
indeed to construct high-coverage unit value indexes. However, it is
with the EXV column that the problems begin and rapidly become worse.
For a unit value we of course need a quantity measure and so 'value
only' entries must be discarded. This has a much greater effect on
exports than on imports. The next criterion is continuity, and the last
two columns show cumulative coverage for those commodities which are
reported in one, and both, of the other two years respectively. Not
merely does coverage crumble but the number of commodities (NOC) contracts
drastically as well; imports are reduced to four, and exports to but one,
iron and steel (cf. Appendix E).
These two indicators, coverage and number of commodities, are con¬
veniently expressed in one measure by their geometric mean (Table 3-lg
and Fig.3-1). This 'product of coverage' is not entirely satisfactory
since it equates the importance of NOC and COV, which may not be
justified, but it suffices here.
It is clear from this simplified illustration that the Vol.IV data
is far from adequate for constructing unit value indexes. However, it
will be noted that imports are less affected than exports, both in terms
of coverage and number of commodities, by these increasing constraints.
In fact, it was possible from Vol.IV to identify a sufficient, but
relatively small, number of commodities which, when data for them had
been extracted from the by-commodity table of Vol.11, provided adequate
coverage and NOC for the construction of import unit value indexes. As
can be seen in Table 3-15 (a synopsis is given in Table 3-2 and Fig.3-2)
coverage ranges from 59 per cent to 91 percent, with an annual averdge___
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Table 3-2
Coverage & NOC for Main Indexes
IMPORTS (MS 3) EXPORTS (XS5)
Year
cov AAV NOC AAV cov AAV NOC* AAV
1930 79 21 83 139
1931 79 20 83 141
1932 78 19 • 85 148
1933 82 20 79 154
1934 82 20 8 1 157




























1946 91 11 61 67
1947 84 15 65 69
1948 93 17 58 65
1949 78 15 82 62
1950 78 18 92 49
46-50 85 15 72 62
1951 74 21 67 46
1952 69 16 94 39
1953 86 21 92 50
1954 90 22 86 60
1955 86 32 79 34
51-55 81 22 84 46
1956 • 83 - 32 75 40
1957 85 32 75 47
1958 83 39 90 72
1959 74 28 86 56
1960 67 29 84 58
56-60 78 32 82 55
1961 69 29 83 53
1962 75 29 85 56
1963 71 35 64 50
1964 64 36 66 74
1965 71 39 71 74
61-65 70 34 74 61
1966 70 41 59 89
1967 67 40 78 49
1968 62 41 60 41
1969 59 40 70 26
66-69 65 41 67 51
Total 78 23 76 83
*This index uses but one commodity (TIS) for iron and steel: indexes













































value of 78 per cent, and this was achieved with a total of sixty-six
commodities. This is no mean number, and as will be seen from the case
of 'hat bodies' (below) and Appendixes B and C, the construction was
far from straightforward. However, compared with the problem of con¬
structing unit value indexes for exports, it was relatively simple.
It will be clear that the Vol.IV data offered no such short cut for
exports. The only commodity which runs throughout the period is 'total
of iron and steel' (TIS, see Appendix E) and even that has a change of
definition. Moreover, had the TIS unit value index been used as a
surrogate for a general export UVI, a completely misleading result would
have been obtained, especially in the latter sixties.
Since there was no identifiable core of commodities with which an
index could be constructed there was no alternative but to scour the
'by commodity' tables and extract every instance when exports to China
were reported. Only cases where a quantity was given were used; that is,
the 'value only' entries were excluded. Apart from regret that some
large (e.g., diamonds) and often strategic (e.g., Section 8; see below)
exports were thus discarded, it was sometimes frustrating that some
exports could not be pursued further. The case of the extraordinarily
large exports of 'pictures' just before and after the war is one
instance (Table 3-3).2 Another, which would be of interest to anyone
studying the course of birth control in China, was her sudden emergence
in 1958 as the principal purchaser of 'seamless rubber products (in-
My enquiry to the Statistical Office of Customs and Excise produced
the following reply from the Public Record Office:
"Your letter of 21 November to the Customs and Excise
Statistical Office in Southend has been forwarded to this
Office, where the historical records of the Board are kept.
I regret to say, however, that the detailed breakdown of
exports which might answer your question has not yet been
transferred to us for any date later than 1899, and it
seems unlikely that a visit to this Office would provide
you with the information you seek."
Although the nature of these 'pictures' is an intriguing question, it
is peripheral, and since it clearly requires some perseverance to elicit










































1 2 . 3 4 5 6
A NC X X NS X X
B NS NS X X NC NC




Commodity not classified in that year
Commodity classified, but no trade with China specified
Trade with China reported
Fig. 3-6
COMMODITY 1930-3 1934 1935-9
Eggs, in shell C NC C
Eggs,in shell,Poultry,under 14 lbs/120 NC C NC
Eggs,in shell,Poultry,14 to 17 lbs/120 NC c NC
Eggs,in shell,Poultry,over 17 lbs/120 NC c NC
Eggs,in shell,Other sorts NC c NC
C: Commodity classified in that year j
NC: Commodity not classified in that year
202
eluding prophylactics)', presumably contraceptive sheaths - at a time
when it is usually said that birth control was somewhat ignored.
Volume IV could by no means be dispensed with entirely. There were
cases when large exports to China which were shown in Vol.IV were
inexplicably omitted from the 'by-commodity' table. For instance, some
film, worth of synthetic rubber was exported to China in 1960, making her
by far the largest customer, and yet she is not identified in the
Vol.Ill entry for 1958-62. (China is, in fact, specified in the earlier,
superseded, 1958-60 edition.) The same happens for copper wire (X406)
and railway axles (X741) (see Appendix D). Aside from omissions of this
sort, Vol.IV with its different approach and categorisation, often
usefully supplements the 'by-commodity' data. The relationship between
the two sources is discussed later.
Even excluding 'value only' trade, the massive amount of data con¬
tained in the Annual Statement over the period, which would perhaps be
best measured by the interior-decorator's unit of feet of bookcase,
yields some 5,000 data points. These were arranged initially in 871
commodities, which were themselves then arranged in SITC order - a
process not without its problems. Exports of 'imported merchandise',
which were entered separately in Vol.11, were then deleted since it was
found there was insufficient consistent data to construct an independent
index and it was considered unwise to mix them in with 'home produce'.
Others were superseded by data from another level (see below). The
result is a data set of 517 commodities with a coverage ranging from
55 per cent to 92 per cent, with an annual average value of 76 per cent.
(Tables 3-15, 3-2; Fig.3-2). A synopsis of this data set is given in
Appendix G. Virtually all the commodity descriptions have been simpli¬
fied, many quite considerably, and it was considered unnecessarily
confusing to attempt to indicate changes in description (see 'commodity
description variation' below). However, it is felt that no great diffi¬
culty will be experienced in tracing any of these commodities in the
Annual Statement.
Despite its bulk, the Annual Statement, as was pointed out in Chapter
One, is not tailored to our purpose. There are three main reasons why
it is difficult to assemble sufficient suitable data:
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1. Trade with China is only reported for those commodities
where it is a substantial part of the trade in that commo¬
dity. The cut-off point will clearly vary with the value of
the commodity - for some commodities the total trade is in
the order of millions of pounds, for others in the thousands.
The criterion is the proportion, not the absolute amount,
and so the chances of trade with China being reported are
affected by the proportions of other countries. It should
also be added that the number of countries reported has de¬
clined drastically over the years - from an average of about
twenty in the 1930's to a handful in the late sixties. Thus
data on the China trade has decreased over time, irrespec¬
tive of the actual course of the trade.
2, For some commodities (industrial diamonds have already
been mentioned),only the value is given, not the quantity.
The more heterogeneous the commodity, the more likely this
is to happen.
3. The most important limiting factor, and the one that
gives rise to the most problems because of the ambiguity
that is often involved, is the qxiestion of comparability.
Clearly this becomes more difficult as the time span in¬
creases .
There is nothing to be done about the first two factors, 'non-reported
tradeand 'value-only trade', but the third factor is not so clear-cut.
The question of comparability arises precisely because of changes in the
composition of the trade. These changes are of two kinds - 'invisible'
and 'visible'.
INVISIBLE COMPOSITION CHANGES
The description of the commodity may remain the same but what is
actually traded under that commodity may vary. This may be due to shifts
Sometimes, as we shall see later, lacunae can be filled in with a
little detec tive work.
204
in the composition of undifferentiated 'sub-commodities' within the
commodity. For instance, the trade returns may not differentiate between
black and white, and colour, television sets and if there were a shift
in the proportion of colour sets to black and white exported, this would
distort a comparison of unit-values of 'television sets' over the years.
Clearly, as we have mentioned in Chapter One, it is often difficult to
decide when a commodity has changed sufficiently to necessitate a re¬
definition, but once it has, the composition change becomes visible.
There is, however, a limit to which re-definition can in practice go,
and commodities in trade returns will always retain a large element of
heterogeneity - which is why we talk of 'unit-values' rather than
prices.4 Thus, even if black and white and colour sets are differen¬
tiated, it might still be too unwieldy in the published statistics to
differentiate between different sizes of sets and so a shift in the
proportion of larger sets to smaller will again distort the unit value.®
Another aspect of this problem is the question of changes in quality.
We shall distinguish two types - augmented technology component quality
change and market quality change.
Augmented Technology Component Quality Change
That there is a very considerable bias towards a differential quality
change between manufactured goods and raw materials is an argument often
advanced by those who attack the view that there has been a long-term
deterioration in the real terms of trade of the under-developed countries.
"...a change in unit-value, which is taken as evidence of a change in
prices, may merely be the result of a change in the proportions of the
different qualities, grades or sizes of the same articles. . . .Very few
commodity goods are completely homogeneous." United Nations, Department
of Economic Affairs, Relative Prices of Exports and Imports of Under-
Developed Countries (Lake Success, New York, 1949), p.134 (herein after
referred to as "U.N. Relative Prices").
See R.D.G. Allen, Index Numbers in Theory and Practice (London,
Macmillan, 1975) .
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Haberler, for instance, in a burst of rather Panglossian optimism that
all manufactures are getting better and better in this best of all
possible worlds, argued:
...since it is primarily industrial products which improve
in quality while primary products remain qualitatively more
or less the same, and since literally hundreds of new pro¬
ducts are added over the years to the list of finished goods,
this bias operates in such a way as to make the movement in
the terms of trade of the primary exporters appear much less
favourable than it actually was.®
In a similar vein Theodore Morgan suggested:
...qualitative improvements in products are inadequately
taken account of....on the whole, I would judge that with¬
out doubt the improvements have been less in primary than
in manufactured products. In the actual statistics that
we have, corrections for improvements in quality are rare
and incomplete...7
It would appear that Haberler, Morgan, et al® have a valid point and
if there were such a bias then, as Chi-ming Hou has pointed out, this
Gottfried Haberler, "International Trade and Economic Development",
National Bank of Egypt Fiftieth Anniversary Commemorative Lectures
(Cairo, 1959), p.21, quoted by Werner Baer in his article "The Economics
of Prebisch and ECLA", Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol.10
(January 1962), pp.169-182. In view of the occasion of Haberler's
lecture it is interesting to note that, some twenty years later, "Thirty-
five per cent of Egypt's export earnings go to paying foreign debts..."
(Washington Post report, The Guardian, June 27, 1977, p.5).
7
Theodore Morgan, "The Long-run Terms of Trade between Agriculture
and Manufacturing", Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol.8,
No.l (October 1959), p.4. In a note he adds: "The only consistent
attempt to meet the problem of continued quality improvements that I
have found in the data underlying the eight charts of this paper is in
the construction of part of the Indian price series." (p.4). Unfor¬
tunately, he quotes a dozen, not easily obtainable, sources for the
Indian series and does not identify the one that attempts the assessment
of quality improvement.
8
It is a point frequently made. See, for instance, "A Critique of the
Prebisch Thesis" by G.L. Hyde in Economia Internazionale, Vol.16 (August
1963), pp.463-487.
9
Chi-ming Hou, "External Trade, Foreign Investment, and Domestic
Development: The Chinese experience 1840-1937", Economic Development and
Cultural Change, Vol.10, No.l (October 1961), pp.21-41.
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could counter-balance an under-developed country's apparent deterioration
in terms of trade. However, compilers of terms of trade indexes are not
unaware of the point10 and some, indeed, argue that at times there has
been a bias in the opposite direction:
Statistical data often fail to make due allowance for
changes in quality. Manufactured goods are more subject
to changes in quality than food and primary materials.
In normal times, there is a general tendency towards
improvement in the quality and efficiency of manufactured
goods, especially vehicles and machinery. Hence, in
normal times, studies of changes in terms of trade between
under-developed countries and more highly developed
countries tend to be affected by a systematic bias towards
making changes appear more unfavourable or less favourable
to the under-developed countries than they really are
unless the manufactured goods selected are of a standard¬
ized nature. On the other hand, changes in quality during
the past ten years [this report was-published in 1949] are
just as likely to be in the direction of lower quality,
and hence may well impart the opposite bias to foreign
trade statistics.11
Whilst it is impossible to deny that in some fields, electronics for
instance, there have been substantial improvements, one should be rather
more sceptical that quality improvement has been so marked in manufactured
goods as a whole. On the contrary, it is commonly felt that the quality
of consumer durables, at least, has often declined. This was, for instance,
the thrust of Vance Packard's The Waste Makers,1^ while the example of
13
motor cars has also been dealt with by, amongst others, Baran and Sweezy.
There has been considerable work done, especially in the United States,
^°See Kindleberger, Terms of Trade, p.358.
^
U.N., Relative Prices, p. 133.
12
Vance Packard, The Waste Makers (London, Longmans, 1961), especially
chapter 4 on motor cars.
13
Baran and Sweezy, Monopoly Capital (New York, Monthly Review Press,
1966), pp.135-138. Their comments are based on earlier research by
Griliches and others.
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on adjusting price indexes14 for quality change,15 but clearly any attempt
to do so here is out of the question. It is pertinent to note,however,
that statistical considerations apart, a major problem in adjusting for
quality change is determining the appropriate characteristics of quality.
Zvi Griliches, for example, in his "Hedonic Price Indexes for Automobiles:
an Econometric Analysis of Quality Change" looked at U.S.four-door sedans
for 1937, 1950 and 1954 to 1960. He took various, accessible, character¬
istics for quality variables but omitted others for lack of data:
No adjustment was made for any changes in minor equipment
items that became standard equipment at some later point in
time, such as directional signals or electric clocks. Major
items, such as automatic transmissions, power steering, and
power brakes were treated by defining independent variables
that took the value of one if the item was "standard equip¬
ment" on a particular model and zero if it was not.
The major numerical "quality" variables used in this
study are horsepower (advertised brake horsepower), weight
(shipping), and length (wheelbase for 1937 and 1950, and
overall from 1950 on). In addition, "dummy" variables, i.e.,
variables that take the value of one if the particular model
possesses this particular "quality" and zero if it does not,
are defined for the following "qualities": V-8 engine or not,
hardtop or not, automatic transmission as standard equipment
or not, power steering as standard equipment or not, and for
1960 models whether a car is "compact" or not ...
A variety of variables for which no convenient data are
available was not included in the calculations. Most
important of these are the various "performance" variables:
gasoline mileage, acceleration, handling ease, durability,
and styling. Scattered data already exist on some of these
qualities, and I am sure that it would not prove very diffi¬
cult to collect more and include such variables explicitly
in a similar price-quality analysis. Variables reflecting
the level of "workmanship" associated with a particular car
and variable accounting for small design changes, such as
14
Note, not unit value indexes; that would produce further difficulties.
"*"^Zvi Griliches, ed., Price Indexes and Quality Change; Studies in
New Methods of Measurement (Harvard, 1971). See also R.D.G. Allen,
Index Numbers in Theory and Practice (London, 1975), p.253. Mathematical
aspects are explored by Franklin M. Fisher and Karl Shell in The Economic
Theory of Price Indices (N.Y. and London, 1972), pp.26-37 and S.N. Afriat,
The Price Index (Cambridge University Press, 1977) .
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the substitution of an alternator for the generator, were
also omitted for lack of data. Nor were brand or manufac¬
turer differentials taken into account. In fact, as far
as the numerical qualities that are included in the analysis
are concerned, they could probably all be interpreted as
different aspects of one underlying quality "size" or
"capacity".
One can, without much thought, add further quality characteristics -
safety, resistance to corrosion, ease of repair, noise and air pollution
levels, ability to park in confined spaces, seat design, and so on. Some
of these omissions, such as petrol consumption, would be easy enough to
measure but others, such as ease of repair, would involve considerable
difficulties, if they were measurable at all. Furthermore, there is also
the problem of the cross-valuation of quality characteristics, or express¬
ing them all in a common unit of quality. ^
Returning to the context of Sino-British trade, or trade between under¬
developed and developed countries in general, it is obvious that the order¬
ing of quality characteristics may well vary between the countries. Thus,
for instance, ruggedness and simplicity of repair will be of greater
importance in a country where the level of mechanical expertise is low,
and the cadre of repairmen small, thqn in, say, Britain. On a more
^Zvi Griliches, "Hedonic Price Indexes for Automobiles" in Price
Indexes and Quality Change, ed. by Griliches, p.62.
17
At least one author in this collection does have doubts as to how
useful his quality characteristics are:
"Of course the first issue is, what does one mean by 'quality'?
In this study, as in previous investigations of this type, one
means the weight, length, displacement, and other identifiable
characteristics as exhibited in the list of variables in Appendix
A. Each such variable carries a positive weight in determining
quality. Thus, for example, an increase in weight or length in¬
dicates an increase in quality, while a decrease in these two
characteristics (or any one of them) would indicate a reduction
in quality. In terms of this definition of quality, the historical
experience of the decade presents for all three manufacturers a
rather mixed record, although, in the ordinary usage, it is
doubtful whether one would accept the proposition that a larger
and heavier car is necessarily one of improved quality[emphasis
added]
Phoebus J. Dhrymes, "Price and Quality Changes", ibid, p.91.
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general level, it can be argued that what is an appropriate technology
for one socio-economic system is not necessarily appropriate for another.
This is not a problem that can be solved merely by 'intermediate
technology', though that is part of it, because although a lower technol¬
ogy might be more suitable for the existing level of the economy, the
very existence of a higher technology generates its own necessity. More¬
over, since developed countries produce primarily for their own domestic
markets and export to other developed countries, the higher technology
is often the only one available.
The Chinese have tried to resolve this contradiction through the
policy of "walking on two legs",but the history of the People's Republic,
especially since the death of Mao Tse-tung, clearly shows how far this
problem is from being solved.
In conclusion, it is by no means certain that there has been a marked
improvement in quality of manufactured goods over the period vis-a-vis
primary goods,and if there has been a differential improvement, it
may have been a mixed blessing for the under-developed countries.
However, it would seem reasonable to assume that the greater the
'technology component' of a commodity, the more likely it is to undergo
a quality change that is both greater than average and greater than the
increase in price - an above-average increase in q\iality/£. For instance,
had this been written before the War it would have been with a steel-nib
pen; then it would have been typed on a manual typewriter (using carbon
paper to produce, at most, three copies). Now, one uses a ball-point
pen, and an electric typewriter (and a photocopier which can produce any
number of copies). However, the quality of the paper will have remained
fairly constant. So, leaving aside the perhaps insuperable problems of
quantification and comparability, we may consider that the pen and the
typewriter, with their higher 'technology component', have changed in
quality more than the paper.
It is, of course, the quality differential that is important here,
not the absolute quality change.
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Various questions remain: If there has been an ATC quality change,
how has this affected our indexes? Would such a quality change differential
explain varying unit value movements of sections or the raw materials/
manufactures dichotomies? Most important of all, would it counterbalance
the 'apparent' movement of the terms of trade?
Firstly, it should be remembered that the balance between manufactured
goods and raw materials in Sino-British trade has oscillated quite widely
(Table 2-13, Figs.2-4, 2-5).*^ Moreover/it can be seen from Appendix G
that many of the most important manufactures in the export sample are
in reality semi-manufactures; commodities such as non-ferrous metals or
iron and steel which, although their production may involve high inputs
of technology, remain low technology component commodities and hence no
20
more susceptible to ATC quality change.
The problem is perhaps that SITC categories, even at division level,
are far too broad to do more than indicate the technology component of
the commodities grouped together. We may reasonably assume that the
technology component will be higher in, say, Division 86: "Professional,
scientific and controlling instruments; photographic and optical goods;
watches and clocks", than in Division 24: "Wood, lumber and cork" or
even Division 26: "Textile fibres" (which includes artificial fibres),
but Division 86 covers a very wide range of possible technology components.
The common assumption that there is a consistent and immutable pattern
whereby under-developed countries exchange raw materials for the manu¬
factures of developed countries is, of course, oversimplified; cf.
Cheryl Payer, ed., Commodity Trade of the Third World (London, Macmillan,
1975), p.viii. The pattern is further confused by the activities of multi¬
nationals .
20
This does not rule out quality changes imposed by market conditions.
I understand that one result of the present (1979) world steel over¬
capacity is that customers of the British Steel Corporation are able to
demand 'higher quality' steel; for example, a more precise determination
of nickel content. The quality improvement, of course, may often only be
possible through a higher technology input in the process as a whole.
The cost of this additional input will then be passed on to all customers,
whether they require the enhanced quality or not.
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Britain and China might well export to each other equal amounts of
Division 86 commodities but, on the Chinese side, this may be comprised
of fairly rudimentary clocks and watches and, on the British side, by
highly sophisticated scientific instruments. What is really required, of
course, is a classification of trade in terms of technology component so
that instead of, say, bicycles and supersonic aircraft being lumped
together as 'transport equipment', they are placed somewhat to the opposite
ends of the spectrum.
A further problem is indicated by the section PNC (proportion of the
trade not covered by the sample that falls within that section). Presuma¬
bly the sections most liable to ATC quality change are Britain's exports
in Section 8 (more precisely, Division 86) and Section 7: "Machinery and
transport equipment". As can be seen in Tables 3-4, 3-5 and Fig.3-3, these
high risk sections in general have low coverage (especially 8), high
21
contribution (especially 7) and high PNC. So serious is the problem
21
PNC is defined as:-
PNCS = VALS - PcQc
COV,s
VALt - ZPcQc
PcQc COVt = EPcQc
VALS VALt
PcQc COVs . VALS , EPcQc = COVt . VALfc
CON = VALS
VALt
Where s & t denote section & total respectively,
substituting
PNC,S VALS - COVs . VALS
VALt - COVt . VALt
VALS(1 - COVs)
VALt(l - COVt)
CON (1 - COVs)
(1 - covt)
Since the denominator is a constant for all sections, the PNC is a




Year E(0-4) Section 5 Section 6 Section 7 Section 8
1930 5 16 37 30 12
1931 4 21 39 30 7
1932 5 17 44 23 11
1933 4 15 36 26 19
1934 4 14 36 26 20
AAV 4 17 38 27 12
SD 0.5 2.7 3.4 3.0 5.0
1935 4 18 31 28 18
1936 3 10 18 25 43
1937 3 . . 10 20 25 42
1938 2 3 8 . 20 66
1939 4 9 .24 21 42
AAV 3 10
• 20 24 42
SD 0.5 5.3 8.4 3.3 17.0
1946 4 14 18 19 45
1947 1 16 16 28 38
1948 2 11 10 27 51
1949 . 14 19 8 32 28
. 1950 4 26 INV* 83 2
AAV 5 17 11 38 33
SD 5.2 5.7 8.2 25.7 19.2
1951 0.0 27 22 38 H
1952 1 48 21 24 6
1953 4 37 19 29 11
1954 6 48 4 30 12
1955 6 60 20 7 7
AAV 3 44 17 26 10
DS 2.8 12.5 7.5 11.5 2.9
1956 1 27 47 13 13
1957 2 41 22 17 19
1958 3 47 14 19 17
1959 5 40 31 15 8
1 960 4 19 55 11 11
AAV 3 35 34 15 14
SD 1.6 11.5 17.0 3.2 4.4
1961 3 23 16 43 12
1962 3 23 13 46 10
1963 1 11 4 77 7
1964 1 18 3 58 20
196S 2 20 4 47 27
AAV 2 19 8 54 15
SD 1.0 4.9 6.0 14.0 8.2
1966 3 10 3 61 23
1967 2 27 16 28 28
1968 1 25 47 17 10
1969 0.0 21 65 10 4
AAV 2 21 18 27 16
SD 1.3 7.6 20.3 25.7 11.1
AAV 3 20 23 30 20
SD 2.5 12. 5 16.3 17.7 16.0
Section 9 is omitted since, apart from, 3 years, its share of PNC is either
nil or negligible. The exceptions are 1960:1%, 1961:4%, 1962:6%.
*INV: See Table 3-15,Note 1, here read as 0.
213
Table 3-5
Coverage, Contribution & PNC for Export Sections 7 & 8
Section 7 Section 8
THP
Year
CON COV PNC CON COV PNC COV
1930 20 74 30 3 37 12 83
1931 17 69 30 2 40 7 83
1932 20 82 23 3 35 11 85
1933 21 74 26 5 25 19 79
1934 23 79 26 5 22 20 81
1935 31 • 81 28 5 23 18 79
1936 23 70 25 13 8 43 73
1937 20 71 25 11 9 42 77
1938 32 72 20 31 2 66 55
1939 29 81 21 12 7 42 74
1946 22 67 19 18 2 45 61
1947 30 . 67 28 14 1 38 65
1948 40 71 27 22 0 51 58
1949 37 84 32 5 0 28 82
1950 28 76 83 0.2 0 2 92
1951 43 71 38 6 34 12 67
1952 14 89 24 1 72 6 94
1953 17 86 29 1 17 11 92
1954 16 74 30 4 55 12 86
1955 3 46 7 2 4 7 79
1956 9 64 13 3 0.0 13 75
1957 10 54 17 5 0 19 75
1958 15 87 19 2 1 17 90
1959 10 79 15 1 0 8 86
1960 12 86 11 2 0 11 84
1961 16 55 43 2 0 12 83
1962 16 56 46 2 0 10 85
1963 37 26 77 3 4 7 64
1964 36 45 58 8 8 20 66
1965 39 65 47 8 4 27 71
1966 46 45 61 10 2 23 59
1967 26 76 28 6 2 28 78
1968 10 33 17 4 0 10 60
1969 5 35
.













with Section 8 that it is omitted from the sectional weighted indexes
(see below). Imports from China pose no such danger. The only section in
which we might expect any appreciable increase in technology component
Op
would be Section 8 again, and then only from the mid-sixties with
the emergence of goods like clocks, microscopes, etc. Despite the fact
that it does not feature in the sample at all (i.e., coverage is nil)
contribution is only 5 to 6 per cent during the later 60's and PNC is
correspondingly low as well, its annual average value for the same period
being 13 per cent (Table 3-6, Fig.3-4).
Coverage is low in the high-risk sections precisely because commodities
with a large technology component tend not to appear in the sample. Some¬
times it is a case of no quantity measure being given at all; scientific
measuring instruments, for instance. Occasionally the quantity measure
is dropped with changes in technology; radios used to be measured by
number of valves but by the late 60's, with the shift to transistors,
only the value is recorded. In other cases the commodity does not appear
until after the base year.
We are thus left with a high degree of uncertainty about the existence
of an export/import differential quality change. As far as the samples
are concerned it is probably of no great importance, and almost certain¬
ly insufficient to counterbalance the general movement in terms of trade.
It is when the sample indexes are used as estimates of the unit value
movement of the total trade (see "Adjustment for incomplete coverage"
below) that danger creeps in, but still not enough, we can be fairly
confident, to seriously threaten the analyses in Part D.
Market Quality Change
There is a further possibility that there has been a shift up or down
market in Sino-British trade as a whole, or more likely, in specific
salient commodities. An important historical example of this is China's
silk and tea trade. China lost its predominance in the raw silk export
trade to Japan at the end of the nineteenth century because "...the
22
Here combined with Sections 1, 3 and 9. These are virtually negli¬






Year Section 0 Section 2 Section 4 Section 5 1,3,8,9
1930 15 32 5 1 31 16
1931 21 17 8 1 39 13
1932 26 18 5 1 39 ' 12
1933 19 25 2 1 40 14
1934 22 25 0.0 1 40 13
AAV 21 23 4 1 38 14
SD 4.0 6.1 3.1 0.0 3.8 1.5
1935 19 27 6 1 38 10
1936 21 26 0.0 1 45 6
1937 16 35 0.0 1 39 9
1938 14 28 0.0 3 41 14 '
1939 24 20 1 4 40 . 11
AAV 19 27 1 2 41 10
SD 4.0 5.4 2.6 I-4 2.7 2.9
1946 2 42 0 46 INV 14
1947 9 18 49 10 3 10
1948 24 33 10 8 11 13
1949 72 6 6 1 9 6
1950 63 13 0.0 12 2 10
AAV 34' ' 22 13 15 5 11
SD 31.8 14.8 20.6 17.6 4.7 3.1
1951 41 22 INV 14 20 3
1952 49 30 0 1 15 6
1953 46 29 12 3 8 2
1954 11 36 INV 19 32 5
1 99R 5 35 0 34 24 2
AAV 30 30 2 14 20 4
SD 20.8 5.6 5.4 13.4 9.1 1.8
1956 9 44 0 11 25 11
1957 5 53 0 3 34 5
1958 28 23 3 12 27 7
1959 22 44 0 7 17 10
1960 19 37 0 4 31 10
AAV 17 40 1 7 27 9
SD 9.4 11.2 1.3 4.0 6.5 2.5
1961 7 22 0 8 58 5
1962 7 22 0 9 49 13
1963 4 25 0.0 11 45 14
1964 5 23 0.0 9 50 13
1965 10 21 0.0 12 40 16
AAV 7 23 0 10 48 12
SD 2.3 1.5 0 1.6 6.7 4.2
1966 13 16 0.0 14 41 17
1967 11 11 0.0 14 45 20
1968 8 12 1 8 54 17
1969 6 10 0.0 10 60 13
AAV 10 12 0.0 12 50 17
SD 3.1 2.6 0.5 3.0 8.6 2.9
AAV 20 26 3 9 32 10
SD 16.7 10.8 8.7 9.5 16. 3 4.6
INV: See Table 3-15, Note 1: here read as '0'.
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IMPORTS : PNC DISTRIBUTION
(Average Annual Value)
66-69







Japanese government took a lively interest in maintaining and improving
the quality of raw silk exported.and the Chinese government did
not. Similarly, at the same period, China's tea exports lost out to those
of India, Ceylon and Java. The best Chinese silk was better than the
Japanese; so it was with tea - "While the finest teas in the world are
still produced in China, it is unfortunately true that a large quantity
OA
of what can only be described as rubbish is also put on the market."
In the 'Classification of Major Sample Commodities', Appendixes A to E,
movement in market quality, as measured by the relationship of the 'China
unit value' to the 'Excluding China unit value' (see below), is one of
the criteria for sample classification.
Whilst it is quite conceivable that there may have been a certain
general decline in quality of imports from China during periods of
upheaval such as the Cultural Revolution, or that particular commodities
may have deteriorated in quality relative to that of competitors (cf. tea
in Appendix A), there seems no reason to suppose that there has been any
major, consistent, long-term change in market quality, either in imports
or exports.
VISIBLE COMPOSITION CHANGES
This may be caused by the introduction of new commodities into Sino-
British trade or, more rarely, by the deletion of old ones. The change
may be either real, in that a completely new commodity (for example, TV
equipment) is brought into the trade, or merely apparent, in that the
volume of the trade is sufficient (or insufficient) for it to be reported.
In either case the end result is the same in that, in year one we have
data for commodity C, but not A and B, and in year two, data for commo¬
dities A and C, but not B, and so on (Fig.3-5).
Remer, Foreign Trade of China, p.138.
24
Chinese Maritime Customs Returns of Trade and Trade Reports, 1913,
Pt.II, Vol.3, p.553, quoted by Remer, ibid, p.145.
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Alternatively, commodities may be either split up or joined together.
Commodity A may be split at some time into commodities B and C; subsequent¬
ly commodity C may be again divided into D and E. This can happen in
reverse, although less commonly, when two or more commodities are joined
into one, either temporarily or permanently. For instance, referring
back to Table 1-3 (Fig.3-6), it will be seen that 'Eggs, in shell' were
split up, joined together, and then split up again during the thirties.
The matter is further complicated by the hierarchy of commodity des¬
criptions. 'Eggs,in shell' is a higher level description which subsumes
lower level descriptions such as 'Eggs, in shell, Poultry, between 14
and 17 lbs./120'. In this case the two levels are not used simultaneously,
but often up to four levels are reported at the same time, so we have
the pattern in Fig.3-7.
This, is basically the result of the grouping hierarchy in the 'by-
commodity' tables of Vols.II and III, which is illustrated here by
Class III J, 1935-9: the various commodities are coded in Table 3-7 and
the hierarchy is shown at the end of the table. In this particular case
only the value is given, and no countries are specified, for the first
degree commodity, so it is of no use for the unit value indexes and, of
course, exports to China are not shown for all the commodities listed.
The commodity hierarchy in Table 3-7, or rather the China aspect of it,
is supplemented by the same information being presented in a different,
ad hoc, hierarchy in the by-country table in Vol.IV (Fig.3-8).
It will be seen from Fig.3-9 that, in this case, the two groupings
do have a high degree of correspondence, but often this is not the
case.
The Vol.IV commodity descriptions, by definition, report trade with
China, but this, of course, is not necessarily so with Vol.Ill (or II).
So now we must fill in the figures for China to give us a picture of the
availability of the data at the various levels (Table 3-8).
It can be seen that it has been possible to fill in some lacunae,
although this is often of limited use, especially when the derived
















(WOOLLEN & WORSTED YARNS & MANUFACTURES)
lo 2° 3°
Woollen & Worsted Yarns & Manufactures:-
IT Wool tops
II Woollen & Worsted Yarns
M Woollen & Worsted Manufactures (except apparel & embroidery)
II II Tissues
IT II Other sorts (value only)
Fig.3-9
COMPARISON OF VOL.IV AND VOL.Ill COMMODITY DESCRIPTIONS
(WOOLLEN & WORSTED YARNS & MANUFACTURES)
Vol.IV Vol.Ill (see Table 3-7)
Wool tops A and B
Woollen & Worsted Yarns H (=D, E, F, G)
Tissues
I, J, K, L, W (=M to V)
DD (=X to Z, BB & CC)
Other sorts (value only) EE to MM
221
Table 3-7
Commodity Descriptions for Class III J, "Woollen and






Woollen and Worsted Yarns-
" Woollen (Carded only) D
" Worsted (Combed) E
" Alpaca and Mohair (including Cashmere) F
" Hair or Wool, not elsewhere specified G
Total of Woollen and Worsted Yarns H
Woollen.and Worsted Manufactures (except apparel & embroidery)-
" Tissues-
" Tissues wholly or mainly of Mohair, Alpaca and
Cashmere (not being pile fabrics) I
" Damasks, tapestries, brocades, etc. J
" Wool and Mohair Plushes and other Pile fabrics K
" Flannels and Delaines L
Other Woollen Tissues-
" All Wool- _r
" " Woven-
" " " Weighing 16 oz. and over to the sq.gd. M
" " " Weighing 12 oz. and under 16 ozs. to the sq.yd. N
" " " Weighing 8 oz. and under 12 oz. to the sq.gd. 0
" " " Weighing under 8 oz. to the sq.gd. P
" " Knitted, netted or crocheted** Q
" Of wool mixed with other materials, if known as
'Woollens'*
" " Woven*
" " " Weighing 16 oz.and over to the sq.gd. R
" " " Weighing 12 oz.and under 16 oz. to the sq.gd. S
" " " Weighing 8 oz.and under 12 oz. to the sq.gd. T
" " " Weighing under 8 oz.to the sq.gd. U
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Table 3-7
Commodity Descriptions for Class III J, "Woollen and
Worsted Yarns and Manufactures", 1935-9 (Exports)...cont'd.
COMMODITY DESCRIPTION CODE
Other Woollen Tissues (cont'd.)
" Of Wool mixed with other materials, ... (cont'd.)
" " Knitted, netted or crocheted** V
Total of Other Woollen Tissues W
Other Worsted Tissues
All Wool- - ...
" " Linings, Lastings, etc.*** X
" " Other tissues-
" " " Weighing 12 oz.and over to the sq.gd. Y
" " " Weighing- under 12 oz.td the sg.yd. Z
" Of Wool mixed with other materials if known as
'Worsteds'-
" " Linings, Lastings, etc. AA
" " Other tissues-
" " " Weighing 12 oz.and over to the sg.yd. BB
" " " Weighing under 12 oz.to the sg.yd. CC
Total of Other Worsted Tissues DD
Blankets EE
Shawls, other than knitted FF
Travelling Rugs, Coverlets and Wrappers GG
Wool Felt, not elsewhere specified HH
Woollen and Worsted Manufactures, including small




Carpets, carpeting and floor rugs, floor mats and
matting of wool (including carpets and rugs on a
wool or jute basis)-
" Printed Tapestry and Tapestry Velvet Carpets and
Rugs JJ
" Brussels and Wilton Carpets and Rugs, known as such KK
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Table 3-7
Commodity Descriptions for Class III J, "Woollen and
Worsted Yarns and Manufactures", 1935-9 (Exports)...cont'd.
COMMODITY DESCRIPTION CODE
Carpets, carpeting and floor rugs, floor mats and
matting of wool ... cont'd.
" Axminster (including chenille Axminster) Carpets
and Rugs, known as such
" Woollen Carpets and Rugs, not elsewhere specified
Total Value- Woollen and Worsted Yarns and
Manufactures - III J
(Countries not specified)
Prior to 1936, included "Knitted, netted or crocheted
tissues".
** Not shown separately prior to 1936
*** Not shown separately in 1936







1st degree 2nd degree 3rd degree
H includes D to G
NN includes/
\
W includes M to V




British Exports of Woollen and Worsted Yarns
and Manufactures to China, 1935-9
COMMODITY 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
Vol.Ill
A 7,310 9,393 84,393 11,827 77,212
B 305,358 776,494 575,668 31,567 186,277
Total of A & B 312,668 785,887 660,061 43,394 263,489
D 46,097 8,757 3,856 3,052 2,144
E 21,243 7,451 11,624 6,484 8,281
G 6,658 1,573 2,017 1,326 4,165
Total of D,E,G 73,998 17,781 17,497 10,862 14,590
H(subs D,E,G) 74,058 18,391 17,987 10,862 . 14,607.
F (H-(D,E,G)) 60 610 490 nil 17
K 2,437 6,143 15,865 6,409 22,558
L 2,431 2,294 3,193 2,151 2,486
M 7,276 4,715 7,479 2,528 11,400
N 11,466 10,225 11,507 7,011 11,192
0 47,845 22,037 26,992 16,110 39,130
P 31,727 10,527 11,503 11,536 15,445
R 4,361 4,596 5,404 2,667 7,991
S 7,479 6,406 7,076 1,694 6,042
T 13,667 5,125 11,768 3,973 24,219
U 28,709 11,989 12,629 11,639 17,154
Total of M to U 152,530 75,620 94,358 57,158 132,573
W (subs M to U) 152,530 75,683 94,358 57,158 132,573
o & V
(w- (M to U))
nil 63 nil nil nil
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Table 3-8
British Exports of Woollen and Worsted Yarns
and Manufactures to China, 1935-9.cont'd.
COMMODITY 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
Vol.Ill (cont'd.)
Y 3,777 2,410 4,652 2,600 6,070
Z 54,061 13,675 37,692 32,631 33,410
BB 1,567 2,323 7,629 1,034 2,338
cc 44,306 12,877 33,864 17,471 . 37,013
Total of Y,Z,
BB, CC
103,711 31,285 83,837 53,736 78,831
DD (subs Y, Z,
BB, CC)
104,107 31,982 83,931 54,070 78,831
X & AA
(DD- (Y,Z,BB,CC))









74,058 18,391 17,987 10,862 14,607
Tissues (ie,




810 1,643 1,457 644 1,782
Other sorts value only
Source: Annual Statement, 1939, Vols.Ill & IV.
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not re-occur in other years.
Clearly, when constructing the index, we cannot use two, or more,
levels simultaneously. We are then faced with a problem: the higher level
usually gives greater coverage but is less homogeneous and hence more
likely to contain 'invisible* composition changes, while the lower levels
are more homogeneous but tend to shed coverage. In Table 3-9 we compare
the different results obtained by using lower and higher level commodities
for a Paasche unit value index for 'Other Woollen Tissues' between 1935
and 1939 (i.e., M to U in Table 3-7).
In this table we also introduce a further complication: there are two
units of quantity given, hundredweight and square yards. By far the most
usual measurement of quantity in the trade returns is weight,but occasion¬
ally other units are given, either alternatively or in addition. In this
case, because of the structure of the commodity categorisation (over
16 oz/sq.yd., 12-16 oz/sq.yd., etc.), there will not be much difference,
in the lower level commodities, between using weight or area. In other
cases, for instance machine tools, where often weight and number are
given, the divergence can be substantial. Conceptually, there is no
advantage in using one quantity measure rather than another - they merely
tell us different things. Moreover, in theory at least, a comparison
using two (or more) different measurements can be informative. For in¬
stance, if the unit value per ton of a particular type of machine tools
goes up less than the unit value per unit (number), then we know that
these machine tools are getting heavier, and thus presumably bigger. From
there we might reasonably infer that they are probably getting more
O C
complex, ^ with all that implies, although, as we have already argued,
it would be a leap of faith to say that 'more complex' is better.
However, we could more easily have reached the same conclusion about
the increasing weight of these particular machine tools by simply finding
the average unit weight. Moreover, the movement of average unit weight
in a commodity series is seldom, if ever, as unambiguous as this. The
more usual pattern is a fluctuation that reflects the heterogeneity of




Paasche unit value indexes for Britain's exports
of 'Other Woollen Tissues' to China, 1935-9
1935 = 100
a/ Lower levels, by weight
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
M
PcQc 7,276 4,715 7,479 2,528 11,400
cwt 354 142 270 73 426
PoQc 7,276 2,919 5,550 1,500 8,756 j
PcQc 11,466 10,225 11,507 7,011 11,192
N cwt 536 420 454 279 384
PoQc 11,466 8,985 9,712 5,968 8,215
PcQc 47,845 22,037 26,992 16,110 39,130
0 cwt 1,683 858 739 391 1,233
PoQc 47,845 24,392 21,009 11,116 35,052
PcQc 31,727 . . 10,5.27 11,503 . 11,536 15,445
P cwt 969 313 335 302 428
PoQc 31,727 10,248 10,969 9,888 14,014
PcQc 4,361 4,596 5,404 2,667 7,991
R cwt 320 281 351 154 383
PoQc 4,361 3,830 4,784 2,099 5,220
PcQc 7,479 6,406 7,076 1,694 6,042
S cwt 673 413 579 87 279
PoQc 7,479 4,590 6,434 967 3,101
PcQc 3,667 5,125 11,768 3,973 24,219
T cwt 517 176 366 139 848
PoQc 13,667 4,653 9,675 3,675 22,417
PcQc 28,709 11,989 12,629 11,639 17,154
U cwt 846 322 358 347 474
PoQc 28,709 10,927 12,149 11,775 16,085
EPcQc 152,530 75,620 94,358 57,158 132,573
EPoQc 152,530 70,544 80,282 46,988 112,860




Paasche unit value indexes for Britain's exports
of 'Other Woollen Tissues' to China,1935-9 ...cont'd.
1935 = 100
Lower levels, by area


















































































































































EPcQc 152,530 75,620 94,358 57,158 132,573
EPoQc 152,530 70,526 80,301 47,136 111,712




Paasche unit value indexes for Britain's exports
of 'Other Woollen Tissues' to China,1935-9 ...cont'd.
1935 = 100
C//Higher level commodity group: 'Total of other Woollen Tissues' (W)




















































d// Comparison of the UVI's
1935 = 100
Level Measure 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
Lower weight 100 107 118 122 118
Lower area 100 107 118 121 119
Higher weight 100 100 106 125 115
Higher area 100 110 119 122 123
e/
Using the Laspeyres & Fisher Formulae
Formula Level Measure 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
Laspeyre: Low Br Weight lOO 107 117 127 118
Fisher 100 107 117 124 118
Laspeyre; Area 100 107 115 126 117
Fisher loo 107 116 124 118
Laspeyre;
Higher
Weight loo lOO 106 125 115
Fisher 100 lOO 106 125 115
Laspeyre: Area 100 110 119 122 123
pisher 100 HO 119 122 123 :
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the commodity, and this is something to which we will return later. For
the moment it is clear that it is not possible to use two or more different
quantity measurements in constructing the general unit value indexes; we
must choose one. As a matter of policy, therefore, we have, in construct¬
ing these indexes, always opted for weight when the choice had to be made.
This was partly for reasons of consistency, and partly because it was
felt that weight was a more neutral measurement and less presumptive of
quality change.^® In the particular example with which we are dealing
here, the two units of quantity are of equal neutrality, so there is no
temptation to say that one is better than the other. What is important,
however, is that the two lower level indexes:-
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
by weight lOO 107 118 122 118
by area loo 107 118 121 119
are virtually the same, the two higher level ones differ considerably
both from the lower level ones, and from each other:-
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
by weight loo lOO 106 125 115
by area lOO no 119 122 123
Whilst there is no question of any particular index being 'the true
27index' , the lower level indexes seem preferable. This is so because
the individual indexes for the lower level commodities tend more towards
being price indexes because the commodities are more homogeneous, and
their summation gives a more accurate weighting to the constituent
indexes. To put it another way, the higher level indexes conceal invisible
shifts in composition. Using the lower level, more homogeneous, commo-
26
cf. Kmdleberger, Terms of Trade, pp.357-358.
27
cf. U.N., Relative Prices: "There can be no single 'true' index
number of export or import prices. The impossibility of finding and pre¬
senting a single 'true' index number and therefore a single 'true' figure
for changing terms of trade is not due to any deficiency in the statisti¬
cal data used or the statistical techniques employed. It is a logical
impossibility.", p.137.
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dities enables us to at least partly identify these shifts. In Table
3-10a, for instance, we calculate indexes and weights for the same
lower level commodities for 1936 (with 1935 as base year) and we can
see that, whereas the higher level index remained constant, the
constituent commodities all rose in unit value (column 4) except 0
("Other Woollen Tissues, All wool, Woven, Weighing 8 oz. and under,
12 oz. to the sq.yd."), which dropped. Accounting as it did for 35
per cent of the total (column 5), this dampened the aggregate index.
It may be, of course, that 'prices' did remain steady (or rise or fall),
and that the changes in the unit values of the lower level commodities
were merely due to shifts within the commodities themselves, but it is
reasonable to assume that the more homogeneous the commodity, the less
effect such shifts would have. This assumption is represented
diagrammatically in Fig.3-10 where, as the commodity approaches homo¬
geneity, so the degree to which variation in unit value can be ascribed
to price change increases. If the commodity is 'perfectly' homogeneous,
then any change in unit value is due entirely to change in price. On
the other hand, as the heterogeneity of the commodity increases, so
does the possible effect of composition shift.
In this example of "Other Woollen Tissues", the decision as to which
commodities to use is easy: we choose the lower level ones and, presumably,
gain in accuracy and the opportunity for analysis. Usually, however, the
choice is not so easy, for by using the lower level rather than the
higher, we invariably lose coverage. In this case we have only lost £63
(commodities Q & V) in 1936, which is of course negligible; but loss can
be up to, say, about 90 per cent of the high level commodity. Therefore,
in constructing the indexes (or rather, the export index; the problem
does not arise with the import index), we have arbitrarily set a
tolerance limit of 25 per cent. As long as the available constituent
commodities total more than three quarters of the higher level commodity,
they are used in preference. In Appendixes F and G, superseded data -
data which is omitted from the sample in favour of data from another
level - is indicated by 'S'.
Table 9-e gives the indexes produced in the Laspeyres and Fisher
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Table 3-10 a
Individual UVI' s and Weights for Exports of
"Other Woollen Tissues" to China,1935 & 1936
1935 = 100















M. 7,276 7,276 1.00 4.77 4.77
N 11,466 11,466 1.00 7.52 7.52
0 47,845 47,845 1.00 31.37 31.37
P 31,727 31,727 1.00 20.80 20.80
R 4,361 4,361 1.00 2.86 2.86
S 7,479 7,479 1.00 4.90 4.90
T 13,667 13,667 1.00 8.96 8.96
U 28,709 28,709 1.00 18.82 18.82
Sum 152,530 152,530 8.00 100 100
1936
M 4,715 2,919 1.62 4.14 6.71
N 10,225 8,985 1.14 12.74 14.52
0 22,037 24,392 0.90 34.58 31.12
P 10,527 10,248 1.03 14.53 14.97
R 4,596 3,830 1.20 5.43 6.52
S 6,406 4,590 1.40 6.51 9.11
T 5,125 4,653 1.10 6.60 7.26
U 11,989 10,927 1.10 15.49 17.04
Sum 75,620 70,544 9.49 100 107.25
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formulae from the same data. In this particular case they are very
similar to the Paasche indexes precisely because the commodities in the
example display no very great changes in unit value or weight. However,
it is easy enough to construct an imaginary case where this does happen
and it can be seen then that differences between the indexes can be
appreciable. Consider, in Table 3-10b, a sample with two commodities,
A and B, over three years. A's unit value falls rapidly while its
weight (in its statistical sense of a proportion, not to be confused
with cwt. or lbs.) is increasing. In this particular example, and
one could of course construct a number of variants, the other commodity
has a constant unit value but a decreasing weight.
The Fisher formula is the geometric mean of the Paasche and Laspeyres
formulae and its index, of course, lies between their's. The Paasche
formula, by being sensitive to the increasing weight of commodity A,
responds much more to its changing unit value and produces a much
lower index than does the Laspeyres which, focusing on the base year
when A's weight is small (20 per cent), is not much affected by its
subsequent change in unit value. Had A's weight been greater in the
base year, or had it been B which declined in unit value, the Laspeyres
form would have given a lower index than the Paasche. In practice,
fortunately, such fluctuations in weight and unit value are dampened
by the relatively large number of commodities,and differences
between the indexes would usually be more muted. Although, as we shall
see below, the structure of the data rules out the Laspeyres and
Fisher formulae, their ability to yield different results should be
borne in mind.
Tolerance of Heterogeneity
So far we have talked of commodities being in a spectrum with hetero¬
geneity at one end and homogeneity at the other. In fact, a 'perfectly'
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Table 3-10b
Illustration of differing indexes
Year 0 1 2
PcQc lOOO 2000 400
cwt 20 50 80
A
UV 50 40 5
PoQc lOOO 2500 4000
PcQo lOOO 800 lOO
PcQc 6000 3750 1500
B
cwt 80 50 20
UV 75 75 75
PoQc 600O 3750 1500
PcQo 6000 6000 6000
Totals
IpcQc 7000 5750 1900
EPoQc 7000 6250 5500
Paasche UVI loo 92 35
EPcQo 7000 6800 6 lOO
Totals
EPoQo 7000 7000 7000
Laspeyres UVI lOO 97 87


























































































heterogeneous' commodity is a contradiction in terms and the trade
returns we are using do not deal with commodities precisely defined enough
(e.g., 10 oz. tins of Heinz baked beans) to be termed 'perfectly homo¬
geneous'.^® So, virtually all the commodities with which we are dealing,
even the preferred lower level ones when we have a choice, are both
potentially intolerably heterogeneous and bunched somewhat in the middle
of the spectrum.
There are two quantitative indicators of heterogeneity: (1) relation¬
ship between quantity measures and (2) unit value fluctuations.
Relationship between quantity measures
Occasionally, as has been noted, commodities are given with two or more
quantity measures - weight, area, number, etc.. In this case the relation¬
ship between the measures gives an indication of heterogeneity. In the
textiles example we have been using, the measures were often tied to¬
gether by definition, but two which were not were "Wool and Mohair
plushes and other Pile fabrics" (K) and "Flannels and Delaines" (L).
In Table 3-11 we take these two commodities and calculate the index of
the weight/area ratios, and in Table 3-12, in order to extend the example,
we do the same for a completely different type of commodity, gear-cutting
machine tools.
These three commodities illustrate the range of relationships between
quantity measures. For commodity K the weight/area ratio is very stable,
and for L it fluctuates by a quarter. However, it is the machine tools
that shows by far the greatest fluctuation: the average weight doubles
and then drops to a twelfth of the base year average before returning,
in 1962, to virtually the same average weight as in 1959. This fluctu¬
ation would not matter if it had no effect on the unit-value indexes but,
by definition, the movement of the cross-measure index (here, average
weight per unit) is directly proportional to the divergence between the
The primary statistics are in fact coded in far greater detail than




Weight/Area Ratios for Selected
British Exports to China
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
K
Value £ 2,437 6,143 15,865 6,409 22,558
sq.yds. 8,836 25,019 61,529 22,724 78,228
cwt 92 242 562 227 760
ozs. 164,864 43,664 1,007,104 406,784 1,361,920
oz/sq.yd. 18.66 17.3 16.37 17.90 17.41
Index 100 93 88 96 93
L
Value £ 2,431 2,294 3,193 2,151 2,486 .
sq.yds. 23,930 23,678 26,260 17,341 21,155
cwt. 145 107 153 82 92
ozs. 259,840 191,744 274,176 146,944 164,864
oz/sq.yd. 10.86 8.10 10.44 8.47 7.79
Index 100 75 96 78 72
Table 3-12
Average Weight of Britain's Exports of "Machine
Tools, New, Complete, Gear-cutting" to China, 1959-62
1959 1960 1961 1962
Value £ 49,470 225,284 16,759 95,834
number 1 3 2 2
cwt. 1,222 7,589 204 2,369
ave.wt. 1,222 2,530 102 1,185
Index .
wt 100 207 8 97
Value/unit 49,470 75,095 8,380 47,917
Index
unit 100 152 17 97
Value/cwt. 41 30 82 41
Indexcwt 100 73 200 100
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individual unit-value indexes:-
1'e'' Icm Iml x 100
*m2
where Ic2^is the index of the relationship between the quantity measures,
mi and m2, and Imi, Im2 are their respective unit-value indexes. In this
case: -
1959 1960 1961 1962
Icm (cwt/unit index) lOO 207 8 97
Imi (U.V.I, by unit) 100 152 17 97
1m2 (U.V.I, by cwt.) 100 73 200 100
(The figures do not fit exactly because of rounding.)
Thus, if we are talking in terms of units, the 'price' of these gear-
cutting machines would seem to rise by half in 1960, and drop to less
than a fifth of its 1959 level in 1961, but in terms of 'price' per
hundredweight, the movement is reversed - they are cheaper in 1960 and
more expensive in 1961. So, depending on which unit of measurement we
29
use, we get radically different results.
Unit value fluctuation
Usually there is but one unit of quantity and the question of diver¬
gent unit-value indexes does not arise. However, there may be violent
fluctuations in the single index as is illustrated, for instance, by
Table 3-13.
It seems that in cases like these the primary cause of UV fluctuation
is composition change. That is, the lenses that were exported to China
in 1955 and 1957 were not the same sort, on average, that were exported
Incidentally, it is worth noting that the by-weight UVI is more




Two examples of violent unit value fluctuation
(Exports; 1958 = 100)
1955 1956 1957 1958
"Precision balances for use in assay, laboratory & similar work"
Value £ - 61 1,904 5,329
number - 4 25 19
unit value £ - 15.25 76.16 280.47
UVI - 5 27 100
B
"Photographic & cinematograph lenses, separately consigned"
Value £ 866 - 128 18,174
number 27 — 4 155
unit value £ 32.07 - 32.00 117.25
UVI 27 - 27 100
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in 1958. With only one unit of quantity we cannot be sure, of course,
but in general violent fluctuation in unit value must throw doubt on
the commodity's role as indicator of price change.
We will return to these two indicators of heterogeneity in a moment,
but let us look first at another aspect of heterogeneity.
Commodity description variation
This is by no means as unambiguous as it might appear. We have seen
that the 'real' commodity can change even though the description of it
remains unaltered. There are, on the other hand, innumerable cases where
the description varies but it seems that the commodity actually traded
remains reasonably constant. This involves an assumption of continuity
which may be defined thus:
It is assumed that the commodity actually traded tends
towards continuity despite changes in commodity
description.
This assumption is illustrated by Table 3-14, Fig.3-11, which traces
Britain's imports of 'hat bodies' from China from 1930 to 1969. Despite
a bewildering kaleidoscope of commodity descriptions, it will be seen
that there is an unbroken thread of imports from China, and although we
cannot be sure, it seems likely that this thread may represent a
reasonably homogeneous commodity.
Part of the ambiguity in this case arises because the commodity(ies)
from China is usually negatively defined - defined in terms of what it
is not. Many commodities are so described. At the one extreme there is
the "other description, not elsewhere specified" type which is often a
rag-bag of odds and ends that have not been fitted in anywhere else and
so tends to be heterogeneous. On the other hand it is by no means unusual
for quite tight commodities to be negatively defined. The determining
factor is often the context, and even when a commodity appears to be
positively defined, it is also invariably contextually defined as well.
That is, few commodities, especially amongst manufactures, stand alone,
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Table 3-14
Britain's imports of 'Hat bodies' from China, 1930-69
COMMODITY DESCRIPTION CODE
Hats, Caps and other Headgear, Trimmed and Untrimmed-
" Of Straw 1
" Of Felt (including bodies)-
Wool Felt 2
" " Fur Felt 3
Of Cloth 4
" Other 5
Hats, Caps and other Headgear (including Hoods)-
"
Hats, Caps, Bonnets, Hoods, Hat shapes, Brims, Crowns
and similar articles, not made wholly or partly of Felt
or Wool (excluding Rubber Bathing Caps;and Toy Paper
Hats and Caps) which have been lined, trimmed or decorated
in any manner, or of which the edges have been cut to
shape, hemmed or bound-
" " Of Straw 6
Other 7
" Loosely felted Hat Forms and cone-shaped Felt Hat Bodies-
" " Of Wool Felt 8
" " Of Fur Felt 9
" Other Hats, Caps, Bonnets, Hoods, Hat Shapes, Brims,
Crowns and similar articles, wholly or partly of Felt
or Wool-
" " Of Wool Felt 10
" Of Fur Felt 11
Of Cloth 12
" " Other 13
" Other descriptions 14
Hats, Caps and other Headgear (including Hoods but excluding
rubber bathing caps and toy paper hats and caps)-
" Not made wholly or partly of Felt or Wool-
" " if lined, trimmed or decorated in any manner, or






Britain's imports of 'Hat bodies' from China, 1930-69...
cont d.
COMMODITY DESCRIPTION CODE
tt IT " Of Straw 15
II II " Other 16
II II Not lined, trimmed, etc. 17
Made wholly or partly of Felt or Wool-
II II Loosely felted Hat Forms and cone-shaped Felt
Hat'Bodies- '
II II " Of Wool Felt 18
II l» " Of Fur Felt 19
II II Others made wholly or partly of Felt—
II II " Of Wool Felt
20
• 1 II Of Fur Felt
21
II II Others made wholly or partly of Wool but not of Felt-
II II Of Cloth 22
II II " Other (including knitted) 23
" Not made wholly or partly of felt or wool-
II IT If lined, trimmed or decorated in any manner, or if
the edges have been cut to shape, hemmed or bound 24
Made wholly or partly of felt or wool-
II II Loosely felted hat forms and cone-shaped•felt
hat bodies 25
II II Others made wholly or partly of felt-
II II Of fur felt-
II II " " With a raised or laid pile finish . 26
II II " " Other 27
Hat bodies, hoods and shapes, not trimmed, blocked to shape
or tip-stretched (excluding rubber bathing caps and toy
paper hats and caps)-
" Loosely felted hat forms and cone-shaped felt hat bodies,
made wholly or partly of felt or wool 28
" Other, not made wholly or partly of felt or wool, not
lined, trimmed or decorated in any manner and excluding
headgear with the edges cut to shape, hemmed or bound 29
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Table 3-14
Britain's imports of 'Hat bodies' from China, 1930-69...
cont 'd.
COMMODITY DESCRIPTION CODE
Hat bodies, hoods, shapes and similar articles, not blocked
to shape, lined, trimmed or decorated in any manner and
excluding headgear with edges cut to shape, hemmed or bound
and rubber bathing caps and toy paper hats or caps-
11
Hat forms, hat bodies, hoods, manchons and plateaux
of felt 30
" Other 31
Hat forms, hat bodies, and hoods of felt, neither blocked to
shape nor with made brims, plateaux and manchons (including
slit manchons), of felt-
"
Hat bodies (other than cone-shaped) and hoods-
" " Of wool felt _ 32
Of fur felt 33
Other 34
Hat shapes, plaited or made from plaited or other strips of
any material, neither blocked to shape nor with made brims 35
NB: - Commodities 15 & 16 and 18 & 19 are joined together in
1950.
- The following small imports from China of commodity 1
have been omitted from the table for clarity
1930 1931 1932 1933




unrelated to other commodities. Thus,to determine that there is a prima
facie indication of continuity despite changes in nomenclature involves
judgments informed by the context.
This combination of contextual evaluation and assumption of continuity
is also used in the common case where a commodity is split into two, or
more, but the trade with China only continues in one of the new commo¬
dities, and at roughly the same level as before. This is illustrated by
Table 3-16, where the commodity is split up into two in 1938 and exports
to China are only reported for one of the new commodities, diesel engines,
and at a similar level.
Had the exports to China dropped from 83 tons in 1937 to, say, 10 tons
in 1938, then it might be presumed that the 1937 engines contained a
large proportion of paraffin engines. However, since the volume actually
rose in 1938, and no exports of paraffin engines are specified, it can be
assumed that diesel engines formed the bulk of the exports in the previous
period and so, instead of having two commodities, one from 1930 to 1937
and the other for 1938 and 1939, it seems likely that there was basically
one commodity, diesel engines, throughout the whole of the period.
Although this joining together of differing commodity descriptions
increases the chances of the resulting commodity becoming more hetero¬
geneous, it does no more than that. All commodities, whether their
descriptions remain unchanged or not, display a certain amount of
fluctuation in what we have termed the quantitative indicators of hetero¬
geneity and the question of goodness of fit between differing descriptions
is but a particular aspect of the general problem.
RESPONSES TO HETEROGENEITY
Arbitrary Tolerance and Exclusion
The most common solution is to apply a specific tolerance limit to unit
value fluctuation. In Nankai University's Price, Quantity and Value Index






























































































































































were 40 per cent higher or 30 per cent lower than in the previous year
were excluded.30 Kindleberger, using less detailed commodities (in fact
commodity groups) applied a tolerance of 100 per cent.^1 A far more
satisfactory approach, but one unfortunately beyond our resources, is
the use of a "Multiple Constrained Unit Value Index" developed by
Edward A. Hewlett in his study of Foreign Trade Prices in the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance:
In this approach, indices are calculated first on the basis
of all available unit values for goods sold in every year
during the period being indexed. Then progressively tighter
constraints are imposed on the absolute value of the annual
percentage unit value changes which a commodity can exhibit
in any given year and still remain in the sample. If, after
the elimination of obviously 'bad' unit values (e.g. a 100%
change in some year) the index proves insensitive to further
constraints within some reasonable range (80% to 20%), then
evidently the specific set of commodities included in the
index does not matter, and there is no need to agonize over
what commodities should or should not be in the index. In
those cases where the index is sensitive to constraints, in
the 'reasonable' zone, guesses are made on which commodities
are exhibiting commodity composition changes and thus which
constraint to use. The MCUVI technique is much less time-
consuming than the a priori elimination technique because,
instead of enormous amounts of man-hours, MCUVI only requires
a few 'computer-minutes'. Also MCUVI is as good as the a
priori elimination technique because it forces the researcher
to make a priori-type decisions, but only when those decisions
will make a difference, i.e. only when eliminating some
products from an index will significantly change the value of
an index.32
This description of Nankai University's Price, Quantity and Value
Index of China's Imports and Exports (Tientsin, 1930) comes from Ch'en
and Liu, Foreign Trade Statistics , pp.319 - 324.
These Nankai indexes are clearly the work of the team headed by Professor
Franklin L. Ho whose report of their work, Index Numbers of the Quantities
and Prices of Imports and Exports and the Barter Terms of Trade in China,
1867-1928, was published by the university that year. Ho, in this report,
does not specify a percentage, he merely mentions "excluding those with
abnormal price fluctuation".
^"''Kindleberger, Terms of Trade, p. 354.
32
Edward A. Hewlett, Foreign Trade Prices in the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp.63-64.
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An Alternative Approach
Concentration on major commodities
Somewhat the same result can be obtained by using a different, and
admittedly more rudimentary, approach. It will be apparent that fluctu¬
ations in the unit value of individual commodities only affect the
general index in proportion to their importance in the sample. Thus, a
100 per cent rise in a commodity accounting for 1 per cent of the sample
only produces a .01 increase in the index. Furthermore it may be safely
assumed that with a large number of commodities, none of which is big
enough to seriously affect the index on its own, distortions caused by
heterogeneity will tend to cancel each other out, revealing the under¬
lying price movement. That is, there is no reason to suppose that compo¬
sition change within the commodities has any inherent bias. If this
'assumption of neutrality' (to use Hewlett's phrase) is accepted, then
we need only 'agonize' over large commodities. The Nankai study, on the
other hand, did not distinguish the size of commodities and in the two
years we are given as an example, the excluded commodities only account
for 2 million haikuan taels out of respective totals of 1,124 and 1,103
million.^ If a constraint only affects 0.2 per cent of a sample it is
either not tight enough or it is pointless.
In this study only those commodities which account for 5 per cent or
more of the sample in any particular year have their unit value fluctu¬
ations tested.34 This use of an arbitrary limit is of course less satis¬
factory than a flexible constraint,but it is not likely to make much
difference to the result. As Table 3-17 indicates, this 5 per cent rule
means that only some dozen commodities need to be looked at, rather than,
in exports 1936, say, 149.
Whether we test all, or only some, of the commodities we are still
33
Ho, Index Numbers, p.8 and quoted in Ch'en and Liu, Foreign Trade
Statistics, pp.322-323.
34
Apart from a few obviously erratic export commodities such as those
illustrated in Table 3-7. Technically the constraint is defined as 5.0
weight in series XS5 (exports) and MS3 (imports).
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Table 3-17






NO % NO % NO %
Exports (XS5)
10% + 3 2 3 8 1 1
5-10% 2 1 0 0 3 3
1-5 % 7 5 2 5 6 7
< 1 % 137 92 35 88 79 89
Total 149 40 89
Imports (MS3)
10% + 2 8 1 3 1 2
5-10% 4 16 5 16 4 10
1-5 % 8 32 3 9 9 22
< 1 % 11 44 23 72 27 66
Total 25 32 41
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faced with the problem of fixing some limit to unit value fluctuation.,
Kindleberger's 100 per cent, whilst it has the virtue of simplicity,
seems far too large, while the Nankai study's 30 or 40 per cent is
equally arbitrary. Without more detailed knowledge of a commodity one
does not know what is the 'reasonable' range of unit values to expect]
and, of course, different commodities will have different reasonable
ranges. That is, a certain fluctuation in the unit value of one commo¬
dity will indicate heterogeneity, but the same fluctuation in another
commodity will largely be the result of price variation. Similarly,
the reasonable range will vary from period to period: a commodity may
move from a period of price stability to one of price volatility. Thus,
a single arbitrary exclusion limit (i.e., when the unit value of a
commodity differs more than x per cent from the previous year's that
commodity is excluded from the sample) suffers both from being pretty
much a guess and also being almost certainly inappropriate for different
commodities and different periods.
Classification
Since deriving tailor-made exclusion limits is out of the question
for such a large number of commodities and years, a different approach
has been adopted. It was decided not to exclude any commodities which
had reached this stage (export commodities, it will be recalled, had
already been fairly drastically reduced) but rather to classify them as
to their 'trustworthiness' as price indicators.
There were two reasons for this. Firstly, whilst the unit value is
used as an estimate for price, it also has a certain legitimacy in its
own right. For example, China's production of tea is affected by bad
weather; the amount exported is the same, but a lot of it is low quality.
The prices on the world market are unchanged but the China unit value,
and receipts, have fallen. It is of no consolation to China that the net
barter terms of trade have remained constant. Indeed, in the case of tea,
where China is an important supplier, with a shortfall in the amount of
high-quality tea reaching the market, the terms of trade might actually
have risen, but what is of importance to China is that for the same
input of factors of production she has received less. The unit value
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terms of trade may thus, in a sense, incorporate the factorial terms of
trade.
Secondly, without access to, and rigorous examination of, price data,
we can never be sure about the respective roles of price and non-price
factors in unit value change. Whatever the tests applied, we remain in
the realm of likelihood rather than certainty, and classification rather
than exclusion is the consistent extension of this.
So far, then, it has been decided:
a. Only to test those commodities which have a weight
in the total sample, in any one year, of 5 per cent
or more. These are called 'major' commodities; the
others are termed 'residual' commodities.
b. To classify major commodities into two categories,
A and B, according to the degree their unit value
seems to be indicative of price. All residual
commodities are automatically classified A.^5
Classification rule formulation
It now remains to formulate some simple tests.The actual testing
is implemented in Appendixes A (imports) and D (exports) and a diagram
of the decision process is shown by Figure 3-12.
Annual unit value variation.- Following usual practice (e.g., Ho,
Kindleberger), the rate of change of unit value over the previous year
is initially examined. An arbitrary,but quite low, limit of 30 per cent
is set. Since even the most important commodities may rise from, or fall
o tr
This meant the inclusion of some highly suspect commodities, such
as X380, whose calculated UVI moves from 99 in 1964 to 12,671 in the
following year. Whether this is merely due to a misprint or whether there
was some extraordinary change in composition is immaterial,since the
effect on the index is negligible.
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into, obscurity, only rate of change into 'critical years' (years in
which the weight is 5 per cent or more) is considered relevant. Neverthe¬
less, as will be seen in the respective Appendixes (A for imports, D for
exports), it is usually important to take other years into account,
especially of course, the base year, and often the run from base year to
critical year(s) will be shown. If the critical year is isolated - that
is, if there is no China data for the preceding year, or if the critical
year is on the leading edge of the period (i.e., 1930 or 1946) - then
this initial test is not possible and we proceed directly to the PUV
test, which is described in paragraph three (examples of this are X18
or X34). If the variation is less than 30 per cent, the commodity is
usually classified A without further testing. Occasionally, when there
is reason to suppose that the China unit value (CUV) differs appreciably
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from the 'Excluding China unit value' (XCUV) either in movement (i.e.,
the DIV test, paragraph two) or actual value (the PUV test), the commo¬
dity is tested further, even though the unit value variation is within
tolerance. One example of this is X53, "Man-made fibres, Cut staple
fibre". The preceding commodity, X52, is also man-made fibres and its
CUV for the critical years is half the XCUV. It was thought likely that
the same might happen with X53, so its PUV was tested and the suspicion
proved correct.
Difference in variation.- The next test involves comparing the movement
of the CUV with that of the XCUV, which gives the Difference in Variation
(DIV):-
DIV = CUVc _ XCUVc
cuvc_1 xcuvc_1
where c is the critical year and c-1 the preceding one. It is assumed
that changes in XCUV are due primarily to price rather than composition.
The validation of sharp fluctuation in CUV by comparing it with XCUV
movement is illustrated by Fig.3-13 which charts both for exports of
37
XCUV: The general unit value of the commodity traded after the China
data has been excluded. If the trade with China is but a small part of
the total trade (or if CUV = XCUV) this exclusion will not make much
difference. However, with major commodities, the China portion is likely











"Wool tops, Merino" (X59; full data is given in Appendix D). The sharp
rise and fall of CUV from 1949 to 1952 (+18%, +48%, +66%, -46%) is
closely paralleled by the XCUV (+16%, +32%, +68%, -37%). As a result,the
DIV is small (+2%, +16%, -2%, -9%) and the movement of the CUV is seen
to be mainly the result of price change. Indeed, what we have here, of
course, is the Korean War boom, which manifests itself time and again
in this study. This test also uses a limit of 30; if the difference
between the two variations is 30 or greater, the commodity is classified B.
Proportional unit value.- The final test concerns the Proportional Unit
Value, PUV, which is the CUV as a percentage of the XCUV. This test is
used when either:-
a. Calculation of the variation of the CUV on the
preceding year is not possible (shown as NC in
Fig.3-12).
b. The 'base year status' of the commodity is E. This
means that no trade with China is reported for the
commodity in the base year, 1958, so the general unit
value for the total trade in that commodity is used
instead. Although, as Appendix H shows, this is statis¬
tically quite acceptable in general, probability
provides no guarantee that any particular commodity is
safe. It is therefore reasonable prudence to check
major commodities in their critical years. The PUV
indicates whether the commodity traded with China has
roughly (a rather tighter constraint of 20 per cent
is used here) the same unit value as the commodity in
general in the critical years, and hence, presuming
continuity, whether the latter provides a reasonable
substitute for the CUV in the base year.
For case 'a', the PUV is an alternative test, but for case 'b' it
is additional to the others.
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Limitations and application of the classification procedure:- There are,
of course, other ways of investigating whether the unit value movement
is plausibly due to price change. One obvious way, which would be
principally applicable to imports, would be to correlate unit value on
quantity. Where China is a major supplier (and perhaps in the occasional
case where she is a major purchaser), we may find a high negative
Correlation between unit value and quantity, which would strongly indicate
price movement.
It could also be argued that we might as well dispense with the
initial test (VAR) and move straight on to the second (DIV) since the
absence of violent unit value fluctuation proves nothing on its own.
Just as Sherlock Holmes found it suspicious that the dog didn't bark,
so a stable CUV during the Korean War boom, for instance, would be cause
for alarm. This is quite true, and the only defence is that more rigorous
testing takes more work, to a degree not justified by the objective. In
the end, just over a third of the major commodities are classified B,
which seems quite a satisfactory proportion.
There is, moreover, a safety device that makes it unlikely that any
commodity has been grossly mis-classified. One advantage of concentrating
on the relatively small number of important commodities, and doing the
job by hand rather than computer, is that the rules can be applied with
discretion. On the one hand, one can easily pick up suspicious cases
such as X53 (man-made fibres) which for a computer to do would require a
very much more complicated rule formulation; on the other hand, there are
occasions when the rules can, with justification, be waived. As a result
the decision process is kept simple, although this is done, it must be
admitted, at the cost of a certain amount of inconsistency.
The most common case when the rules are explicitly overridden occurs
when the CUV and XCUV are 'out of phase' with each other. This usually
happens in times of rapid price change (especially Korean War boom) and
it is not surprising that new prices should appear in different recording
years. (It would have been interesting to examine the monthly returns for
the Korean War period.) This is illustrated by Table 3-18 and Figs.3-14,
3-15. In the table, the unit value movements are smoothed by two- and
three-year moving averages and the correlation coefficients (r) calculated.
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Table 3--18
Smoothing of ' out of phase' uilit value movements
CUV XCUV
Year Actual 2 yr . MAV 3 yr.MAV Actual 2 yr .MAV 3 yr MAV
1946 12.15 11.16
1947 12.19 12 .17 10. 76 9.66 10. 41 8.92
1948 7.95 10 .07 9. 07 8.55 9. 11 8.23
1949 7.07 7 .51 8. 29 7.58 8. 07 8.71
1950 9.86 8 .47 9. 16 9.99 8. 79 10. 27
1951 10.56 10 .21 11. 07 13.25 11. 62 11.99
O 1952 12.79 11 .68 9. 91 12.73 12. 99 11.54
S1953 6.37 9 .58 8. 45 8.64 10. 69 9.22
1954 6.20 6 .29 7. 08 6.30 7. 47 8.04
1955 8.66 7 .43 8. 08 9.19 7. 75 8.13
1956 9.39 9 .03 8. 74 8.90 9. 05 8.62
1957 8.18 8 .79 7. 57 7.77 8. 34 7.27
1958 5.15 6 .67 6. 38 5.15 6. 46 6.16





1947 17.55 16 .42 16. 94 18.40 17. 13 18.11
1948 17.99 17 .77 18. 38 20.09 19. 25 20.16
1949 19.59 18 .79 26. 58 21.98 21. 04 24.71
1950 42.15 30 .87 43. 22 32.07 27. 03 40.48
1951 67.91 55 .03 47. 55 67.39 49. 73 46.53
1952 32.60 50 .26 47. 14 40.14 53. 77 50.30
O 1053 40.91 36 .76 37. 25 43.36 41. 75 42.24
X 1954 38.24 _39 .58 38. 75 43. 23 43. 30 42.58
1955 37.10 37 .67 36. 85 41.15 42. 19 41.51
1956 35.20 36 .15 38. 23 40.1,4 40. 65 42.11
1957 42.39 38 .80 37. 00 45.04 42. 59 40.69
1958 33.40 37 .90 35. 82 36.88 40. 96 39.08
1959 31.66 32 .53 35. 48 35.32 36. 10 , 36.91





^1959 387 384 209 300
5 1960 188 288 202 206 -




COMPARISON OF CUV WITH XCUV FOR X42
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It will be seen that in all three cases at least one of the moving
averages gives a better fit than the actual unit value. This is especially
so for X42 which, for the same reason, produces the most graphic shift.
No moving averages have been calculated for M27 because of the gaps in
the China data. Further details of these commodities will be found in
the classification appendixes A and D and, of course, in F and G.
One further point remains to be mentioned. It was decided to ignore
unit value fluctuation in 'residual' commodities and concentrate on major
commodities because it was considered that no individual residual commo¬
dity could, by definition, have much effect on the unit value indexes
and that, en masse, erratic unit value movements would cancel themselves
out to reveal general price movement. Appendixes A and D suggest that
this also tends to apply to individual commodities. At small quantities,
38
unit values are often erratic in terms of both value in particular
years and movement over time. As the quantity increases, so the CUV tends
towards a more stable pattern, and often that of the XCUV. The reason
for this is not far to seek. What we describe as a 'commodity' is a
conglomerate of 'sub-commodities': the fewer the units of the commodity,
the more likely it is that its unit value will be affected by the
composition balance of sub-commodities. With larger quantities the
composition becomes more consistent. It also, not surprisingly, comes
close (gauging by the unit value) to the XCUV. One effect of this in
classifying major commodities is that VAR, DIV and PUV are often large
for non-critical years, and if we were to take those into account, we
would either have to loosen the rules or end up classifying virtually all
majors as B. By focusing on critical years this problem is avoided. We
are able to apply fairly strict tests to instances where it matters (i.e.,
major commodities in critical years) rather than dissipate the classi¬
fication over the unimportant (rather as Ho appears to have done). One
instance of the relationship between quantity and unit value stability
is illustrated by X674,(Table 3-19). Similar instances are afforded by
X680 and X697 (Appendix D).
So much so that,when the quantity drops to two or three units,the
commodity is usually,for convenience, read as nil for that year. This
has to be done, of course, when a value is given but the quantity is
shown as nil (i.e., it is less than half a unit). These cases are in¬
dicated by 'N' in the tables of Appendixes F and G.
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Table 3-19





cwt % of total
1958 :ns 36.38 _
1959 NS 34.56 -
1960 NS 36.28 -
1961 NS 37.75 -
1962 NS 39.07 -
1963 NS 44.42 -
1964 589 0.2 0.2 91.27 47.43 192
1965 57,283 12.8 15.2 49.34 45.24 109
1966 12,698 1.3 2.9 95.23 50.27 189
1967 17,673 2.0 2.3 101.31 58.97 172
1968 302 0.0 0.1 113.75 64.05 178
See also Appendix D.
Correlation coefficient of PUV on China cwt is -0 95.
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CHOICE OF INDEX FORMULAE
Despite all attempts at constructing continuous commodities there
remain innumerable gaps in the data caused by the non-existence or non-
reporting of trade and the non-classification of commodities in particular
years. This is especially true of the export data.
Since we are examining here the specific terms of trade; that is, the
combination of price and composition change in the trade of two countries,
these data gaps are, in a limited and negative sense, informative. Having
made the necessary simplifying assumption that non-reported means nil (or
negligible) these gaps become definite statements about the composition
of the trade. However, they are clearly a major hindrance to the
construction of the unit-value indexes.
The problems of constructing indexes over long periods of time are
both formidable and familiar. One solution is to use a chained index, but
this, in automatically adjusting to composition changes, is of no use
in analysing them over time.^9 For this we need a fixed base index,and
■noe.1q b t<?_cj
the usual combination of a Laspeyres base-weighting quantum index and a
Paasche current-weighted unit-value index would seem to be the best
solution. Moreover, from the same data, one could also calculate a
Laspeyres unit-value index, the comparison of which with the Paasche
form is a useful indication of composition change.^®
The scattered nature of the data, however, means that the resulting
indexes would cover only a small proportion of the total trade. The value
of commodities which are reported in the three years 1930, 1958 and 1969
and their percentage of the total trade, for instance, are shown in
Table 3-20. When it is considered that coverage in country/rest of the
•^For a recent and comprehensive coverage of the problems of index
numbers see R.D.G. Allen, Index Numbers in Theory and Practice. Chapter
5 deals with chain indexes and he suggests that the chained Laspeyres
form gives the best measure for a price index.
40
If the Paasche price index is greater than the Laspeyres this in¬
dicates that the composition has shifted towards commodities with above




Commodities directly reported in selected years
1930 1958 1969
Exports
Value (Era) 1.4" 24.1 21.7 *
as % of THP 17 90 42
Imports
Value (Era) 3.7 16.0 9.4
as % of TSM
(ie, excluding bullion)
37 86 25
*Over £18m of this is comprised of just three commodities
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world indexes (i.e., the types usually constructed by national and
international agencies) usually runs from 50 per cent to 95 per cent,41
it is apparent that the coverage indicated in Table 3-20 is unsatisfactorily
low.42
IMPROVING COVERAGE
Clearly the coverage had to be improved. There were two steps in doing
this. Firstly, it was important to select a base year that maximised the
chances of obtaining coverage. It was considered that somewhere in the
middle of the period would be more likely to have commodities that ran to
either end of the period than a year at either the beginning or the end.
Thus it might be expected that Britain had exported, say, radio sets to
China in the 30*s, 40's and 50's but not 60's (when they had been super¬
seded by TV sets), and television sets in the 50's and 60's but not 30's.
(This is also suggested by Table 3-20.) Following this assumption, 1958
was chosen because it was also a year when trade was high but one which
avoided the distorting effects of the Chinese depression of 1959-62.43
1958 had the additional advantage that it was an end year in the four-
year cycles in which the Annual Statement was then published and it thus
tended to report trade in those commodities which, although small in
1958, had been large enough to be included in any of the preceding three
years.
Having selected 1958 as base year, the next step was to see if an
estimate could be made of the unit-value of those commodities which
featured in other years but for which no trade was reported in 1958. If
R.D.G. Allen, "Index Numbers of Volume and Price", International
Trade Statistics ,ed.by R.D.G.Allen and J.E.Ely (N.Y.,John Wiley,1953),
p.199. See also UNCTAD, Long Term Changes in the Terms of Trade, 1954-
1971, p.102 where coverage is in the eighties for over two-thirds of
the countries examined.
42
It will be appreciated that the utilisable coverage would be con¬
siderably lower since commodities directly reported in the various years
are not necessarily the same commodities (cf. Table 3-1).
43Exports and imports were both higher in 1960 but that was the year
when large imports of silver bullion commenced.
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as seemed likely, the 'China' unit-values were, in general, average unit-
values for the respective commodities, then the mean unit-value could be
used as an estimate for those commodities in which there had been no
trade reported with China in the base year. Appendix H tests this
assumption and, as the results in Table 3-21 show, the two sets of unit-
values are acceptably close, at the 1 per cent significance level, for
both imports and exports. Nevertheless, this is no guarantee that the
'China' unit-value will conform to the average in any particular commo¬
dity and so the major commodities are tested in their critical years
(i.e., the PUV test).
This use of estimated unit-values considerably enlarges the coverage.
Export coverage rises from 17 per cent in 1S30 to 83 per cent, and 42 per
cent in 1969 to 69 per cent (1958 is, of course, unaffected) and similarly
import coverage increases from 37 per cent in 1930 to 79 per cent, and
from 25 per cent in 1969 to 59 per cent. The coverage for each year of
the period, together with the number of commodities used and the number
of major commodities, is given in Table 3-15. However, the use of estimated
unit-values unfortunately rules out the Laspeyres form since we no longer
have the component PcQo (i.e., current unit-values for base year quantities).
Thus we are limited to the Paasche form for both quantum and unit-value
indexes.
ADJUSTMENT FOR INCOMPLETE COVERAGE
Coverage, of course, can never in practice be complete, and the UVI's
must be adjusted for this. There are three ways of making the jump from




There is a fourth alternative, which is not to make the jump at all
but merely to say that the UVI is the UVI of the sample only and not of
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Table 3-21
Results of Appendix H
CUV XCUV
Exports: 98 commodities
mean unit value 59.97 58.47
standard deviation 98.13 108.90
critical' value of Z* : ±2.57
Z (calc)** : 0.10
correlation co-efficient: 0.9669
Imports: 78 commodities
mean unit value 26.61 23.17
standard deviation 43.52 35.55
critical value of Z : ±2.57
Z (calc) : 0.54
correlation co-efficient: 0.8789
*
Two-tail test at 1% significance level
Z(calc) = X1 ~ x2
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the whole trade. This is done by some countries44 but, since the sample
here varies from year to year, the UVI's would lack any historical
coherence. Moreover, their combination in the Terms of Trade index would
have no constant definition.
The undifferentiated index assumes that the aggregate UVI of the
commodities not directly covered is the same as the aggregate UVI of the
commodities directly covered. Thus, the UVI of the sample becomes,
without further ado, the UVI for the whole trade. This is done by some
countries'^® and, for instance, the Nankai indexes.4® Full data for the
undifferentiated indexes (and the others) is given year by year in
Table 3-15 and is here presented longitudinally and synoptically as
follows
Imports Table 3-22 Samples and totals (MS2, MS3)
Fig. 3-16 Sample (MS2) and TSM
Overlay 3-16 Bullion sample (MS3) and TSMb
Coverage has already been given in Table 3-2 and Fig.3-2. (The final unit
value indexes are coded MSI to 9 for imports and XS1 to 15 for exports;
see Fig.3-26, Table 3-36.)
Exports Table 3-23 Sample and totals
{XS5)
Fig.3-17 Sample and THP
Overlay 3-17 Sample and TEX
Coverage has again been given in Table 3-2 and Fig.3-2.
The section-weighted (or sectional) index makes a similar assumption
but this time by commodity groups or, in SITC(R) nomenclature, sections;
44















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Exports: Sample & Totals
£m
Year
S amp1e THP TDX Bullion Via HK TEX
(PcQc)
1930 7.1 8.6 8.7 0.1 2.1 10.9
1931 6.5 7.9 8.0 0.7
" -
1.9 10.6
1932 6.6 7.8 7.9 0.5 2.5 10.5
1933 5.0 6.3 6.4 0.1 1.8 8.3
1934 5.3 - 6.5 6.6 - 1.2 7.8
1935 4.0 5.0 5.1 - 1.1 6.2
1936 4.2 5.8 5.8 - 0.8 6.6
1937 4.5 5.9 6.0 - 1.2 7.2
1938 2.2 4.1 4.1 - 1.5 5.6
1939 2.6 3.6 3.7 - 0.5 4.2
1946 4.8 7.8 7.9 - 1.3 9.2
1947 8.2 12.8 12.8 0.5 2.2 15.5
1948 5.0 8.6 8.7 - 3.1 11.8
1949 1.9 2.3 2.4 0.9 6.5 9.8
1950 3.3 3.6 3.6 - 10.5 14.1
1951 1.8 2.7 2.7 - 15.4 18.1
1952 4.3 4.5 4.6 - 5.1 9.7
1953 5.7 6.2 6.2 - 5.2 11.4
1954 5.9 6.8 6.9 - 3.2 10.1
1955 6.2 7.9 7.9 - 1.7 11.6
1956 8.0 10.7 10.8 N 1.2 12.0
1957 9.0 12.1 12.2 N 1.2 13.4
1958 24.1 26.6 27.2 N 1.0 28.2
1959 20.9 24.4 24.8 - 1.0 25.8
1960 26.4 31.4 32.1 N ' N 32.1
1961 10.7 12.9 13.1 - N 13.1
1962 7.1 8.4 8.6 - N 8.6
1963 8.4 13.2 13.3 - N 13.3
1964 11.7 17.7 17.8 N N 17.8
1965 17.7 24.9 25.8 40.6 N .66.4
1966 18.7 32.0 33.5 13.3 N 46.8
1967 29.5 38.0 38.8 - N 38.8
1968 17.1 28.5 29.1 26.9 N 56.0
1969 36.4 51.7 54.7 7.9 N 62.6
TDX: Total direct exports - Total Exports (United Kingdom +
Imported Merchandise)
Via HK: Estimate of trade via Hong Kong - see Chapter 2
TEX: Total estimated exports - total of other columns, but






that is, the UVI of the aggregate of commodities not directly covered is
assumed to be the same as that of the commodities directly covered in
that section, rather than the general aggregate of exports or imports.
Commodities, in theory at least, could be further differentiated into
divisions, but this is not feasible here because of changes in classi¬
fication over the period.47 Even at section level it is sometimes
impossible to satisfactorily fit the different classification systems
together; no exports, for instance, are ascribed to Section 4 prior to
1951. There is also the problem of low coverage. With the undifferentiated
adjustment this is spread uniformly over the sample, but with the section-
weighted index, each section becomes responsible for its own coverage.
This is particularly devastating for exports Section 8 (Tables 3-4, 3-5;
Fig.3-3). The contribution column (CON) in Table 3-5 shows what Section
8's sectional weight would have been had it been included in these
indexes.48 However, since coverage was so low, and contribution at
times high, it was considered that the risk of unrepresentative commo¬
dities wildly distorting the index was unacceptably high. Consider, for
instance, 1938. From Table 3-5 it can be seen that coverage is but 2 per
cent, while contribution is 31 per cent (leaving 66 per cent of the trade
not covered by the sample in that section). From Part C it will be seen
that eleven commodities produce a sectional UVI of 39. In Table 3-24 we
examine the effect on the section-weighted index (XS10) these eleven
commodities (value £25,587 out of total exports of over £4 million) would
have had had they been included in this index. The final index number,
the SWUVI, would have been over 20 per cent higher at 27 against 22.
Fig.3-18 shows that this is quite outside the range of the other export
UVI's for that year. Thus including Section 8 would have produced markedly
different SWUVI's. Regretfully, then, it was excluded and the (export)
section weights are calculated as proportions of 'total exports of Home
Produce less Section 8' (in Table 3-15x, TSX rather than THP). This is
4^An attempt at arranging post-war Sino-British trade into SITC(R)
divisions is made in my Dissertation, Vol.11.
48
































































*** This is a reduction to one decimal place of the more accurate
calculations of Part C. This produces a slightly different
result than would have been obtained by direct calculation
from cols.2 & 3 here (22.2 rather than 22.0).
Table 3-28
Sectional Contribution: Imports (Bullion years)
(%)
Year Sect.0 Sect. 2 Sect.4 Sect.5 Sect.6
Sect.
1,3,7,8,9 Bullion
30 51 33 3 0.0 9 3 1
31-2 anb anb anb anb anb anb anb
33 32 19 2 0.0 7 2 38
34 17 11 1 0.0 4 1 67
35 29 23 4 0.0 9 1 33
36 34 22 4 0.0 12 1 27
37 30 27 3 0.0 12 1 27
38 47 25 5 0.0 14 2 6
39 anb anb anb anb anb anb anb
46-58 anb anb anb anb anb anb anb
59 16 55 1 4 17 2 4
60 17 50 4 2 14 3 10
61 7 24 1 2 14 1 51
62 6 28 1 4 16 2 43
63 12 53 2 5 23 4 1





























































regrettable for two reasons. Firstly, it makes matters more complicated,
never a good thing; and secondly, it means that the section-weighted
indexes are not strictly compatible with the other two sets. There are
excluded sections in imports as well, but in a different way. Sections
1, 3, 7, 8 and 9 do not feature in the sample at all (whereas exports
Section 8 did, of course) and so are automatically absent from all three
sets. As Table 3-25 shows, this has but a slight effect on the
representativeness of the sample. Even at their height, at the end of
the sixties, they still only account for 6 per cent of (non-bullion)
imports, and their average for the period is 2 per cent, and their con¬
tribution in the bullion years (i.e., CONB) is, of course, even less.
Longitudinal data for this weighting is presented as follows
Imports Table 3-26
Fig. 3-19 Sectional coverage (MS5, MS6)
Overlay 3-19
Table 3-27 Sectional contribution
(excluding bullion)
Fig. 3-20 (MS5)
Table 3-28 Sectional contribution
(including bullion)
Overlay 3-20 (MS6)
Since bullion is considered a de facto section, its inclusion does not
affect the coverage of the other sections, but it does affect (and
dramatically) their contributions. Sectional PNC has already been given
in Table 3-6 and Fig.3-4.
Exports Table 3-29
(XS10)









Contribution of Absent Import Sections (1 ,3,7,8,9)
Year VAL TSM TSMb CON CONB AAV
1930 323,252 9,888,819 9,988,603 3 3
1931 223,707 7,773,074 anb 3 * anb
1932 166,222 6,163,025 anb 3 anb
1933 150,298 5,866,816 9,529,858 3 2
1934 170,749 7,147,010 21,893,449 2 1 3
1935 138,892 7,138,318 10,689,238 2 1
1936 ' 106,374 ' 8,133,374 11,084,878 1 1
1937 158,743 9,022,818 12,363,142 2 1
1938 134,692 6,991,388 7,428,065 2 2
1939 86,525 5,360,213 anb 2 anb 2
1946 33,334 2,696,823 anb 1 anb
1947 121,484 7,172,090 anb 2 anb
1948 72,130 8,201,085 anb 1 anb
1949 47,051 3,622,320 anb 1 anb
1950 214,076 10,324,328 anb 2 anb 1
1951 59,290 7,669,804 anb 1 anb
1952 55,160 3,011,897 anb 2 anb
1953 26,435 10,222,182 anb Oo anb
1954 46,626 8,958,694 anb 1 anb
1955 31,500 12,302,063 anb o * o anb 1
1956 222,469 12,549,349 anb 2 anb
1957 104,995 14,224,536 anb 1 anb
1958 232,010 18,540,937 anb 1 anb
1959 491,689 18,823,110 19,687,907 3 2
1960 714,569 22,260,373 24,719,428 3 3 2
1961 241,072 15,342,357 31,310,126 2 1
1962 422,749 13,296,601 23,168,852 3 2
1963 764,090 18,385,117 18,513,389 4 4
1964 1,131,912 24,599,204 anb 5 anb
1965 1,409,536 29,698,326 anb 5 anb 4
1966 1,702,341 33,787,116 anb 5 anb
1967 1,890,121 29,625,713 anb 6 anb
1968 2,182,114 34,273,767 anb 6 anb
1969 2,000,029 37,719,003 anb 5 anb 6




Year Section 0 Section 2 Section 4 Section 5 Section 6
1930 94 80 66 0 31
1931 92 86 52 0 21
1932 ' 91 84 71 ' 0
"
- 21 '
1933 93 85 89 0 37
1934 92 86 99 0 35
1935 91 85 80 0 46
1936 90 82 99 0 43
1937 92 81 100 0 52
1938 96 86 100 0 63
1939 93 87 97 0 70
1946 97 93 100 0 170* .
1947 90 93 78 0 61
1948 96 92 97 15 14
1949 74 92 93 37 26
1950 80 82 99 58 71
1951 77 86 105* 27 28
1952 78 50 100 53 36
1953 86 87 90 69 64
1954 97 91 102* 50 49
1955 98 90 100 30 68
1956 94 85 100 64 67
1957 98 80 100 88 76
1958 88 86 86 68 80
1959 66 80 100 56 75
1960 67 78 100 52 37
1961 85' 86 100 ' 44 36
1962 83 88 100 67 55
1963 90 86 100 40 44
1964 76 85 95 40 28
1965 79 88 99 43 33
1966 80 89 99 43 29
1967 82 91 99 41 26
1968 86 88 88 54 23
1969 85 89 98 47 17
ik"





Sectional Contribution: Imports (excluding bullion)
(%)
Section
Year Section 0 Section 2 Section 4 Section 5 Section 6 1,3,7,8,9
1930 51 33 3 0.0 9 3
1931 58 25 4 Oo 11 3
1932 59 24 4 0.0 11 3
1933 51 31 3 0.0. 12 3
1934 51 33 2 0.0 11 2 •
1935 43 35 6 0.0 14
'
2
1936 46 30 6 0,0 16 1
1937 41 36 5 0.0 16 2
1938 50 27 6 0.0 15 2
1939 49 23 6 1 20 2
1946 8 51 35 4 1 1
1947 15 45 36 2 1 2
1948 43 30 24 1 1 1
1949 61 17 18 0.0 3 1
1950 69 16 5 6 2 2
1951 45 40 2 5 7 1
1952 69 18 3 oo 7 . 2
1953 47 31 18 1 3 0,0
1954 39 38 12 4 7 1
1955 28 47 8 7 10 oo
1956 24 48 9 5 13 2
1957 31 39 5 4 21 1
1958 38 28 4 6 23 1
1959 17 58 1 4 17 3
1960 19 55 4 2 16 3
1961 14 49 3 4 28 2
1962 11 49 2 7 28 3
1963 12 53 2 5 23 4
1964 7 58 2 5 25 5
1965 15 52 7 6 18 5
1966 19 43 10 7 17 5
1967 20 44 5 8 20 6
1968 22 39 2 7 27 6







Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8** 9
1930 60 100 46 100
'
NI 72 88 74 . 37 98
1931 53 100 65 100 NI 66 89 69 40 99
1932 55 100 70 100 NI • 64 89 82 35 100 !
1933 65 100 81 100 NI 65 87 74 25 99
1934. 72 100 92 100 NI 62 88 79 22 99
1935 55 100 94 0 NI 56 85 81 - 23 - 98
1936 53 100 98 0 NI 64 "87 70 8 100
1937 39 100 98 0 NI 71 89 71 9 97
1938 47 100 77 0 NI 57 87 72 2 99
1939 35 95 96 0 NI 78 82 81 7 100
1946 2 50 94 0 NI 57 79 67 2 100
1947 0 16 97 0 NI 47 85 67 1 100
1948 0 5 96 0 NI 44 78 71 0 99
1949 0 2 90 0 NI 75 95 84 0 100
1950 0 15 98 0 NI 67 102* 76 0 0
1951 0 0 100 0 0 32 69 71 34 0
1952 0 26 100 0 100 95 80 89 72 0
1953 0 66 100 0 100 79 85 86 17 0
1954 100 58 100 0 100 69 92 74 55 0
1955 42 0 99 0 0 45 33 46 4 0
1956 0 0 100 0 0 44 58 64 0.0 0
1957 98 0 100 0 0 55 66 54 0 0
1958 76 0 99 0 0 60 97 87 1 0
1959 2 0 98 37 0 60 92 79 0 0
1960 2 0 98 25 0 63 85 86 0 0
1961 69 0 99 99 0 69 89 55 0 0
1962 14 0 99 90 0 75 95 56 0 0
1963 0 90 99 0 0 60 96 26 4 100
1964 0 0 97 97 100 40 97 45 8 100
1965 0 0 90 0 100 54 97 65 4 100
1966 21 0 86 0 100 52 96 45 2 100
1967 38 0 99 0 100 44 91 76 2' 100
1968 0 0 98 0 100 19 72 33 0 100
1969 0 0 99 0 100 18 75 35 44 100
NI: See Table 3-15 , Note 1;*Read here as 'lOO'.
* * . q





















Exports: Contribution by Sections
%
Year
Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1930 1 12 1 0.0 NI 9 53 20 3 1
1931 1 10 1 0.0 NI 11 58 17 2 1
1932 1 4 1 0.0 NI 7 64 20 3 1
1933 1 3 3 0.0 NI 9 58 21 5 1
1934 1 2 5 0.0 NI 7 56 23 5 1
1935 1 3 8 0 NI 9 44 31 5 1
1936 1 2 16 0 NI 8 38 23 13 1
1937 1 1 15 0 NI 8 43 20 11 1
1938 1 2 2 0 NI 4 29 32 31 1
1939 1 3 9 0 NI 11 36 29 12 1
1946 0.0 1 12 0 NI 13 34 22 18 0.0
1947 0.0 0.0 7 0 NI 11 38 30 14 0.0
1948 0.0 0.0 11 0 NI 8 19 40 22 0.0
1949 0.0 oo 19 0 NI 13 25 37 5 0.0
1950 0.0 0.0 10 0 NI 7 55 28 0.0 0
1951 0.0 0.0 15 0.0 0.0 13 24 40 6 0
1952 0.0 0.0 16 0.0 1 61 7 14 1 0
1953 0.0 0.0 58 0 c.o 14 10 17 1 0
1954 0.0 0.0 53 0.0 0.0 22 6 16 4 0
1955 0.0 0 67 0,0 0 23 6 3 2 0
1956 0.0 0 48 0.0 0 12 28 9 3 0
1957 11 0 35 0.0 0 23 16 10 5 0
1958 1 0 25 0.0 0 11 47 15 2 0
1959 0.0 0 20 0.0 0 15 54 10 1 0.0
1960 0.0 0 17 0.0 0 8 61 12 2 0.0
1961 1 0 42 1 0 13 25 16 2 1
1962 oo 0 29 0.0 0 14 38 16 2 1
1963 0.0 0.0 18 0.0 oo 10 31 37 3 1
1964 0,0 0,0 14 0.0 0.0 10 32 36 8 1
1965 0.0 0.0 4 0.0 0.0 13 36 39 8 oo
1966 0.0 0.0 7 0.0 0:0 "8 29 46 10- oo
1967 0.0 0.0 17 0.0 0.0 11 40 26 6 0.0
1968 0.0 0.0 6 0.0 0.0 12 67 10 4 0.0
1969 0.0 0.0 8 0.0 0.0 8 78 5 2 0.0
0.0: <0.5
0 : nil






Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect.
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9
1930 1 12 1 0.0 NI 10 54 21 1
1931 1 10 1 0.0 NI 11 59 17 1
1932 1 4 1 0.0 NI 8 65 20
'
1
1933 1 3 3 0.0 NI 9 61 22 1
-1934 1 3 5 0.0 NI 7 59 24 1
1935
'
1 3 8 0 NI 9
'
46 32 . 1
1935 1 2 18 0 NI 9 43 27 1
1937 1 2 17 0 NI 9 48 22 1
1938 1 3 3 0 NI 5 41 46 1
1939 1 3 10 0 NI 12 41 32 1
1945 1 2 14 0 ni 15 41 27 0.0
1947 0.0 0.0 8 0 NI 13 44 35 0.0
1948 0.0 0.0 14 0 NI 10 24 51 0.0
1949 0.0 0.0 20 0 NI 14 26 39 0.0
1950 0.0 0.0 10 0 NI 7 55 28 0
1951 0.0 0.0 15 oo 0.0 14 25 46 0
1952 0.0 0.0 16 0.0 1 62 7 14 0
1953 0.0 0.0 59 0 o o 14 10 17 0
1954 0.0 0.0 55 0.0 oo 22 6 17 0
1955 0.0 0 68 0.0 0 23 6 3 0
1955 0.0 0 50 0.0 0 12 29 9 0
1957 12 0 37 0.0 0 24 17 10 0
1958 0.0 0 26 oo 0 12 47 15 0
1959 0.0 0 20 0.0 0 15 55 10 0.0
1950 0.0 0 17 0.0 0 9 62 13 o o
1951 1 0 43 1 0 13 25 17 1
1952 0.0 0 29 0.0 0 14 39 16 1
1963 0.0 0.0 18 0.0 0.0 11 32 38 1
1964 0.0 0.0 15 0.0 oo 11 34 39 1
1965 0.0 0.0 4 0.0 0.0 14 39 42 0.0
1966 0.0 0.0 8 0.0 0.0 9 32 51 0.0
1967 0.0 0.0 18 0.0 0.0 11 42 27 0.0
1968 0.0 0.0 6 0.0 0.0 13 70 11 0.0
1969 0.0 oo
1
8 0.0 0.0 8 79 5 o•o
oo <0.5 Sections 0,1,2,5 ,6 & 7 are charted on overlay 3-23.
0 : nil
NI : see Table 3-15,Note 1.
Section 8 is excluded from sectional indexes.
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Exports
(XS10) Table 3"31 Q ,Sectional weight
cont'd. Overlay 3-22
Although Section 8 contributes to total exports (and hence is shown in
Table 3-30 and Fig.3-22), it is excluded from the sectional weighted
indexes and so does not appear in Table 3-31. The difference between
contribution and sectional weight for the important sections (Sections 3,
4 and 9 are omitted for clarity) is shown by comparing Overlay 3-22 with
Fig. 3-22.
Again, PNC has been given previously, in Table 3-4 and Fig.3-3.
The dichotomous adjustment largely avoids the problem of uneven
coverage by dividing commodities into 'raw materials' (Sections 0 to 4)
ACk
and 'manufactures' (Sections 5 to 9). By doing this both parts have a
50
reasonable coverage in all years. The synopses for the dichotomies are:-
Imports Table 3-32 Value and samples (MS8 and MS9)
Fig. 3-23 Value and excluding bullion sample (MS8)
Fig. 3-24 Value and including bullion sample (MS9)
Table 3-33 Contribution,Coverage and PNC' (MS8,MS9)
Overlay 3-23 Contribution,Coverage and PNC (MS8)
Overlay 3-24 Contribution,Coverage and PNC (MS9)
Manufactures are usually considered as Sections 5 to 8. Section 9,
in Sino-British trade at least, is virtually all 'postal packages' whose
value is arbitrarily fixed by Customs (see Devons, An Introduction to
British Trade Statistics (Cambridge, 1956), p.143, n.3). It is, however,
very small in value, when reported at all, and so for convenience it has
been included as a manufacture.
Not entirely though; coverage for the imports manufactures dichotomy




Import Dichotomies: Value & Sample
£m
M o -4) 1(5 -9) E(5 -9,b)
BullionYear
VAL PcQc VAL PcQc VAL PcQc
1930 8.7 7.5 1.2 0.3 1.3 0.4 0.1
1931 6.7 5.9 1.1 O. 2 1.1 0.2 -
1932 5.3 4.7 0.8 0.1 0.8 O.l -
1933 5.0 4.5 0.8 0.3 4.5 3.9 3.7
1934 6.2 5.5 l.O O. 3 15.7 15.0 14.7
1935 6.0 5.3 1.1 O. 5 4.7 4.0 3.6
1936 6.7 5.9 1.5 0.6 4.4 3.5 3.0
1937 7.4 6.5 1.6 0.8 5.0 4.1 3.3
1938 5.8 5.4 1.2 O.l 1.6 1.1 0.4
1939 4.2 3.8 1.2 O.l 1.2 0.7 -
1946 2.5 2.4 O. 2 O.Ol 0.2 0.01 -
1947 6.8 5.9 O. 3 0.06 0.3 0.06 -
1948 8.0 7.6 0.2 0.02 0.2 0.02 -
1949 3.5 2.8 O.l 0.03 0.1 0.03 -
1950 9.3 7.6 l.O 0.5 1.0 0.5 -
1951 6.7 5.4 l.O O. 3 1.0 0.3 -
1952 2.7 2.0 O. 3 O.l 0.3 O.l -
1953 9.7 8.7 O. 5 0.3 0.5 O. 3 -
1954 7.9 7.5 1.1 O. 5 1.1 0.5 -
1955 10.2 9.5 2.1 1.1 2.1 1.1 -
1956 lO.l 9.0 2.4 1.5 2.4 1.5 -
1957 lO. 6 9.4 3.6 2.7 3.6 2.7 -
1958 12.9 11.2 5.6 4.2 5.6 4.2 -
1959 14.3 11.0 4.6 2.9 5.4 3.8 0.9
1960 17.4 13.4 4.8 1.6 7.3 4.1 2.5
1961 10.1 8.7 5.2 1.9 21.2 17.8 16.0
1962 8.3 7.3 5.0 2.7 14.9 12.5 9.9
1963 12.4 10.8 6.0 2.3 6.2 2.4 0.1
1964 16.1 13.5 8.5 2.2 8.5 2.2 -
1965 21.3 18.5 8.4 2.5 8.4 2.5 -
1966 23.8 20.9 lO.O 2.8 10.0 2.8 -
1967 19.6 17.5 10.0 2.5 lO.O 2.5 -
1968 20.6 17.9 13.7 3.5 13.7 3.5







Contribution, Coverage & PNC by Dichotomies (Imports)
Z(0-4) E{5~9) E(5-9,b)
Year CON CONB COV PNC CON COV PNC CONB COV
1930 88 87 87 55 12 24 45 13 30
1931 86 anb 88 46 14 17 54 anb anb
1932 87 anb 88 48 13 16 52 anb anb
1933 86 53 90 46 14 30 54 47 87
1934 86 28 90 47 14 29 . 53 72. 96
1935 84 56 88 52 16 40 48 44 72
1936 82 60 88 48 18 40 52 40 72
1937 82 60 88 51 18 47 49 40 72
1938 83 78 93 42 17 54 58 22 67
1939 78 92 45 22 63 55
1946 94 96 44 6 17 56
1947 95 87 76 5 17 24
1948 97 95 68 3 9 32
1949 96 81 84 4 18 16
1950 90 anb 82 76 10 48 24 anb anb
1951 87 82 63 13 26 37
1952 91 73 79 9 30 21
1953 95 87 87 5 62 13
1954 88 95 44 12 52 56
1955 83 93 40 17 52 60
1956 80 89 53 20 60 47
1957 75 89 58 25 76 42
1958 70 87 _ 53 30 74 47
1959 76 72 77 66 24 64 34 28 69
1960 78 70 77 56 22 33 44 30 56
1961 66 32 86 29 34 36 71 68 84
1962 62 36 88 30 38 53 70 64 84
1963 67 67 87 29 33 37 71 : 3 9
1964 65 84 29 35 26 71
1965 72 87 32 28 29 68
1966 70 anb 88 29 30 28 71 a ib a ib
1967 66 89 23 34 25 77
1968 60 87 21 40 25 79















The raw materials dichotomy is coded on the figures and overlays, and
the manufactures side H . The overlays show the distribution of con¬
tribution and PNC between the two dichotomies by means of annual lines of
fixed length (100 per cent) oscillating on the central line. Thus, for
example, Overlay 2-25 shows that exports are nearly exclusively manu¬
factures until 1951, whereupon there are a couple of waves of predominance
of raw materials until the mid-sixties, when there is a reversion to
the original balance. The central part of the overlay shows that coverage
of the raw material exports is virtually complete,but that coverages of
manufactures is lower and varying. As a result, the PNC, the proportion
of trade not covered by the sample, falls virtually entirely on the
manufactures side on the PNC line.
It is considered that the other synoptic longitudinal tables and
figures for the three sets of indexes are self-explanatory and that any
verbal description would be tiresomely redundant. The assumptions under¬
lying these three different types of adjustment for incomplete coverage
are examined in Part D. However, irrespective of their validity for
extrapolating from the sample to the whole trade, it will be appreciated
that the division of the sample and trade into sections and dichotomies
is in itself an important element in analysing the interactions between
composition and price movements.
ASSEMBLING AND COMBINING THE EXPORT AND IMPORT UVI'S
So far we have described the extraction and collation of innumerable
pieces of data, their reduction to a far smaller number of commodities
which are reasonably consistent over time and which have a 1958 unit
value which is either 'real' or can be estimated, the ordering of these
commodities into SITC(R) sequence and their classification into minor







E(0 -4) E (5 -9)
VAL . PcQc VAL PcQc
1930 1.2 i.i 7.4 6.0
1931 0.9 0.9 6.9 5.6
1932 0.4 0.4 7.4 6.2
1933 - Q. 4 0.4
*
5.9 4.6
1934 0.6 0.5 6.0 4.8
1935 0.6 0.5 4.5 3.5
1936 1.0 1.0 4.7 3.2
1937 1.0 1.0 4.9 3.5
1938 0.2 0.2 3.9 2.1
1939 0.5 0.4 3.1 2.2
1946 1.1 0.9 6.8 3.9
1947 0.9 0.8 11.9 7.4
1948 1.0 0.9 7.7 4.1
1949 0.4 0.4 1.8 1.5
1950 0.4 0.3 3.2 2.9
1951 0.4 0.4 2.3 1.4
1952 0.8 0.8 3.8 3.5
1953 3.6 3.6 2.6 2.1
1954 3.6 3.6 3.2 2.3
1955 5.3 5.2 2.6 1.1
1956 5.1 5.1 5.5 2.9
1957 5.6 5.6 6.5 3.5
1958 6.8 6.8 19.8 17.3
1959 4.8^ 4.7 19.6 16.3
1960 5.3 5.1 26.2 21.3
1961 5.6 5.5 7.3 5.1
1962 2.5 2.5 5.9 4.6
1963 2.4 2.3 10.8 6.1
1964 2.5 2.5 15.2 .9.2
1965 1.0 0.9 23.9 16.9
■ 1966 2.3 1.9 29.7 16.8
1967 6.7 6.5 31.3 23.0
1968 1.8 1.7 26.7 15.4





Contribution, Coverage & PNC by Dichotomies (Exports)
£(0-4) £(5-9)
Year CON COV PNC CON COV PNC
1930 14 94 5 86 81 95
1931 12 93 4 88 81 96
1932 6 87 5 94 84 95
1933 6 86 4 94 79 96
•
1934 9 92 4 91 80 96
1935 11 92 4 89 78 96
1936 18 96 3 82 68 97
1937 17 96 3 83 72 97
1938 5 81 2 95 54 98
1939 13 93 4 87 71 96
1946 14 87 4 86 57 96
1947 7 94 1 93 62 99
1948 11 92 2 89 53 98
1949 19 87 14 81 81 86
1950 10 97 4 90 91 96
1951 14 99 0.0 86 62 100
1952 17 100 1 83 92 99
1953 59 99 4 41 82 96
1954 53 99 6 47 73 94
1955 67 98 6 33 41 94
1956 48 100 1 52 52 99
1957 46 99 2 54 53 98
1958 26 99 3 74 87 97
1959 20 96 5 80 83 95
1960 17 96 4 83 81 96
1961 43 99 3 56 71 97
1962 30 99 3 70 79 97
1963 18 99 1 82 56 99
1964 14 97 1 86 61 99
1965 4 86 2 96 71 . 98
1966 7 83 3 93 57 97
1967 18 97 2 82 74 98
1968 6 95 1 94 58 99
1969 8 98 oo 92 68 100
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which after the 30's were largely integrated into the commodity returns,
have been isolated so that imports can be considered with or without
bullion. Finally, the three modes of weighting, undifferentiated, sectional
and dichotomous, have been described. There is one further complication
to be introduced, and that is the question of exports of iron and steel.
This is tackled in Appendix E and all that needs to be said here is that
we arrive at three mutually exclusive, but not disparate, UVI's for iron
and steel.
The number of ways these alternatives and variants could be combined
into import and export UVI's and from them into terms of trade indexes is,
of course, huge. The actual combinations that are utilised are shown in
Fig.3-26 and Table 3-36. The basic rule has been to pair like with like;
for instance, undifferentiated exports of A commodities UVI (XS1) with
undifferentiated imports A (MSI), but not with sectional imports A (MS4)
or undifferentiated imports AB (MS2). This is quite arbitrary and there
is no good prima facie reason for it. It might, for example, have been
unwarranted to apply the same classification criteria to both imports and
exports, in which case imports AB may be just as appropriately combined
with exports, and so on. However, it seems unnecessary to worry too much
over that.
Even with a partial take-up of possible combinations we still generate
twenty-one terms of trade indexes, which may well seem twenty too many.
In fact, most of them can be relegated to second division without too
much ado. Firstly, whilst it is useful for purposes of analysis to have
export UVI's exclusive of iron and steel,they remain partial indexes.
Of the three iron and steel indexes (in each weighting mode) the ISIV
series is only operational from 1946. There is little to choose between
the other two (see Appendix E) but where, for convenience, we have to
plump for one, it is the TIS variant that is used, and specifically
the undifferentiated weighted version (XS5).
On the imports side the role of bullion is ambiguous, but it only
features in the trade for a third of the period (i.e., for twenty-two
years out of thirty-four ABB = AB) so for most of the time it is
For instance, iron and steel, in all three variants, has a very strong
dampening effect on the latter 60's.
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Fig.3-26










Table 3-36 *1946 onwards
Provenance of Terms of Trade Indexes

































































































































immaterial whether we use MS2 (undifferentiated,AB) or MS3 (undifferen¬
tiated, ABB). In fact MS3 has conventionally been chosen when only one
52
UVI was needed (e.g., the following section).
In practice, then, we may consider that there is one main set of UVI's
(XS5 and MS3) from which one (net barter) Terms of Trade index is
derived (TT5), and that there are a number of ancillary ones which are
used primarily for comparison and analysis. There are times, however,
when exclusion of bullion is necessary (especially in Chapter Eleven) and
then MS2 is used to produce the Terms of Trade index, TT16.
POSTSCRIPT: ESTIMATING CONFIDENCE INTERVALS
Since the sample from which the indexes are constructed is not
randomly selected but a purposive one, we are not free to use in the
usual way those statistical tools such as confidence levels, x^ tests
and so on which are based on probability theory. However, it is possible
to apply some of these statistical techniques with discretion to arrive
at a 'plausible' (rather than the statistical 'probable') estimate of
the confidence interval for the indexes.
There are two indicators of the reliability of the sample-coverage
and number of commodities (NOC). They have been determined down to section
level (Table 3-15) but here, for manageability, they are only considered
at total level. Similarly, only the two major indexes, MS3 and XS5, are
tested. (Tables 3-37,-38,-39; Fig. and Overlay 3-28.)
NOC figures were given in Table 3-2 and Fig.3-2. One fact is immediate¬
ly apparent: the number of commodities in the export sample is considerably
greater than in the import sample. On average, over the period, the export
NOC is nearly four times the import NOC. The preponderance is much
greater in the 30's,and in 1969 the position is actually reversed, but
apart from this year the export side never drops below 30 (even in 1969
it is 26) while the import side is seldom above it. It follows from this
52
MS3 is considered to take on the value of MS2 during non-bullion
years. The same, mutatis mutandis, applies to the other bullion indexes,
both imports and Terms of Trade.
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that the two sides should be treated differently. When, below, an
assumption of normality is made in estimating percentage deviation around
the UVI, individual commodities and Student's t distribution are used for
imports and sections, and normal distribution for exports.
Coverage is both high and virtually identical on both sides - an
average of 78 per cent for imports and 76 per cent for exports. Using
the working assumptions already made, and for simplicity confining
ourselves to the undifferentiated adjustment, it follows that we need
only consider the effect on the 'real unit value index' (RUVI) of a
plausible deviation of the UVI of the non-covered trade (NCUVI) from the
UVI of the sample (SUVI). That is, the RUVI is given by a combination of
the SUVI, which we know (if the other assumptions hold), and the NCUVI,
which we do not know but which we presume will be of the order of the
SUVI. The effect that the NCUVI can have on the RUVI decreases sharply,
of course, as the coverage increases. Thus, for example, if the SUVI
were 100, even if the NCUVI is 200 (line A in Fig.3-27), although at
30 per cent coverage the RUVI would be 170, by 70 per cent coverage it
would only be 130 and at 90 per cent coverage it would have fallen to 110.
. Arithmetically, this can be expressed thus:
let a = coverage, b = non-coverage (expressed as %)
y = deviation factor, NCUVI .
SUVI
percentage deviation (PD) = RUVI - SUVI . ^qq
RUVI
then RUVI = a. SUVI + b. NCUVI
100 100
but a + b = 100 and NCUVI = y . SUVI
so RUVI = _a^ SUVI + (100 - a) _ (y.suvi)
100100





. (a + lOOy - y.a)
100




PD = SUVI . (a + 100.y - y.a) - 100.SUVI
^ 10Q
100.SUVI
= a + 100.y - a.y - 100
= a(l - y) - 100(1 - y)
= (a - 100) (1 - y) or (100 - a) (y - 1)
Thus, since we have 'a' (coverage), we need only an estimate of y to
arrive at a figure for PD.
If we take SUVI as an estimate of NCUVI, and assume a normal distribu¬
tion, then at the 5 per cent confidence level the limits of the NCUVI
will be ±1.96 by the standard error of SUVI (SES) . (In the case of imports
1.96 will be replaced by the t at the appropriate degrees of freedom.)
Thus,
for exports: y = 100.SUVI ± 1.96 SES
100.SUVI
for imports: y = 100.SUVI ± t . SES
100.SUVI
For exports, because of the large NOC, it would be unjustifiably time-
consuming without computer facilities to calculate the standard deviation
from individual commodities, so sections are used instead. To take account
of the varying weights of the sections (or, in the case of imports, commo¬
dities) we treat it as a frequency distribution of UVI's with the section
(commodity) PoQc figure as the frequency.
Thus, where
f is frequency = PoQc
311
X is UVI = PcQc
PoQc
100
N is the sum of frequencies = EPoQc








100 = PcQc . 100
PcQc
PoQc










'■Vhen calculating the standard error in the formula SES
>/»
'n' is taken as the actual number of UVI's used (i.e., number of sections









Since we are deriving a percentage, we can disregard for the moment the
-1.96 SES version of the PD.
(for exports):
312
PD = (100 - a) (y - 1)
(100 - a) SUVI.100 + 1.96 SES
100.SUVI








+ 1.96 SES - 1
(100 - a) 1 + EPoQc
100.EPcQc
1.96.SES - 1























Percentage Deviation & Range: XS5
Year XS5 n 100-a P.D. Range
lower upper
• 1930 23.4 9 17 3.4 22.6 24.2
.1931 21.0 9 17 2.5 20.5 21.5
1932 19.3 9 15 2.7 18.8 19.8
1933 20.2 9 21 3.1 19.6 20.8
1934 18.8 9 19 2.9 18.3 19.3
1935 20.0 8 . 21 . 2-7 . 19.5 20.5
1936 20.1 8 27 3.5 19.4 20.8
1937 21.0 8 23 3.6 20.3 .21.7
1938 21.7 8 45 6.3 20.4 23.1
1939 23.9 8 26 2.4 23.3 24.5
1946 42.8 8 39 5.6 40.4 45.2
1947 50.4 7 35 3.8 48.5 52.3
1948 56.3 6 42 4.7 53.7 58.9
1949 67.8 6 18 1.9 66.5 69.1
1950 76.0 5 8 2.1 74.7 77.6
1951 97.5 5 33 14.2 83.7 111.3
1952 103.6 7 6 1.2 102.3 104.9
1953 118.2 7 8 1.1 116.9 119.5
1954 116.4 8 14 0.8 115.5 117.3
1955 107.5 6 21 1.2 106.2 108.8
1956 103.4 5 25 4.7 98.6 108.2
1957 115.2 5 25 -• 2.7 112.1 118.3
100 INVJ.7 JO
1959 107.3 6 14 0.8 106.4 108.2
1960 104.0 6 16 1.9 102.0 106.0
1961 93.4 6 17 2.5 91.1 95.7
•1962 85.9 6 15 3.0 -83.3 88.5
1963 93.3 7 36 7.3 86.5 100.1
1964 102.1 8 34 4.8 97.2 107.0
1965 129.7 7 29 2.3' 126.7 132.7
1966 116.1 8 41 8.6 106.2 126.0
1967 103.8 8 22 4.7 99.0 108.0
1968 118.2 6 40 8.8 107.8 128.6
1969 167.4 7 30 8.8 152.7 182.1
n : number of sections used.
a : coverage.




Percentage Deviation & Range: MS3
Year MS 3 d.f. t 100-a P.D. Range
lower upper
1930 32.3 20 2.086 21 3.8 31.1 - 33.5
1931 27.8 19 2.093 21 4.6 26.5 - - 29.1
1932 27.7 18 2.101 22 4.4 26.5 - 28.9
1933 30.3 24 2.064 11 2.2 29.6 - 31.0
1934 31.7 23 2.069 6 1.0 31.4 - 32.0
1935 28.7 24 2.064 13 3.0 27.8 - 29.6
1936 30.7 24 2.064 15 3.0 29.8 - 31.6
1937 34.6 22 2.074 14 2.4 33.8 - 35.4
1938 32.2 22 2.074 13 1.9 31.6 - 32.8
1939 29.9 21 2.080 15 2.5 29.1 - 30.7
1946 156.0 10 2.228 9 2.2 152.6 - 159.4
1947 133.0 14 2.145 16 3.7 128.0 - 138.0
1948 119.3 16 2.120 7 1.1 118.0 - 120.6
1949 108.0 14 2.145 22 2.4 104.8 - 111.2
1950 113.2 17 2.110 22 2.2 110.7 - 115.7
1951 137.5 20 2.086 26 3.8 132.3 - 142.7
1952 144.4 15 2.131 31 5.1 137.0 - 151.8
1953 129.9 20 2.086 14 0.8 128.8 - 131.0
1954 110.9 21 2.080 10 1.0 109.8 - Ij.2.0
1955 102.6 31 1.960 14 1.2 101.3 - 103.9
1956 114.3 31 1.960 17 1.5 112.6 - 116.0
1957 111.1 31 1.960 15 1.6 110.4 - 111.8
nn 9 9 O i nr r\ TTSTT71958 98. Z 38 1 . 9bU ± / IN V
1959 105.3 28 2.048 25 1.2 104.1 - 106.5
1960 111.6 29 2.045 30 2.9 108.4 - 114.8
1961 111.5 30 2.042 15 1.6 109.7 - 113.3
1962 119.7 30 2.042 15 2.1 117.1 - 122.3
1963 120.7 35 1.960 29 4.7 115.0 - 126.4
1964 122.3 35 1.960 36 5.3 115.8 - 128.8
1965 116.8 38 1.960 29 3.7 112.5 - 121.1
1966 112.2 40 1.960 30 4.0 107.7 - 116.7
1967 114.0 39 1.960 33 4.6 108.8 - 119.2
1968 117.2 40 1.960 38 5.4 110.9 - 123.5
1969 125.4 39 1.960 41 6.2 117.6 - 133.2
d.f.: degrees of freedom (n = d.f. + 2) . t: 'Students
' t' .




Estimated range at 5% confidence level for TT5
Year
Imports (MS 3) Exports (XS5) Terms of Trade TT5
2 lower 3 upper 4 lower 5 upper lower(4/3) upper(5/2)
1930 31.1 33.5 22.6 24.2 67 78
1931 26.5 29.1 • 20.5 21.5 70 81
1932 26.5 28.9 18.8 19.8 65 75
1933 29.6 31.0 19.6 20.8 63 70
1934 31.4 32.0 18.3 19.3 57 61
1935 27.8 29.6 19.5 20.5 66 74
1936 29.8 31.6 19.4 20.8 61 70
1937 33.8 35-4 20.3 21.7 57 64
1938 31.6 32.8 20.4 23.1 62 73
1939 29.1 30.7 23.3 24.5 76 84
1946 152.6 159.4 40.4 45.2 25 30
1947 128.0 138.0 48.5 52.3 35 41
1948 118.0 120.6 53.7 58.9 45 50
1949 104.8 111.2 66.5 69.1 60 66
1950 110.7 115.7 74.7 77.6 65 70
1951 132.3 142.7 83.7 111.3 59 84
1952 137.0 151.8 102.3 104.9 67 77
1953 128.8 131.0 116.9 119.5 89 93
1954 109.8 112.0 115.5 117.3 103 107
1955 101.3 103.9 106.2 108.8 102 107
1956 112.6 116.0 98.6 108.2 85 96
1957 110.4 111.8 112.1 118.3 100 107
1958 INV
1959 104.1 106.5 106.4 108.2 100 104
1960 108.4 114.8 102.0 106.0 89 98
1961 109.7 113.3 91.1 95.7 80 87
1962 117.1 122.3 83.3 88.5 68 76
1963 115.0 126.4 86.5 100.1 68 87
1964 115.8 128.8 97.2 107.0 75 92
1965 112.5 121.1 126.7 132.7 105 118
1966 107.7 116.7 106.2 126.0 91 • 117
1967 108.8 119.2 99.0 108.0 83 99
1968 110.9 123.5 107.8 128.6 87 116
1969 117.6 133.2 152.7 182.1 115 155








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1. The three classification systems used during this period (1930-50,
1951-62, 1963-69; see Chapter One) are not strictly comparable and the
arrangement into SITC(R) order prior to 1963 can only be approximate.
Occasionally, it will be found that the sample in a section overflows
that section's (estimated) value, but usually the distortion involved
is negligible and can be disregarded. This overflow has an effect, of
course, on other parts of the construction. If coverage is greater than
100 per cent in one section, then somewhere else, in one section or more,
there must be a shortfall. It will also produce a 'negative' PNC (e.g.,
imports 1946, 1951; shown as INV). However, these instances are, by
definition, peripheral and are no more than an inconvenience.
Section 4, however, requires special mention. There is no suitable
commodity group to match Section 4 before 1951 (on re-examination, it
was decided that the coupling used in my Dissertation (Vol.11) was un¬
satisfactory) . On the import side there is no great problem since some
of the most important commodities fall within that section (e.g., the
oils - tung, cotton seed, stillingia and castor) and so adequate estimate
of the section value could be made from the sample. In other words, for
many years value is taken as the sum of Section 4 commodities (i.e.,
VAL = PcQc; COV = 100%) and since virtually all substantial commodities
are in the sample we can be confident that this is not far out. For
exports, on the other hand, there are few Section 4 commodities and their
total value is very small. It was necessary, therefore, to omit that
section prior to 1951 and to transfer the sample commodities to Section 6,
which is too large to be affected by their inclusion. These commodities
are coded in Appendix G as belonging to Section '6/4'.
2. In this case the discrepancy is due to exports of rubber inner
tubes which in 1950 were considered parts of motor vehicles (hence
under Section 7) but which were subsequently transferred under SITC




Chapter Four: The Terms of Trade:
Classical and Neo-classical Theory
Chapter Five: The China Trade
CHAPTER FOUR
The Terms of Trade in Classical
& Neo-classical Theory
THE ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT
Theoretical attention to the terms of trade is usually dated from
1
J.S. Mill's elaboration of Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage,
although Dobb has argued that earlier the Mercantalists "...while
stating their theory in terms of a favourable balance of trade, ...were
equally if not more concerned with the advantages of favourable terms of
trade - of buying cheap and selling dear; and while honour was paid to
the former, the latter was an important, and at times a major, preoccupa-
O
tion."^ Clearly, an embryonic concern with the terms of trade, expressed
For example, Bairoch, The Economic Development of the Third World
since 1900 (English edition, London, Methuen, 1975), p.227, note 1 to
chapter 6. The phrase 'terms of trade' comes from Marshall, although he
also uses the. expression 'rate of interchange'.
2
Maurice Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capitalism (Routledge
paperback edition, London, 1963), p.202, cf. the following passages
quoted by Viner (Studies in the Theory of International Trade, New York,
Harper, 1937) from Tawney and Power, Tudor Economic Documents, III
(London, Longmans, 1924):
"And another [object of policy] is that the things which we
carry out do surmount in price the things which we bring in;
else shall we soon make a poor land and a poor people."
[A discourse of corporations, (ca 1587), T.E.D.,111, 267
(Viner, p.7)]
"...the wealth of the realm cannot decrease but three manner
of ways, which is the transportation of ready money or
bullion out of the same; by selling our home commodities
too good cheap; or by buying the foreign commodities too
dear, wherein chiefly consisteth the aforesaid overbalancing..."
[Malynes, A treatise of the canker, (1601), T.E.D., III, 387
(Viner, p.17)]
Viner himself notes: "Some mercantalists argued, on what would now be
called 'terms of trade1 considerations, that it was desirable that export
prices should be high and import prices low." (ibid.,p.35).
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as a complaint about the high price of importst has a long history.
During the Roman Empire, for instance, while, as Tenney Frank argues,
3
the state had no "commercial policy" there were moves to regulate trade
prices, such as Claudius* attempt to lower the price of the politically
vital tribute corn, and Diocletian's more extensive Edict trying to
control, in the modern phrase,, prices and incomes. Moreover, when a
moralist such as Seneca attacks the fashion of wearing "seric cloths"
(that is, Chinese silk) he complains not merely that they are diaphanous,
but also that they are costly and have to be paid for in specie:
I see silken (Seric) garments, if they can be called
garments, which cannot afford any protection either
for the body or for shame; on taking which a woman
will scarce with a clear conscience deny, that she is
naked. These are sent for at an enormous price from
nations, to which our commerce has not yet extended,
in order that our matrons may display their persons
to the public no less than to adulterers in their chambers.
/
The Romans may never have got beyond this perception of the expensive-
ness of imports, but it is likely that fluctuations in import and export
prices may have induced a certain rudimentary consciousness of the terms
of trade. Just as we find it easier to see a moving animal than a
stationary one, so it might have been the change in the terms of trade
that was most noticeable. Prices were both varied and, perhaps,
'god-given'; a general rise in import prices caused by war on the trade
routes, with perhaps a corresponding fall in export prices, may have led
closer to a concept of the terms of trade. Teggart argued that there was
a correspondence between wars on China's western frontier and those on
Tenny Frank, An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome (Baltimore, Pageant,
1933-40), Vol.5, p.295.
4
Cited by James Yates, Textrmum Antiquorum; an account of the art of
weaving among the ancients (London, Taylor & Walton, 1843), Vol.1, p.183.
Tenny Frank comments on the specie drain: "...the expensive importations
from the East were to them [the Roman emperors] not so much a question
of danger to Italian production as of the depletion of precious metals
that flowed beyond reach." (p.295)
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5
Rome's eastern caused by interruptions in the trans-continental trade.
He claimed:
...the effects of wars which arose out of interruptions
on the great "silk route' through Persia are plainly
visible in the internal history of Rome. Cicero directed
attention to the fact that war could not occur in the
East without shaking the money market at Rome to its
foundations, and seemingly there could be no better
illustration of the interdependence of nations than the
consideration that a decision of the Chinese government
should have been responsible for a financial panic in
the capital of the Roman empire.^
7
Teggart may or may not be correct in his general 'correlation' hypothesis,
but it does not seem too far-fetched to see, in the reaction of the Rome
money market, a certain consciousness of the terms of trade.
However, it seems likely that the intellectual leap from these rudimen¬
tary ideas to a true concept of the terms of trade, that is the relation¬
ship of the prices of imports to those of exports (ignoring for the
moment the various definitions such as net barter, gross barter, etc.),
was dependent on the reduction of the overwhelming costs of transport,
a knowledge of what those costs were and, as a corollary, some idea of
what were the prices obtaining for the imported commodities in the export¬
ing country or the labour involved - in brief, a diminution of the
obfuscating role of the merchant. The commercial revolution of the early
modern period, with its lowering of transportation costs (to a large
degree due to the erosion of monopolies) and the subsequent shifting of
emphasis from exchange to production, may be seen to have set the stage
for this development in economic thought.
Frederick J. Teggart, Rome and China; A Study of Correlations in
Historical Events (Berkeley, University of California, 1939), p.ix.
ibid., p.x.
7
Teggart has been criticised by, inter aha, Mortimer Wheeler, Rome
beyond the Imperial Frontiers (London, Bell, 1954), pp.180-181, and
Yii Ying-shih, Trade and Expansion in Han China (Berkeley, University of
California, 1967), p.157.
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Dobb argues that with the growth of manufacturing there is a sea
change in Mercantalist thought (and state policy): it transfers its
attention to the profits of industry which functions within a pattern
(largely produced by the metropolis-colony relationship) of the exchange
of exports of home manufactures for imports of raw materials. Since
these raw materials are an element in the production of the manufactures
for which they are exchanged: "Any favourable turn in the terms of trade
would...tend to lower industrial costs relatively to the prices of
9
finished industrial goods and consequently to augment industrial profit."
Moreover, it was felt that the terms of the raw materials-manufactures
exchange was inherently advantageous to the manufactures-exporting
country, since more labour was embodied in the manufactured article and
hence more profit for capital."''0 This being so, it followed that monopoly
which had its profit in merely manipulating the terms of trade within a
static market was attacked for limiting the volume of exports. This is
not to say that the later Mercantalists were adverse to shifting the
terms of trade - on the contrary, "Their case rested on the assumption
that (apart from lower wages) a change in the ratio of prices of imports
and exports was the only way of increasing the rate of profit available
to trade and manufacture."-'-^ This was increasingly seen to be best
achieved by regulating the framework of trade to the pattern of export of
12
home manufactures for imports of (colonial) raw materials, and expansion
Q
Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capitalism, p.204.
^ihid., p.2C>4.
"*"0Viner (p. 51 and note 1) traces the 'employment argument', which he
(p.55) describes as "absurd" further back.
"'""'"Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capitalism, p.2.09, n.3.
12
By restricting, for instance, competing colonial manufactures, cf.
Dobb, p.205: "A Report of the Commissioner for Trade and Plantations in
1699 declared that 'it was the intent in settling our plantations in
America that the people there should be only employed in such things as
are not the product of England to which they belong'. Steps were taken to
prohibit the colonial manufacture of commodities which competed with the
exportable products of English industry, and to forbid the export of
enumerated colonial products to other markets than England."
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13
within that framework. This mercantalist concern with the commodity
structure of trade was ignored by the classical economists and their
successors, but it has been resurrected as an important aspect of the
contemporary debate on trade between the developed countries and the
Third World.
The 'employment advantage' was but one aspect (the supply side) of the
gain accruing to the manufactures-exporting country. Equally important
was the widespread feeling that the demand for English exports was highly
inelastic. Dobb argues that the mercantalists felt this way because they
were principally thinking of the colonial trade.
It might be argued that it was the very success of mercantalist
policy in achieving this pattern of trade that led to the demise of
mercantalist theory. By the end of the Napoleonic Wars, suggests Hobsbawm:
Britain's position was unassailable. As the only industrial
power, she could undersell anyone else, and the less dis¬
crimination there was, the more she could undersell. As the
only naval power in the world she controlled access to the
non-European world, on which her prosperity rested. With
one major exception (India) she did not, economically
speaking, need even colonies, for the entire underdeveloped
world was her colony, and would remain so if, under Free
Trade, they bought in the cheapest market and sold in the
dearest, which meant, if they bought and sold in the only
big market there was, Britain.
It is not surprising, therefore, that this environment engendered
economic theories which stressed the gains, to both partners, from the
freest possible trade, and paid no attention to the commodity structure
of the trade.
GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT
Adam Smith saw foreign trade as a "vent for surplus" which derived
from absolute advantage in the production of certain commodities, which
^Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capitalism, p.218.
^-^ibid. , pp.203-204.
15E.J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire (Harmondsworth, Penguin,1968) ,p.232.
393
in turn was the result of an (actual or perceived) "highly skewed
1 fi
resource base". This concept, as Kindleberger points out, was virtually
17
self-evident and had long been the basis of trade theory. It was,
moreover, merely the extension beyond national boundaries of the
18
principle of the division of labour. It is interesting to note that
the 'international division of labour' forms the theoretical basis for
Soviet foreign trade. In the twenties and thirties the actual division
was seen as inimical to Soviet development and something which had to be
changed: "We do not in the least intend to strengthen the existing
international division of labour, we do not intend to be an agrarian
appendage of the capitalist economic system."19 Currently, the Soviet
Union is charged by the Chinese with being all too successful in effecting
this transformation:
Qu'est-ce que la "division internationale du travail"?
Quelle est cette these dont la clique des traitres
revisionnistes sovietiques a fait son cheval de bataille?
A vrai dire, ce n'est pas une nouvelle decouverte. C'est
un masque deja bien ecorne qu'ils ont rachete aux
econornistes bourgeois et dont ils s'afflublent pour
camoufler leur agression economique et leur expansion
commerciale vers l'exterieur. Leur ultime objectif est
de modeler l'economie des autres pays sur leurs propres
besoins de developpement, afin que ces derniers deviennent
des debouches pour les marchandaises sovietiques, des
usines annexes de transformation, des jardins potagers et
maraichers, des ferraes et des bases d'approvisionnement en
Charles P. Kindleberger, Foreign Trade and the National Economy
(New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962), p.30. in Smith's words: "When
the produce of any particular branch of industry exceeds what the demand
of the country requires, the surplus must be sent abroad and exchanged
for something for which there is a demand at home. Without such exporta¬
tion a part of the productive labour of the country must cease, and the
value of its annual produce diminish. The land and labour of Great Britain
produce generally more corn, woollens, and hardware than the demand of
the home markets requires. The surplus part of them, therefore, must be
sent abroad, and exchanged for something for which there is a demand at
home. It is only by means of such exportation that this surplus can acquire
a value sufficient to compensate the labour and expense of producing it."
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (Harmonasworth, Penguin.ed., 1974), p.472
(Books I - III of the fifth edition (1789) of An Enquiry into the Nature
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations).
17
ibid. It is, of course, the forerunner of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem.
18
W.M. Scammell, International Trade and Payments (London,Macmillan,1974) .
19
Report to the 15th Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, December, 1927, cited by E.H. Carr and R.W. Davies, Foundations of
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matieres premieres. C'est couloir reduire ces pays a un
etat de dependance economique.2®
DAVID RiCARDO
It remained for Ricardo to make the crucial leap from absolute advantage
to the theory of comparative advantage, whereby it was the relationship
21
of costs within the country that was the determining factor. In his
famous example, the cost of both wine and cloth was lower in Portugal than
in England, and yet it was advantageous to trade wine for cloth:
Though she [that is, Portugal] could make the cloth with
the labour of 90 men, she would import it from a country
where it required the labour of 100 men to produce it,
because it would be advantageous to her rather to employ
her capital in the production of wine, for which she would
obtain more cloth from England, than she could produce by
diverting a portion of her capital from the cultivation of
O p
vines to the manufacture of cloth.
There was some debate subsequently as to whether Ricardo had claimed
that all the gain from trade went to one of the countries rather than
a Planned Economy, 1926-1929 (Pelican edition, 1974), Vol.1, p.749. See
also Michael R. Dohan, "Volume, Price, and Terms of Trade Indices of
Soviet Foreign Trade 1913-1938", p.5 in Michael Dohan and Edward Hewett,
Two Studies in Soviet Terms of Trade, 1918-1970 (Bloomington, Indiana
University, 1973).
20 . „ . ... ,
Monnaie, salaire, commerce exterieur, dans la societe Capitaliste,
dans la societe socialiste, pp.179-180 (this is a French translation of
three pamphlets published in Shanghai, 1974), Lausanne, 1976.
21
As Mill put it: "It is not a difference in the absolute cost of
production which determines the interchange, but a difference in the
comparative cost." J.S. Mill, Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of
Political Economy (2nd ed., London, 1874), Essay I, p.2.
22
David Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy, in Works, pp.76-77,
cited by Viner, p.440. Haberler (The Theory of International Trade,
London, Hodge & Co., 1936, p.122) suggests Torrens as the originator.
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being divided between them (that is, where the terms of trade lay), or
21
indeed whether he had "unguardedly" (the word is Mill's) claimed that
both of them got all the gain, but Viner argues that this is a misread¬
ing and that Ricardo's example in fact divided the gain approximately
04
equally between the two countries. Viner credits Pennington with the
important point that the comparative costs set the limits of the terms
of trade, and Torrens with the argument that the actual terms of trade
were determined by reciprocal demand, although it was J.S. Mill's
25
exposition that later economists followed.
Thus, to use Ricardo's figures (Table 4-1), in Portugal one unit of
wine exchanges for 8/9 unit of cloth, whereas in England one unit of
wine exchanges for 120/100 units of cloth, and so the range of possible
terms of trade for wine in terms of cloth is from 8/9 (below which
Portugal will not export) to 6/5 (above which England will not import).
Table 4-1





Source: Viner, Studies in the Theory of International Trade,p.445.
Similarly, the potential terms of trade for cloth in terms of wine ranges
from 5/6 (100/120) to 9/8, and the actual terms of trade are determined







If the Portuguese demand for English cloth is high, then, apart from the
countervailing effect of English demand for Portuguese wine, the rate of
exchange of cloth for wine will tend towards the ratio of comparative
costs in Portugal (1 w : 8/9 c). Thus, the greater the demand for
English cloth in Portugal and the lower the demand for Portuguese wine
in England, the more the terms of trade will tend towards the Portuguese
ratio and the more the gains from trade will flow to England. Even at
this extreme, however, Portugal cannot lose from trade in the Ricardian
model, she can merely fail to gain; or rather, since this is a limiting
parameter, she must make some gain for her to trade at all.
J.S. MILL
John Stuart Mill, in his essay Of the Laws of Interchange between
Nations; and the Distribution of the Gains of Commerce among the
26
Countries of the Commercial World, first expounded his argument that
the gains from trade were apportioned by the workings of reciprocal demand
with the result that: "The advantage will probably be divided equally,
oftener than in any one unequal ratio that can be named; though the
27
division will be much oftener, on the whole, unequal than equal." The
introduction of money into the argument makes no difference, since bullion
will flow to redress any trade imbalance and in doing so will affect
prices. The costs of carriage are not necessarily divided in the same
proportion as the 'advantage of the trade' because of differing
elasticities of demand for the two commodities in the two countries. He
suggests that export or import taxes may or may not bring gain to the
levying country for the same reasons, but that they are in any case
unwise because their effect is unpredictable, and because the trading partner
may retaliate. (He is utterly opposed to protective import duties which
J.S. Mill, Essay I of Essays on Some Unsettled Questions...written
1829-30 (2nd ed., London, Longmans, 1874). Viner (p.535) notes that the
argument was reproduced "with extensions, but also with important
omissions" in the first edition (1848) of his Principles of Political





he terms "purely mischievous",) In conclusion, he writes:
If the question be now asked, which of the countries of
the world gains most by foreign commerce, the following
will be the answer.
If by gain be meant advantage, in the most enlarged
sense, that country will generally gain the most, which
stands most in need of foreign commodities.
If by gain be meant saving of labour and capital in
obtaining the commodities which the country desires to
have, whatever they may be; the country will gain, not
in proportion to its own need of foreign articles, but
to the need which foreigners have of the articles which
itself produces.
Let us take, as an illustration of our meaning, the
case of France and England. Those two nations, in con¬
sequence of the restrictions with which they have loaded
their commercial intercourse, carry on so little trade
with each other, as may almost, regard being had to the
wealth and population of the two countries, be called
none at all. If these fetters were at once taken off,
which of the two countries would be the greatest gainer?
England without doubt. There would instantly arise in
France an immense demand for the cottons, woollens, and
iron of England; while wines, brandies, and silks, the
staple articles of France, are less likely to come into
general demand here, nor would the consumption of such
productions, it is probable, be so rapidly increased by
the fall of price. The fall would probably be very great
before France could obtain a vent in England for so much
of her exports as would suffice to pay for the probable
amount of her imports. There would be a considerable
flow of the precious metals out of France into England.
The English consumer of French wine would not merely
save the amount of the duty which that wine now pays,
but would find the wine itself falling in prime cost,
while his means of purchasing it would be increased by
the augmentation of his own money income.2® The French
consumer of English cottons, on the contrary, would
not long continue to be able to purchase them at the
price they now sell for in England.2® He would gain
28
cf. F.W. Taussig, International Trade (New York, Macmillan, 1927),
146ff.
29
By this J.S. Mill means that the inflow of French specie would
raise prices in England and hence the returns to producers.
30
Because that price will by then have risen because of the specie
inflow.
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less, as the English would gain more, than might
appear from a mere comparison between the present
prices of commodities in the two countries.31
On the whole, England probably, of all the
countries of Europe, draws to herself the largest
share of the gains of international commerce: because
her exportable articles are in universal demand, and
are of such a kind that the demand increases rapidly
as the price falls. Countries which export food, have
the former advantage, but not the latter. But our own
colonies, and the countries which supply us with the
materials of our manufactures, maintain a hard struggle
with us for an equal share of the advantages of their
trade; for their exports are also of a kind for which
there exists a most extensive demand here, and a
demand capable of almost indefinite extension by a
fall of price. Contrary, therefore, to common opinion,
it is probable that our trade with the colonies, and
with the countries which send us the raw materials
of our national industry, is not more but less ad¬
vantageous to us, in proportion to its extent, than
our trade with the continent of Europe.32
33
Mill, in his later Principles of Political Economy, further
elucidated his ideas on the relationship between reciprocal demand and
the commodity (or net barter) terms of trade. He again takes two
countries, Germany and England, and two commodities, linen and cloth,




linen (yds) 20 15
cloth (yds) lO lO
(costs are assumed to be constant)
31
cf. F.Y. Edgeworth, The Pure Theory of International Values, Vol.11
of Papers Relating to Political Economy (London, Macmillan, 1925), p.55





J.S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, Book III, chapter xviii;
I here follow Viner's exposition (Viner, pp.535-541).
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From this it follows that England will export 10 yards of cloth for
between 15 and 20 yards of linen and Mill assumes that the reciprocal
demands are such that the terms of trade lie at 10 yards of cloth for
17 of linen. Now he assumes that there is an improvement of productivity
in the linen industry in Germany so that the comparative costs there
become 30 yards of linen to 10 of cloth. He then assumes that the German
demand for cloth in terms of linen rises in proportion so that it is
50 per cent higher than before, and he concludes that the terms of
trade of linen in terras of cloth will rise above 17:10 and that the
new terms of trade will be determined by the elasticity of England's
demand for linen in terms of cloth. Thus:
a. if the (English) demand increases "in the same
proportion with the cheapness" (that is, unit
elasticity) the new terms of trade will be 10
yards of cloth for 25J yards of linen (that is,
up 50 per cent)
b. if the elasticity is greater than unity more than
25-^ yards of linen will exchange for 10 yards of
cloth.
c. if the elasticity is less than unity the rate
will be less than 25j>:10.
Viner illustrated Mill's reasoning with his own modification of
Marshall's foreign trade diagram in which the y-axis represents the
terms of trade of linen in tei'ms of cloth, and concluded that Mill's
argument, given his assumptions, was correct (Fig.4-1. Marshall's
diagrams and Viner's modification are discussed in detail below.) When
the English elasticity of demand for linen in terms of cloth (reciprocal
demand) is unity (E) the terms of trade are 25^:10 (that is, NM); when
the elasticity is greater than unity (curve E") the terms of trade fall
to N"M" (that is, <CNM, or <^25%) and when the elasticity is less than
unity (E') the terms of trade rise to N'M' (that is, ^>NM, or ^^252).
ALFRED MARSHALL AND RECIPROCAL DEMAND
Alfred Marshall himself accepted Mill's analysis of reciprocal demand
400
Fig.4-1
Source: J. Viner, Studies in the Theory of International
Trade, p.539
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as the determinant of the terms of trade ("As to international trade
34
curves:- mine were set to a definite tune, that called by Mill.")
35
and elaborated it chiefly by means of geometrical diagrams. His
work on this theme was first given in his Pure Theory of Foreign Trade,
which was part of a manuscript on international trade written between
1869 and 1873. This pamphlet was privately printed and circulated
among economists in 1879 and published in 1930. Together with further
material on attempts to measure the national demand and the total
direct net benefit of a country's foreign trade, it was virtually
reproduced as Book III and appendices H and J of his Money Credit and
Ofi
Commerce, 1923.
Marshall, like Mill, takes two countries (E and G), but instead of
the latter*s yards of cloth and linen he uses 'representative bales'
of exports, "each of which represents uniform aggregate investments of
her [that is, the exporting country's] labour (of various qualities)
37
and of her capital". He supposes relative factor mobility within
the country and factor immobility between countries.He excludes
money (and wages), restricting his analysis to pure barter of these
'bales' since he considers that money, because there is no "large and
free circulation of labour and capital" between the two countries, "even
when firmly based on gold, does not afford a good measure of international
values, and it does not help to explain the changes in those values,
34
Letter from Marshall to Cunynghame, 28.6.04, cited by Viner,
p.54, n.14.
35
For hxs belief in the utility of diagrams,see his Pure Theory, p.5.
36
F.D. Graham, for one, considered the latter treatment much below
the standard of the earlier pamphlet (Graham, "Theory of International
Values", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.46, 1932, p.598.
37
Marshall, Money Credit and Commerce (London, Macmillan, 1923), p.157.
38""This is, of course, his definition of the difference between
foreign and domestic trade and in this he is following Smith, Ricardo,
Mill, etc. cf. Haberler, The Theory of International Trade, pp.3-8.
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which are caused by broad variations in international demand: but on
the contrary it disguises and conceals them. For it measures changes in
values by standards which are automatically modified by the variations
39
in international demand, the effects of which are to be measured." In
this he differs markedly from later writers such as Taussig and
Haberler for whom wages are an integral and important part of the theory
(let alone Emmanuel). Moreover, pure barter excludes the problem of
unilateral transfer caused by capital movements or reparations, which
40
again was important for his successors.
Marshall stresses that, under pure barter, demand and supply are
interdependent; that is, the 'price' of the good demanded for import is
the supply of the good exported. Reciprocal demand incorporates both
supply and demand.^
42
He considers that in the "normal case" a country's demand is elastic,
but he does briefly mention two cases which he thinks are possible but
unlikely. In class I, that of 'Exceptional Demand', the demand of
country E for country G's exports is so inelastic "as to be completely
glutted by moderate supplies; in so much that any further increase of
the supplies, forced on the market, will compel them to be sold for a
43
diminished aggregate return." At the same time, and a necessary
*3 Q
JJMarshall, Money Credit and Commerce, p.157.
^°See, for instance, Viner, Studies..., "The Mechanism of Transfer of
Unilateral Payments in Some Recent Literature", part VII (pp.326-336) of
chapter VI. He, himself, had studied capital movements in the Canadian
case in his Canada's Balance of International Indebtedness, 1924. In
Studies he also describes the keen debate in the 18th and 19th centuries
over the question of Irish absentee landlords. The problem of German
reparations, with which we identify Keynes above all, loomed large
after the 1st World War. See also F.W. Taussig on the Franco-German
Indemnity of 1871 (International Trade, N.Y., Macmillan, 1927, pp.263-
279) .
^Marshall, Money Credit and Commerce, p.160.
^He is thinking here of countries such as England and Germany, as is
implied by his use of Kafkaesque initials. His remarks on the typical
demand elasticities of other countries is considered below.
43
Marshall, Money Credit and Commerce, p.333.
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corollary implied by the 'forcing' of G's exports on E's market, G's
demand for E's exports is.so 'urgent' that she accepts for her.increased
44
exports the same, or even decreased, imports.
Marshall gives the following numerical example:
Suppose the sale of 10 million yards of linen in
England to afford the means of purchasing and exporting
10 million yards of cloth, the rate of interchange
being thus, one yard of cloth to one yard of linen. An
increase in the amount of linen to 15 million yards may
perhaps cause the amount of cloth to increase to 12
million: while it is possible that a further increase
in the linen to 20 million may so force down its price
in the English market as to cause the rate of inter¬
change to become two yards of linen for one of cloth;
in which case the amount of cloth which Germany obtains
45
will fall to ten million yards.
His geometrical representation is shown in Fig.4-2 (the construction
of Marshall's diagrams is discussed below, vide Figs.4-3 to 4-5) where
Oy measures G bales, Ox, E bales, and OE shows E's reciprocal demand.
In class II, that of "Exceptional Supply":
...the size of an E bale is supposed to be capable
of a very great increase in the economies of production
by E, which is inherent in an increase of her export
trade. And in that case G might conceivably be willing
to take an increased number of E's bales at a rate of
interchange that moved nominally against her; for their
nominal movement might be consistent with her obtaining
an increased quantity of goods that she desired in
exchange for a unit-product of her own labour and
capital.46
44
"The first exceptional case is that of a group of problems in which
it is assumed that a diminution of the total exports of a country may
cause these to be in such urgent demand abroad that she obtains in return
for her diminished exports an increased instead of a diminished supply
of foreign wares." Marshall, Pure Theory, p.5.
45
Marshall, Pure Theory, p.6.
46
Marshall, Money Credit and Commerce, p.333. Marshall seems particu¬
larly confused here. He seems to imply that the terms of trade (the "rate
of interchange") is moving against G, whereas since it is E's supply that
is increasing, the movement is surely in G's favour. If G's demand is
elastic there is no need to be surprised, as Marshall appears to be, that
she accepts 'an increased quantity of goods' since the price (that is the





Marshall displays great ingenuity in formulating rules for his
reciprocal demand curves which are developed in some complexity (Viner,
47
for one, implies too much complexity) in Appendix J of Money Credit
and Commerce and his earlier Pure Theory, but his analysis is perhaps
best illustrated by concentrating, as does Viner, on a basic proposition
that is criticised by Graham, and in part by Viner himself, and which
later came to be called "Marshall's Paradox'The proposition deals
with the 'normal class' where the reciprocal-demand curves of both
countries are elastic.
Marshall poses the question:
Let us suppose that, trade between the two countries
E and G having been in equilibrium, there is a consider¬
able increase in E's demand for G's goods, unaccompanied
by any corresponding increase of demand on the part of G.
The first result will be an increase in the amount of E's
goods which her importing merchants will be able to obtain
in return for each bale of G's goods. The second will be
that merchants will be able and compelled to offer more
of E's goods in G's markets for each G bale; their mutual
competition will force them to do so. That is to say, the
terms of international trade will be altered to G's
favour. But how far will the movement go?°
He concludes that, "The answer depends on the relative elasticities
51
of the demands of the two countries for each others goods."
to say is that the fall in E's costs is greater than the shift in terms
of trade, in which case, despite the nominal movement in terms of trade
against her, she is still getting more G bales per 'unit of labour and
capital' than before.
47
Viner, Studies, p.545: "The unnecessary complexity of Marshall's
diagram seems to have concealed from him the fact that it provided no
answers to the questions he was putting..."
48
F.D. Graham, "Theory of International Values", Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 1932.
49
The term appears to have been coined by Acheson J. Duncan in his
"Marshall's Paradox and the direction of shift in demand", Econometrica,
Vol.6 (1938),pp.357-374.
Marshall, Money Credit and Commerce, p.177.
51ibid., p.172.
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This in detail means that:
...in every possible combination of a large, medium
or small elasticity on the part of E's demand, one
general rule holds. The more elastic the demand of
either country, the elasticity of the demand of the
other being given, the larger will be the volumes both
of her exports and of her imports; but the more also
will her exports be enlarged relatively to her imports;
or, in other words, the less favourable to her will be
the terms of trade.^2
The basic Marshallian normal reciprocal demand schedules (or offer curves
as they are now usually known) are shown in Fig.4-3. OE shows E's offer
curve and OG, G's offer curve. At P, E's reciprocal demand matches G's
and the trade is in equilibrium. The ray OD passing through P, shows the
terms of trade at equilibrium; the tangent of the angle PON (PN/ON =
OM/ON = exports of E bales^ gives E's terms of trade and, similarly, the
exports of G bales
tangent of POM gives G's. As the angle PON increases, E's terms of trade
deteriorate and G's improve.
In Fig.4-4, the elasticity of E's demand at point c is given by the
ratio (-) where cb is the tangent to OE at c and ca is perpendicular
Ob
to Ox. At this point the elasticity is greater than unity (0a>0b); at d,
Oa' equals Ob' and the elasticity is unity; beyond d, OE becomes inelastic
(cf. Fig.4-2). Fig.4-5 shows two demand schedules where cb is the tangent
to OE and cb' the tangent to OE'. Since x I the schedule OE can be
Ob I- rOb'l
seen to have greater elasticity than OE' at c (and beyond). 53
54
In Fig.4-6, we return to Marshall's exposition. He supposes "that E's
demand for G's goods increases: and in consequence OE is shifted to a new
55
position OE'." A is the old equilibrium point, A' the new one, OD the
52 .
ibid,, p.178; his geometrical treatment is in Appendix J, part 5,
pp.342-344.
53
cf. Edgeworth, The Pure Theory of International Values, pp.35-36.
54
This is a simplification of Marshall's fig.11, Money Credit and
Commerce, p.34 3.
55.
ibid., p.342. At this stage no assumption is made that the elasti¬
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old terms of trade line, a is the point of intersection of a horizontal
line through A and shows the original quantity of G bales demanded by
E, and Od is a ray drawn through a. Marshall says that since OE' is of
the normal class (that is, elastic), the new equilibrium point A' will
lie somewhere within the area DAad and that its actual position will be
determined by the elasticities of E's and G's demands. To show this he
enlarges the area DAad and draws three curves each for E and G represent¬
ing "great, medium and small" elasticities (Fig.4-7, which is a repro¬
duction of his fig.12).
Marshall first considers the case where G's demand is very elastic;
that is, OG.^® He argues that the positions J, K and L indicate "much
increased exports of G's produce" since they are much above A (or the
line Aa) which was the original level of G's exports. He then goes on to
say that "E obtains her increased supplies of G's goods without suffering
any great injury in regard to the rate of interchange [since] the angles
LOx, KOx and even JOx are not very much greater (sic) than AOx." 'Greater'
must be a slip of the pen; he surely means 'smaller' (that is,
JOx < KOx < LOx AOx). It will be recalled that as the terms of trade line
rotates towards the x-axis; that is,as the angle it makes with the x-axis
decreases, so E's terms of trade deteriorate; thus,the greater the angle
the more favourable the terms of trade for E. He then applies the same
reasoning in turn to the case of "a moderate elasticity in G's demand",
OG', and a small elasticity, OG". He concludes:
...the rates of interchange at J, K, L are in ascending
order of favourableness to E, and unfavourableness to G;
so are those at R S, T;58 and at U, V, W;59 so also are
those at W, T, L; 0 and at V, S, K;61 and at U, R, T.62
56
As OE in Fig.4-5 was more elastic than OE', so similarly in Fig.4-7:
EOE > EOE' > EOE" and EOG > EOG' > EOG" "
57
LOx > KOx > JOx (OG with OE", OE' , OE) .
58
TOx > SOx > ROx (OG' with OE" , OE' , OE) .
59
WOx ^ VOx > UOx (OG" with OE" , OE' , OE) .
60
LOx > TOx > WOx (OE" with OG, OG' , OG") .
61
KOx > SOx > VOx (OE ' with OG, OG' , OG") .
This should presumably read URJ; then JOx >
OG, OG', OG").
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Those at W, S and J are presumably about equal: ^ and
so are those at T and K;®^ and so again are . those at
V and R.®5
A rough ordering of Marshall's conclusions is shown in Table 4-3, and
the movement of the terms of trade line through the various points of
intersection in Fig.4-8. We will return to both of these later.
Graham begins his attack on Marshall by first quoting the latter's
own definition of elasticity: "...the elasticity of a country's demand
for imports may be measured by the proportionate increase in that demand,
which results from any movement in her favour of the terms on which she
can obtain them." From this Graham argues: "Conversely, presumably,
elasticity of a country's demand for imports may be measured by the pro¬
portionate decrease in the demand which results from any movement against
00
her of the terms on which she can obtain them."
Graham then quotes Marshall's passage about the 'general rule' quoted
above, and concludes:
While valid for G (The terms of trade will, of course,
move in G's favour,but the movement will be less favourable
when G's demand schedule is elastic than when it is inelastic.
Marshall's phrase would have been somewhat better if he had
said "the less favourable to her will be the movement in
terms of trade", rather than "the less favourable to her will
be the terms of trade".), the rule will certainly not hold
for E. The more elastic the demand of E, the demand of G
being given, the smaller will be the volume of E's imports
and exports (As compared, of course, with what they would
be if E's demand were inelastic, not with what they had
been before the change in E's demand schedule.), and the
less will her exports be enlarged relatively to her imports.
E's demand having increased (shift of the demand schedule
to the right), and the terms of trade having consequently
moved against E, E will, on Marshall's very definition of
elasticity, take a quantity of imports which will vary in
inverse relationship with the elasticity of her demand
schedule. E's exports, as well as her imports, will be
smaller in volume when her demand schedule (for imports)
shows an elastic trend than they would be if it were in-
WOx = SOx = JOx (approximately).
64
TOx = KOx (approximately).
VOx = ROx (approximately).
^Frank d. Graham,"Theory of International Values", QJE, 1932, Vol.46,
600ff. The quotation from Marshall comes from Money Credit and Commerce,
p.167.
Table 4-3 Movement of Terms of Trade against E in
Marshall's example
Elasticity of OG
(1 is least unfavourable, 5 most unfavourable)
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elastic, both because, her imports being smaller in
volume, fewer exports will, on this account, be
required in payment, and also because the terms of
trade will not be so adverse as they would be were
her demand inelastic. The terms of trade will, of
course, have moved against E, but they will certain¬
ly not carry as far in that direction if her demand
for G's goods is elastic as they would were it
inelastic.®7
[I have put Graham's footnotes into parentheses.]
Thus Graham, who does not refer to Marshall's diagrams, relies ex¬
clusively on his derived corollary of Marshall's definition of elasticity.
However, as Table 4-3 and Fig.4-8 show, in the diagrams, the more elastic
E's demand, the greater the swing in terms of trade against her. The
question then arises, of course, whether the diagrams correctly represent
Marshall's proposition. Viner thought not.
Viner, who agreed with Graham (and hence disagreed with Marshall),
considered that it was the "unnecessary complexity" of his diagrams that
had misled Marshall (see note 47 above). He argued that:
...the diagram by which he attempts to demonstrate the
nature of the dependence of the results of an increase
in the English reciprocal demand on the degree of
elasticity of that curve shows three original English
curves, different in locus as well as elasticity, and
fails to present a comparison of the effects of an
increase in an original English curve according as
that original curve has high or low elasticity.®®
He uses his own modification of the Marshall diagram (cf. Fig.4-1) to
demonstrate his argument (Fig.4-9). Firstly, he attempts to clarify the
phrase 'increase in demand":
Since 'increase' of demand can be given a variety of
meanings, and the results obtained will depend on
what meaning is chosen, I will assume, as does
Marshall, that when a reciprocal demand "increases"
it shifts to the right by a uniform percentage at all
points of the original curve.®®
6 7
ibid., pp.601-602.
^Viner, Studies, pp.545-546. cf. D.H. Robertson, "Changes in Inter¬





Number of E - bales
Derived from Viner, Chart XIV, p.545.
Fig.4-9
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In Fig.4-9 (which is a slightly simplified reproduction of Viner's
chart XIV, p.545) we have two original E demand curves of differing
elasticities (Eee > Egg ); ee' and EE' represent the respective increased
demands. When the less elastic schedule is shifted to the right (EE to EE'),
the terms of trade fall from A to a', which is a greater movement than
that caused by the shift of the more elastic schedule (ee to ee'; terms
of trade to a; Aa' > Aa). Thus, in Viner's diagram, the less elastic
theE demand the greater the movement of terms of trade against E.
D.H. Robertson subsequently pointed out that the reason for the dis¬
agreement was simple:
By a given - say a 10 per cent - increase in demand
Professor Viner means something different from that
Marshall meant. Marshall meant that, for any given
quantity of G goods, E will now offer a 10 per cent
higher price, and will therefore part with 10 per
cent more E goods, than before. Professor Viner means
that, at any given real price of G goods, E will now
demand 10 per cent more G goods, and will therefore
part with 10 per cent more E goods, than before.7®
He suggests that 'Viner's increase', "corresponds to the straight¬
forward case of a growth in E's population, while Marshall's only
corresponds to the removal by E of an import or export tax (spent on
E goods)."71
In fact, Marshall considered his 'increase' covered both cases, but
the central point is correct; Marshall is talking about a rise in price
at "a given amount of G-bales":
To give definiteness to the ideas we may suppose that,
in consequence of an increase in the population of E,
or of the cessation of a tax which she had levied on
imports from G, the amount of her bales which can be ^
commanded by any given amount of G bales has increased...
70




Marshall, Money Credit and Commerce, p.342.
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The point, that Marshall on the one hand and Graham and Viner on the
other were meaning different things by 'an increase in demand', was
73
reiterated and developed by other writers. C. Bresciani-Turroni said
that if Marshall had been talking about an increase in quantity of
imports at a given price, he would have come to the same conclusion as
74
Graham. Acheson J. Duncan represented this diagrammatically (Fig.4-10)
by projecting the new curves along the terms of trade line rather than
to the right as Marshall had done (cf. Fig.4-6). OE" is the curve of
greater elasticity and it can be seen that it intersects the G curve at
P", which represents a smaller movement of the terms of trade against E
(that is, P"Ox •> P'Ox); also, as Graham and Viner had argued, both the
imports and exports were less the greater the elasticity of the increased
E demand.
Duncan then went on to argue that Viner should not have shifted his
curves to the right to represent Marshall's increased demand (Fig.4-9),
but rather vertically downwards. That is, a shift horizontally to the
right in a Viner diagram would represent an increase in quantity at the
same price, whereas Marshall meant an increase in price (which means a
decrease in the exchange rate of G bales for E bales) at a constant
quantity. When this is done, said Duncan, the Viner diagram gives the
same result as Marshall's: the greater the elasticity of E, the greater
the movement of terms of trade against E and the greater both the
imports (0T"P"M" > OT'P'M') and the exports (OM" >0M') (Fig.4-11).
Duncan's modification of the Viner diagram was subsequently criticised
75
by W.R. Allen, who pointed out that the terms of trade would be altered
by the increase in E's demand if either:
Viner himself acknowledged his misinterpretation of Marshall in
"Indemnity Payments and Gold Movements: A Reply", Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol.52 (1939),pp.316-317.
74
Cited by Acheson J. Duncan, "Marshall's Paradox and the Direction of
Shift in Demand", Econometrics, Vol.6 (1938),pp.358-359.
75
W.R. Allen, "The Effects on Trade of Shifting Reciprocal Demand
Schedules", American Economic Review, Vol.62 (March 1952), pp.135-140.
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a. E's exports remained constant while G's
exports fell.
b. E's exports increased while G's exports
remained constant.
Marshall, he says, took case b. while Duncan "inexplicably" took case a.
To represent Marshall's shift, the curves should be moved not vertically
downwards (as in Fig.4-11), but along a rectangular hyperbola. At any
point on this hyperbola (R in Fig.4-12) G's exports (being the area of
the rectangle) are constant, while the terras of trade vary. Allen
claimed that, not merely did this correctly represent Marshall's increase
on a Viner diagram, but also that it enables one to analyse the Marshallian
problem with inelastic demands. (For Marshall, it will be recalled, the
demands of both countries were elastic.)
Allen's diagram is reproduced in Fig.4-12 (his fig.l, p.136). The
curve R is the rectangular hyperbola, G is the elastic G-demand, G' the
inelastic and, as before, ee and e'e' the more elastic and EE and E'E'
the less elastic (but not inelastic) E-demands. Allen concludes:
With the elastic G curve, an increase in E's demand
causes E's exports and imports to be greater and her
terms of trade to be worse the more elastic the
E-curve; and, with a given increase in E's demand,
the more elastic the G-curve the greater is G's trade
and the worse her terms - which are Marshall's con¬
clusions
Allen also points out that while the Marshall and Graham/Viner cases
give different solutions when G's demand schedule is elastic, they yield
77
the same result when it is inelastic.




Murray C. Kemp, who tackles the problem algebraically, comes to the
same conclusion: "The Relation between Changes in International Demand
and the Terms of Trade", Econometrica, Vol.24 (1956), pp.41-46.
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Number of E-bales
Source: Acheson J. Duncan, Marshall's Paradox..(1938)
Source:
Number of E-bales
W.R. Allen, The Effects on Trade...(1952)
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types of shifts itemised by Kemp utilising the 'straight line
Marshallian curves' developed by Allen, and adding, as he does, inelastic
curves to the analysis.
Fig.13: Type I Shift - the Marshall Case
An increase in the amount of E-goods offered in exchange for given
amounts of G goods... The increased E curves are iso-elastic (and hence
in the straight-line modification, parallel) to their originals and are
shifted to the right along the line representing a constant amount of G
goods. We have three E curves of differing elasticity, with E being
inelastic (Ee» > Ee« > 1 > EE) and similarly three G curves (Eg» > Egt >
1> Eq) . The ray OT gives the parameter of infinite elasticity, hence the
E curves must be to the anti-clockwise direction of it. (Similarly, the
G curves must be to the clockwise direction of a line parallel to OT drawn
through the original equilibrium point; this line would, of course, also
run through the origin in a real 'curved-line' Marshallian diagram.)
Although the terms of trade rays and the x and y intercepts have been
omitted for fear of further cluttering the diagram, it will be apparent
that the following conclusions hold:
Terms of trade
a. For any elasticity of E's demand (that is, E^, e\, e',') ,
the greater the elasticity of G, the better the terms of
trade (for E).
b. When G is elastic (that is, g", g'), the greater the
elasticity of E, the worse the terms of trade.
c. When G is inelastic (G), the greater the elasticity of
E, the better the terms of trade.
ibid. Kemp points out that these three types "do not exhaust the




G bales (G's exports/E's imports)
d. For any elasticity of G, the greater the elasticity
79
of E, the greater the G bales.
e. For any elasticity of E, the greater the elasticity
of G, the greater the G bales.
E bales (E's exports/G's imports)
f. 'Then E is inelastic, the greater the elasticity of
G, the less the E bales.
g. When E is elastic, the greater the elasticity of G,
the greater the E bales.
h. When G is inelastic, the greater the elasticity of
E, the less the E bales.
i. When G is elastic, the greater the elasticity of
E, the greater the E bales.
Since Marshall confined himself to the 'normal case' where both
demands are elastic, only statements a, b, d, e, g, i apply directly to
his analysis; it will be seen that they agree with his conclusions.
Fig.^-1^: Type II Shift - the Graham/Viner Case
Here there is an increase in the amount of E-goods offered at a given
terms of trade. The increased demand curves, again iso-elastic to their
originals, are shifted outwards along the original terms of trade ray OT.
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When the G demand is inelastic, in this and other cases, the actual
number of G bales is, of course, smaller than the original. Even so, it
is greater the more elastic is E. Similarly, when E is inelastic the
amount of exports or imports may be smaller, or the terms of trade less
favourable. In these cases it would be more correct, but confusing, to say
"the lesser the decrease" rather than "the greater". However, since it is
the relative position we are considering, rather than the absolute, the





a. For any elasticity of E, the greater the elasticity
of G, the better the terms, of trade.
b. For any elasticity of G, the greater the elasticity
of E, the better the terms of trade.
G bales (G's exports/E's imports)
c. For all elasticities of E, the greater the elasticity
of G, the greater the G bales.
d. When G is inelastic, the greater the elasticity of
E, the greater the G bales.
e. When G is elastic, the greater the elasticity of E,
the less the G bales.
E bales (E's exports/G's imports)
f. For all elasticities of G, the greater the elasticity
of E, the less the E bales.
g. When E is inelastic, the greater the elasticity of G,
the less the E bales.
h. When E is elastic, the greater the elasticity of G,
the greater the E bales.
Statements b, e, f correspond to Graham's and Viner's disagreement with
Marshall.
Fig.4-15: Type III - the Duncan Case
Here there is a decrease in the amount of G goods for a given amount






a. When E is inelastic, the greater the elasticity of
G, the worse the terms of trade.
b. When E is elastic, the greater the elasticity of G,
the better the terms of trade.
c. For all elasticities of G, the greater the elasticity
of E, the worse the terms of trade.
G bales (G's exports/E's imports)
d. When E is inelastic, the greater the elasticity of G,
the less the G bales.
e. When E is elastic, the greater the elasticity of G,
the greater the G bales.
f. When G is inelastic, the greater the elasticity of
E, the less the G bales.
g. When G is elastic, the greater the elasticity of E,
the greater the G bales.
E bales (E's exports/G's imports)
h. For all elasticities of E, the greater the elasticity
of G, the greater the E bales.
i. For all elasticities of G, the greater the elasticity
of E, the greater the E bales.
It will be apparent that not merely do these three diagrams not
exhaust the possible interpretations of 'an increase in G's demand', but
also that they themselves could generate many more than the twenty-six
statements given here. We could, for instance, conclude from Fig.4-13
(Type I shift) that the terms of trade would be worse for E, and imports
and exports lower, if both country's demand were inelastic than they
would be if they were both highly elastic. Similar conclusions could be
drawn, with varying degrees of confidence, from most of the other inter¬
section points in these diagrams.
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ASPECTS OF MARSHALL'S WELTENSCHAUUNG
Alfred Marshall may reasonably be seen as the leading representative
of the late classical school,and his weltenschauung, if not necessarily
typical, is at least highly illustrative of what might be termed the
Metropolitan Bourgeois Tradition, in contradistinction to those
economists, Marxist and non-Marxist, who tend to be non-metropolitan
(at least in viewpoint) and radical. Before we examine his views on the
gains from trade then, we will briefly consider some of his more general
remarks on international trade that are pertinent to this study, and which
may conveniently throw light on the ideological context in which the
economic technicalities we are examining are located.
Marshall's general views on the uneven development of the world seem
to lay undue stress on race and climate - a preoccupation he shared with
80
many of his contemporaries. "In the long run," he says, "national wealth
is governed by the character of the population more than by the bounty
of nature. Invigorating climates have attracted and developed strong
81
characters; and wealth has come to them." At the other end of the
scale, the tropics are debilitating and breed effete races; he talks of
"some vegetable products, especially of a tropical character, which have
82
not yet been largely cultivated by alert and strenuous races."
To be sure, he has his doubts about the Japanese: "The human factor is
QO
also uncertain; the sudden rise of Japan suggests caution" - but then
cf. Victor Kiernan's Lords of Human Kind (London, Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1969) or Raymond Dawson's survey of European perceptions of
China, The Chinese Chameleon (London, Oxford University Press, 1967). A
modern exponent of the emphasis on climate and race is P.T. Bauer;
consider, for instance, his Dissent on Development (London, Weidenfeld
and Nicolson, 1971), pp.331-332. The novels of, amongst others, John
Buchan and Somerset Maughan, convey the flavour of racial attitudes of
the day.
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Marshall, Money Credit and Commerce, p.lOO.
82 . .
ibid., p.103, cf. his comments on South America where "Anglo-Saxon,
German and Italian energies are, however, gradually making their way
against political and other difficulties: the native population, though




the Japanese do live in the temperate zone, so perhaps, like the South
Africans, he would accept them.as 'honorary white', Moreover, he does
appear to accept that present differences in development are temporary:
"It seems probable that advantages, which any particular country has
gained from an early start in the industrial race, will diminish: for
nearly every place will gradually develop her resources up to a fairly
high level.And later:
But backward countries will gain on those that are more
advanced: and therefore those local inequalities of human
faculty, which now afford a solid basis for such trade, seem
likely on the whole to diminish: and this, in spite of the
tendency towards the concentration of some classes of
industries which can derive great economies from production
on a vast scale. For the equalizing tendencies, which arise
from improved means of communication and increased human
plasticity, seem not yet to have reached their full develop¬
ment: while the increased economies, which arise from mere
enlargements of the scale of production, have already
occupied the greater part of industry in which they are
of much importance.
The conflict between these two tendencies, the one
strengthening many weak industrial nations, and the other
strengthening the strong,will afford an interesting retro¬
spect to the economic historian a hundred years hence.®®
[emphasis added]
However, it would appear from the context that the 'backward countries'
he has in mind might merely be those of 'Slavonic Europe', although
later he does hold out hope that "the energies of those races, which were
civilized while Europe was still barbarous, may be aroused and trained in
o c
modern methods." Moreover, he probably saw this "arousing and training"
as part of 'the white man's burden' that was not confined to the tutelage
of the 'civilized races': "A great part of the world's resources is
wasted through the unhealthiness of a large part of its surface. But there
are reasons for hoping that this evil will be gradually remedied; and, if
so, then the rate of migration, which has prevailed in the last century,
may probably continue for at least another." Thus, it is uncertain whether
Marshall actually envisaged the possibility of the equal development of






Marshall recognized that, generally speaking, the larger the country
(latitude being more relevant than longitude) the less important to her
is foreign trade:
A large country with ample natural resources, and simple
manners, such as Russia or China, resembles a self-
sufficing family: her real income consists mainly of her
own products; and it is not very greatly affected by the
terms on which she exports a small part of them in exchange
for foreign goods. Nearly the same may be said of the
United States..."®'''
Apart from this, he sees a correlation between development and foreign
trade:
A great national trade has always been an evidence of
high industrial energy. It is true that easily worked
rich mines, or exceptionally advantageous soil and
climate, have sometimes yielded a large per capitaX
external trade for a small population: but they have
never yielded a very large aggregate trade. That has
always belonged to a great energetic people, who
export a considerable part of the raw or the manufac-
o o
tured products of their industries.
However, he does admit the possibility that diminution in foreign trade
may result from an increase in wealth:
Britain's foreign trade consists in great measure of
an exchange of manufactures for grain and meat. Let us
suppose that the methods of intensive cultivation are
vastly improved: so that the produce of British farms
can be greatly increased; since farmers obtain as good
a return to much larger applications of labour and
capital than before the change. The result would be a
considerable addition to Britain's wealth. But her
imports of grain and meat would have diminished and her
exports would have diminished in like degree (unless
indeed she were talcing the gpportunity of bringing
home some of her capital).
Marshall's argument here seems confused, although the main thrust is
valid. If farmers merely "obtain as good a return to much larger
applications of labour and capital than before" there is no improvement in
productivity, and hence no "addition to Britain's wealth", just a diversion





ibid., p.113. Bhagwati 's ' immiserizing growth ' -bolow.
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requisite for such a diversion would be increased returns. However, if
we understand Marshall to mean an increase in productivity, the thing
makes more sense. Outputs would grow faster than inputs and there would
be 'an increase in wealth'. These extra outputs would displace imports,
and if trade were inexorably balanced, decrease exports as well. Exports
would also decrease if the factors moving into agriculture came from ex¬
porting industries. He also seems to have the capital flow in the wrong
direction; an export surplus would tend to produce an outflow of capital
rather than the reverse.
Nevertheless, the main point seems to hold. If there is an improvement
in productivity in a 'comparatively disadvantaged' industry (that is,
there is a lessening of comparative advantage), then although there is
a decrease in trade, and the gains from it, there is still an increase
in wealth. We will return—feo this-in—dirscussing the work of Bhagwati.
THE GAINS FROM TRADE
Marshall distinguishes between two concepts of the gains from trade
In broad terms it may be said that the prima facie and
direct gain which a country derives from her foreign
trade consists in the excess of the value to her of the
things which she imports over the value to her of the
things which she could have made for herself with the
capital and labour devoted to producing the things which
she exported in exchange for them; the costs of working
the trade being of course reckoned in.
No statistics are, however, available for making a
near estimate of this excess: and consequently the gain
which a country derives from her foreign trade is often
stated on another plan, which suggests more definite
ideas: it is not strictly correct; but it serves fairly
well for some purposes. On this plan, it is tacitly
assumed that the country would make for herself those
things which she imports, if she could not get them by
trade: and accordingly her gains from trade are taken
to be the excess of the cost to which she would be put
if she made her imports herself, over that to which she
is put by making other things and exporting them in
exchange for her imports. This result is of course very
His geometrical treatment of the first concept is discussed below.
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far from the truth in regard to such things as Britain's
imports of tropical foods: for she could not produce
any great quantities of these herself; and, if she
could not import them, she would have very little of
them.
Marshall here is touching on an important problem of the basic
Ricardian model in measuring the gains from trade, and the terms of trade,
in the trade between developed and under-developed countries - the case
of exclusive commodities. If we have two countries,each of which ex¬
clusively produces one of the (two) commodities, say oil and bananas,
not being able to produce the other commodity either absolutely (for
example, because it has no oil) or virtually (the cost of producing
bananas being prohibitive), then the range of possible terms of trade
q*>would tend to infinity and the gains from trade would be immeasurable.
The actual terms of trade would be determined by demand unrelated to
comparative costs.
In fact, there are probably no commodities, and certainly no important
ones, which are nowadays exclusive (or for which there are no substitutes)
93to one country. If we add a third country (of comparable size) which
produces both commodities, then the comparative costs in that country
would (disregarding demand) tend to set the international terms of trade.
This process can be extended for any number of commodities and countries;
as long as there is an overlap, a linkage of comparative costs is esta¬
blished.
Despite Marshall's reference to comparative costs, his concentration
94




Courrot apparently made the same point; see Viner, p.564.
93
There has been, of course, an immense diffusion of products throughout
the world, especially since the discovery of the Americas (for example,
potatoes, tobacco, rubber outwards, coffee and cotton inwards). As for
China, the transference of silk worms, first to Byzantium and then to Italy,
and the later planting of tea in India, etc., have had great effect on
her trade.
94
Viner, Studies m International Trade, p.527, n.l.
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Again he is following J.S. Mill:
When two articles are produced in the immediate
vicinity of one another, so that, without expatriating
himself, or moving to a distance, a capitalist has the
choice of producing one or the other, the quantities
of the two articles which will exchange for each other
will be, on the average, those which are produced by
equal quantities of labour. But this cannot be applied
to the case where the two articles are produced in two
different countries; because men do not usually leave
their country, or even send their capital abroad, for
the sake of those small differences of profit which are
sufficient to determine their choice of a business, or
of an investment, in their own country and neighbourhood.
The principle, that value is proportional to cost of
production, being consequently inapplicable, we must
revert to a principle anterior to that of cost of pro¬
duction, and from which this last flows as a consequence,
namely, the principle of demand and supply.
We should express the principle more accurately, if we
were to say, the price so regulates itself that the
demand shall be exactly sufficient to carry off the
supply.95
Thus we may distinguish two different approaches to value or price -
cost-orientated and market-orientated - and Marshall's (and Mill's)
96
emphasis 011 reciprocal demand is market-orientated. It remains to
95
J.S. Mill, Essays, pp.8-9.
96 ,
In distinction to 'cost-orientated' writers, either direct-cost'
such as Taussig and Viner, or 'opportunity-cost', such as Haberler. This
dual approach to value/price is an old one. Consider Marx's address to
the General Council of the First International in 1865:
"What then is the relation between value and market prices,
or between natural prices and market prices? You all know
that the market price is the same for all commodities of the
same kind, however the conditions of production may differ
for the individual producers. The market price expresses
only the average amount of social labour necessary, under
the average conditions of production, to supply the market
with a certain mass of a certain article. It is calculated
upon the whole lot of a commodity of a certain description.
"So far the market price of a commodity coincides with
its value. On the other hand, the oscillations of market
prices, rising now over, sinking now under the value or
natural price, depend upon the fluctuations of supply and
demand. The deviations of market prices from values are
continual, but as Adam Smith says:
'The natural price...is the central price, to
which the prices of all commodities are continually
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consider briefly Marshall's view on what elasticities of reciprocal
demand night be typical for different kinds of countries.
It should firstly be recalled that Marshall's (foreign) demand is
also supply. Thus:
The elasticity of her effective demand for foreign
goods is governed not only by her wealth and the
elasticity of the desires of her population for them;
but also by her ability to adjust the supplies of her
own goods of various kinds to the demands of foreign
markets.®^
He suggests that this is especially important for those countries
"whose exports owe more to special bounties of nature than to man's
98
energy"; that is, primary products specific to a country rather than
manufactures which are, generally speaking, non-specific. A country of
this sort "may be unable to expand her trade without accepting much less
favourable terms to herself; she may have already developed those resources
nearly as far as they will reach; or her special products may be such as
to command high prices abroad, only when supplied in limited quantities;®®
that is, foreign demand or her supply may be inelastic.
Marshall took issue with Mill on the question of who gains most from
trade, rich country or poor. He quotes Mill as follows:
...the countries which carry on their trade on the
most advantageous terms are those whose commodities
are most in demand by foreign countries, and which
gravitating. Different accidents may sometimes
keep them suspended a good deal above it, and
sometimes-force them down even somewhat below
it. But whatever may be the obstacles which
hinder them from settling in this centre of
repose and continuance they are constantly
tending towards it.'"
Karl Marx, Wages Price and Profit, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels,
Selected Works in One Volume (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1968) ,
pp.207-208. The citation from Smith, ...Wealth of Nations (Edinburgh,
1814), p.93. cf. Viner, pp.489-493; Graham (1948), pp.7-8, p.271.
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have themselves the least demand for foreign commodities
...From which, among other consequences, it follows that
the richest countries are.those which coeteris paribus
gain the least by a given amount of foreign commerce:
since, having a greater demand for commodities generally,
they are likely to have a greater demand for foreign
commodities, and thus modify the terms of interchange to
their own disadvantage. Their aggregate gains by foreign
trade, doubtless, are generally greater than those of
poorer countries, since they carry on a greater amount
of such trade, and gain the benefit of cheapness on a
larger consumption: but their gain is less on each
individual article consumed.-'-^
Marshall's rejoinder is both confusing and confused. Mill's 'richer
and poorer' countries ai*e transmuted into 'large' and 'small'; 'large'
then changes into 'large and rich' before becoming 'great rich' and
finally both countries revert to being 'rich and poor'. Marshall then
gives as specific examples England and Germany. However, his main point
would seem to be that advantage lies in diversity and elasticity of demand
and supply and that these tend to be proportional to size (of population,
area, G.N.P.?) and industrialisation. Thus, on the supply side:
...a great rich country [presumably a country which is
both large and industrial] has opportunities for
pioneering new sorts of implements and machinery, and
new sorts of comforts and luxuries of all kinds: she
is likely to have highly organized transport and
commercial relations with so many markets that she
need not push any one variety of any product on a
market which shows signs of being glutted with that
ini
variety. "
In fact, much the same point had been made by Mill elsewhere (see above)
about England. As for demand, and this is where he is at variance with
Mill, he notes that, "...the demand of any country for imports is as a
rule small relatively to the world's supply of goods of the same class:
and the world can nearly always follow changes in that demand rapidly
102
and easily by a change in supply."
Marshall attempted to give an arithmetical and geometrical example of
his primary definition of the gains from trade; that is, the 'excess of
loo
J.S. Mill, Principles, III, XVIII, 8; cited by Marshall, Money
Credit and Commerce, pp.168-169.




value' (or total net utility) concept rather than the second 'excess of
cost' one. This 'excess of value', or 'net benefit', or 'surplus' as he
also calls it, is Marshall's foreign trade equivalent to his 'consumer's
1 0*3
surplus' in domestic trade.
Marshall's illustrative figures are given in Table 4-4. He arrives at
his assessment of 'net benefit' thus:
The schedules indicate that if 1000 G bales were
offered in E markets they could be disposed of at a
rate of 10 for each 100 E bales: at that rate, E
would be willing to trade to the extent of exporting
10,000 of her bales: or, which is the same thing, to
the extent of importing 1000 G bales: but a rate more
favourable to her would be required to induce her to
extend the scope of her trade. At the rate of 20 G
bales for 100 of her own, she would be willing to trade
to the extent of importing 4000 bales and exporting
20,000: and so on. Similarly, a small quantity of E's
goods could meet with so eager a demand in G's market
that 10,000 E bales could be disposed of at the rate
of 100 for 230 G bales: and so on.
Adding up, we find that G gets for 70,200 of her
bales a number of E bales for which it would be worth
her while to pay 125,300 of her bales rather than forgo
them. The net benefit of the trade to her therefore is
55,100 unit products of her labour and capital.
The arrangement of the figures is rather less con¬
venient for a similar calculation of the gain which
E derives from the trade. But they indicate that it
would be worth E's while to give 170,000 of her bales
for the 70,200 G bales for which she actually gives
90,000: so that her total net benefit by the trade is
80,000 unit products of her labour and capital. The
aggregate gain to the world of the trade is thus
135,000 unit products of labour and capital.
Unfortunately, Marshall's argument is somewhat vitiated by faulty
arithmetic. Presumably G would have been willing to buy the first 10,000
E bales at the rate of 230G.-100E (23,000); the second 10,000 at the rate
175G:100E (17,500) and so on. Adding up, we find that at the equilibrium
point (90,000 E bales) the total number of bales which G would have been
cf. Viner, Studies..., p.570; Allyn A. Young, "Marshall on Consumer's
Surplus in International Trade", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 39 (1924),
pp.144-150 and 498-499.





































































































































































willing to pay is 111,950 not 125,300, giving a 'net benefit' of 41,750
bales rather than 55,100. Similarly, the 'net benefit' of the trade to E
is 60,931 not 80,000.
These arithmetical mistakes would be of no consequence if Marshall had
made clear the process by which he arrived at his figures for 'net benefit'.
However, since 'net benefit' is clearly analogous to 'consumer's surplus',
we can be confident that the procedure followed here is faithful to his
105
reasoning.
There remains the question whether his reasoning was valid. Allyn A.
Young, for one, thought not:
...the nature and conditions of such gains must be sought
in the analysis of costs, not in demand schedules.... the
study of costs affords the only practicable road to con¬
clusions respecting net gains or losses. Gains come from
economies. The economies of international trade are by no
means an exact measure of its net benefits. But that net
benefits are more or less according as the economies
secured are more or less, is a justifiable assumption.
Viner is not so dismissive of the applicability of the consumer's
1 07
surplus concept to foreign trade, but he does criticise Marshall for
his use of the reciprocal demand schedule to determine net benefit. His
argument, though focussed on the geometrical treatment, applies, mutatis
mutandis, to the arithmetical example, and since his version of Marshall's
diagram is simpler and more cogently explained than the original, it is
that which is followed here:
In Fig. 4-16:-
0G is country G's reciprocal-demand curve, and under
equilibrium OH unit's of G's commodity are exchanged
for OB units of the commodity of the other country, E.
OR is the tangent to 0G at 0, intersecting BA produced
at R. Through P, any point on 0G, draw 0Pp to cut BR in
p; and produce MP to P^, so that, M^ being the point at
which it cuts HA, M^P1 may be equal to Ap. Then G is
105cf. Young, QJE. (1924) .
106Young, QJE (1924), p.150. This corresponds to Marshall's second concept.




Source: Viner, Chart XVI, p.571.
willing to pay for the OMth E-bale at the rate of PM
G-bales for OM E-b.ales: i.e. at the rate of pB G-bales
for OB E-bales. Country G therefore obtains a surplus
on the OMth bale at a rate which if applied to OB bales
would make an aggregate surplus of Ap G-bales, or
G-bales. Thus her surplus on that OMth E-bale is equal
to M^-pl . If P, starting from 0, is made to move along
"OB-
OG, then PA will start from U, the foot of the perpendi¬
cular drawn from R on OY; and it will trace out a
curve UP'A ending at A. Then the aggregate surplus or
net benefit which G derives from her trade will be an
CBth part of the aggregate of the lines M'P' as P'
passes from U to A; that is, it will be an OBth part
of the area UHA. Draw VW parallel to OX, so that the
rectangle VHAW is equal to the area UHA. Then ,
= VH, will be country G's net benefit from trade,
measured in G-bales.
Viner argues that Marshall's use of the reciprocal-demand schedule
invalid since:
He assumes that since country G would have been willing
to take an OMth E-bale at the rate of Bp G-bales for OB
E-bales, but actually gets the OMth bale - as all the
other bales - at the rate of AB G-bales for OB E-bales,
G bales represents the surplus on the OMth E-bale-
OB
But this assumes that country G would have been willing
to take an OMth E-bale at the BD terms even if she hadof
already purchased (0M - 1) E-bales at terms less
favourable than Bp , and it assumes similarly that
country G would Se willing to take an OBth bale at A®.
terms if she had already purchased (OB - 1) E-bales at
terms less favourable than A£. . i.e. it assumes that the
OB
rate at which earlier E-bales were actually obtained will
not affect the rate at which country G would be willing to
buy additional E-bales. The marginal utility to G of the
G-bales she retains, will, however, be greater the greater
the number of G-bales she has already surrendered, and,
therefore, the amount country G would be willing to pay
for an OBth E-bale, when all the OB bales are procured at
the same price in G-bales, , must be greater than the
price she would be willing to pay for an OBth E-bale, when
all the preceding (OB - 1) E-bales had been paid for at






If I understand Viner correctly, his argument can be illustrated by
the schedules in Table 4-5 (Fig.4-17). OG is G's reciprocal-demand curve
(column 2) which, is in equilibrium at the rate of 5 G-bales to 8 E-bales
(that is, the point where it would be intersected by E's reciprocal-demand
curve were that drawn in). If G were to buy these 8 E-bales in incremental
steps,she would pay 1 G-bale for the first E-bale. At 2 E-bales the rate
has fallen to 0.855, but having paid 1 G-bale already, her total for two
is 1 plus 0.855, 1.855 (column 3). Similarly at stage 3, the rate is
0.7803, but having already bought the previous two E-bales at higher rates,
her total for three is now 2.6353. And so on to the 8th E-bale. Viner's
OGi curve (Fig.4-18) compensates for the higher cost of previous bales
and is given here by the curve Oy. At any point on Oy the total of in¬
cremental prices brings us back to the reciprocal-demand curve OG; that
is, column 7 = column 2.
The difference between the OY and OG curves measures Marshall's net
benefit (note that OY - OG does not equal OY - Oy). At the same time they
merely represent different aspects of the same reality; thus the data is
the same,but different procedures ('all at once' rather than 'one at a
time') yield different curves. Marshall's mistake is using the inappro¬
priate procedure; he thinks he is drawing an OG cuz*ve,but in fact is
drawing an OY curve,and in doing so he is replicating net benefit. Viner
is right, the net benefit diagram demands the Oy (Viner's 0G>) curve.
There is an interesting limitation to the net benefit approach that
Viner (and Marshall) seem to have overlooked - it only works while OG is
elastic. If we take the case where E's demand is so 'urgent' that the
equilibrium point moves to A' where G's reciprocal-demand is inelastic,
then, since the net benefit is given by subtracting the area under A'
from that above (that is, UH'S' - S'A'AJ),and since S'A'AJ is greater
than UH'S', net benefit becomes net loss, which is manifestly absurd
(Fig.4-19).
Returning to the situation where OG is elastic, Viner points out that





















































































































While the amount of surplus for country G will,
therefore, necessarily be smaller than VH in
[Fig.4-16j, it will increase with any decrease
in the price of E-bales in terms of G-bales, pro¬
vided this decrease in price is not the result of
a change in country G's utility curves for G-goods
or E-goods - provided, that is, that it is not the
result of a change in the OG curve - and if the OG,
curve is known it will be possible to determine the
amount of change in surplus.
F.Y. EDGEWORTH
The utility approach to gains from trade was taken further by
Marshall's contemporary, F.Y. Edgeworth in his The Pure Theory of
111
International Values. However, Edgeworth is far from lucid and it is
seldom clear just what his argument is. Even Viner, who in his Studies in
the Theory of International Trade has taken several centuries of economic
thought in his stride, prefaces his comments: "Edgeworth's exposition is
elliptical and cryptical, and is in part expressed in mathematical terms
which I can follow on?vimperfectly. It is, therefore, with considerable
trepidation that I present the following interpretation and criticism of
, . . . "112
his analysis.
The most important aspect of Edgeworth's analysis for our purposes is
that he pays scant attention to the terms of trade. For him, the movement
of the equilibrium point along the reciprocal-demand curve away from the
origin is the indicator o.f an increase in 'total net utility* or gains
from trade. He does not go as far as Jevons , who argued that a deteriora¬
tion in the net barter terms of trade would probably indicate an increase
in gains from trade on the rather tautological grounds that "he who pays
a high price must either have a very great need of that which he buys or
"*"10Viner, Studies..., p.574.
^^^*F.Y. Edgeworth, Papers Relating to Political Economy, Vol.11
(London, Macmillan, 1925), pp.3-60. What Haberler (International Trade,
p.123, n.7) called his "truly ingenious use of the Marshallian curves" is
to be found in pp.31-47.
112
Viner, Studies..., p.576. His comments on Cournot (p.586) are even
harsher. Taussig, p.v, refers to Edgeworth's "remarkable comments".
444
113
very little of that which he pays for it", but his analysis appears
indifferent to any relationship between terms of trade and gains from
trade. His briefest case will perhaps suffice to demonstrate his method:
114
ABCDEF This is the case of international trade proper,
between two countries, regard being had to the interests
of the home country only, and immediate or direct effects
only being considered; and a certain simplicity in the law
of demand and supply for both countries being assumed, a
change is supposed to occur in the terms on which the
foreigner is willing to trade.
The increase of the supply of foreign produce (in the
sense that more of it is offered at each rate of exchange)
is represented in fig.2 [our Fig.4-20] by the displacement
of the foreign curve 0G to 0G'. Whatever the direction
[consistent with the condition that the equilibrium should
be stable - Edgeworth's note] of the native or the foreign
curve in the neighbourhood of their intersection, it will
be found that in every case the new intersection has
travelled along the native curve away from the origin.
Whence the change is beneficial (If this proposition is
not self-evident, I may refer for a proof of it to my
Mathematical Psychics, p.115) to the native country. Con¬
versely, a dimunition in the offer of foreign goods is
prejudicial to the home country; as may be seen by taking
the dotted curve as the original one.
This is merely the reverse of the 'Type II shift - the Viner/Graham
case' described above, with the increase of reciprocal demand coming from
G rather than E.
Edgeworth's indifference to the relationship between terms of trade
and gains was criticised by Viner:
...in Edgeworth's results the direction of change in
the amount of gain from trade and the direction of
change in the commodity terms of trade always correspond,
whereas...in many types of situations the commodity terms
of trade and the amount of gain from trade may move in
opposite directions.
113
Cited by Viner, p.558. cf. Taussig, p.118; Haberler, p.166.
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One innovation of Edgeworth's that is of interest here is his
T17
application of the indifference curve to foreign trade. His. diagram
is reproduced as Fig.4-21. As before, OE is England's.reciprocal-demand
curve and OG, Germany's. OS represents England's comparative costs on
the assumption of constant costs. (An increasing costs assumption would
give a rising curve.) The equilibrium point must be higher than OS
for England to obtain linen cheaper by trade. Similarly for the OT line
110
and Germany. J
Viner takes the opportunity when commenting on Edgeworth's diagram to
make a general criticism of the Marshallian curve. He argues that the
reciprocal-demand curve (OE) will not diverge from the constant-cost
line (OS) until "the point on OS is reached which corresponds by its
vertical distance from the X-axis to the amount of linen which England
120
would consume and produce in the absence of foreign trade (ON in
Fig.4-22 which is a slight simplification of Viner's diagram). That is,
trade does not start from zero, but from a pre-trade level of production
and consumption. Viner concludes that the reciprocal-demand curve will
have "somewhat the appearance of OME".
F.W. TAUSSIG
At the other extreme from the cryptic geometry and utility approach
of Marshall and Edgeworth is the down-to-earth, cost-orientated,
121
arithmetic of F.W. Taussig. His exposition is worthy, but rather dull,
Although he uses the expression 'indifference curve', this 'curve
of constant advantage' as he also terms it is, of course, not the
familiar (consumer's) indifference curve but the precursor of the
production possibilities curve; that is, a producer's indifference curve.
118





'F.W. Taussig, International Trade (New York, 1927).
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and smacks at times of accounting rather than economics. His illustrations
of the workings of comparative advantage are based initially on labour
time cost,with interest charges and wage rates subsequently introduced to
bring them more into line with the 'real world'. Much of the theoretical
section of his International Trade is an avowed elaboration of the work
of "Ricardo, Mill and their successors''^^ which we need not go into here
since the essentials have already been covered. Moreover, since his
examples illustrate the application of the classical theory to the type
of trade exemplified by that between the United States and Germany (the
two countries he uses as examples), it makes that theory no more relevant
to the Sino-British type of trade.
There are, however, a few points from Taussig which are of interest
here. Firstly, there is his introduction of the concept of the "gross
barter terms of trade" to cope with the problem of unilateral transfer
(of capital, interest, indemnity, etc.). The net barter terms of trade,
then, "regards those goods only which pay for goods; it demarcates any
movement of goods which serves for other payments",while the gross barter
terms of trade "regards the whole volume of goods, both imports and
123
exports. To put it another way, the net barter terms of trade measures
Py
the movement of prices (Tn = ^^) while the gross barter terms of trade




Taussig calculated the net barter terms of trade by dividing the
price index of imports by that of exports. Viner inverted this, arguing
quite reasonably that,whilst there was no matter of principle involved,
it was more convenient to have a favourable movement represented by a
rising index rather than a falling one. (Viner, Studies..., p.558, n.9).
It is this formulation which has invariably been followed since (cf.
Chapter One). This objection does not hold for the gross barter terms
of trade, since a favourable movement does coincide with a rising index
in Taussig's formula. Nevertheless, Haberler, who did not invert Taussig's
net barter formula, did so with the gross barter one (see his table,
International Trade, p.163), whilst other writers, perhaps to be con¬
sistent, have inverted both (see, for instance, Clement et al.,
Theoretical Issues.in Industrial Economics, London, Constable, 1967,
pp.127-128; Scammell, International Trade and Payments, p.131). The
dangers of this confusion are indicated by a slip of the pen of the
latter writer where he claims that "The higher the ratio [that is, ^-] ,
the better the gross barter terms of trade. A greater quantity of imports
can be had for the same volume of exports." The ratio by this formulation,
of course, falls for an improvement, it would seem best to use the Viner
formulation for the net barter terms of trade and Taussig's for gross barter,
then in both cases a rise in the index represents a favourable movement.
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because in the classical model trade tends towards equilibrium. If there
is an imbalance of trade, there is a resulting movement of specie which
in turn affects prices so that the trade returns to balance. There can
only be a long-term imbalance if there is an unilateral transfer.
125 126
The concept was criticised by, inter aha, Viner and Haberler,
who pointed out that it failed to differentiate between the causes of an
import or export surplus. Payment of reparations was one thing, export of
capital (the repayment of principal and interest of which would in time
more than swing the terms back) was quite another. The gross barter terms
of trade is seldom used today, but it does have a function in analysing
the trade between two countries, such as Britain and the People's Republic
127
of China, where unilateral transfer is negligible and exchange rates




Haberler, International Trade, pp.162-166.
-I o 7
Unilateral transfer is by no means negligible for the total balance
of payments of the People's Republic since aid (both ways), deferred
payment and remittances from overseas Chinese have been quite important.
Indeed, article 37 of the Common Programme of the Chinese People's Poli¬
tical Consultative Conference (29/9/49) charges the government to facili¬
tate remittances from overseas Chinese"*) See, for instance, Mah Feng-hwa,
The Foreign Trade of Mainland China (Edinburgh University Press, 1972),
chapter 5. There have been no aid flows, of course, between Britain and
the PRC,and the question of deferred payments is beyond the scope of this
study. As for remittances from overseas Chinese, which Mah estimates as
ranging from between about US $100m and $30m (average about $66m) during
the period 1950-67 (Mah, pp.173-174), it is highly likely that direct re¬
mittances from Britain have been inconsiderable. Most 'overseas Chinese'
in Britain come from Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, etc., and it is pre¬
sumably to their immediate families there that they remit money (whether
some of that finds its way to China is, of course, another matter). This
is clearly indicated by looking at the destination of postage packages
sent from Britain. No figures are specified for China between 1950 and
1962 (in contrast to Hong Kong, Malaya and Singapore) but the following
table for 1963-69 is suggestive. These postal packages are, of course, not
necessarily from or to Chinese, and the values given are purely notional
(cf. Devons, An Introduction to British Economic Statistics, p.143, n.3) ,
but the proportional values do suggest that direct remittances to the PRC
have been negligible.
Postal packages to selected countries, 1963-9
(E'OOO)
Year Hong Kong Singapore Malaya* China Taiwan
1963 1,018 962 966 75 NS
1964 1,032 - 2,054 - 84 13
1965 1,129 -2,226- 85 26 cont.d.
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the physical (that is, at constant prices) balance of trade and is
utilised in this way in Part D.
The second point has to do with what Taussig calls the "cumulative
advantage" of manufactures-exporting countries. Briefly, in agriculture
the benefits of internal and external economies of scale are counter¬
balanced by the tendency towards "diminishing returns in those operations
12 8
which have to do with the direct culture of the soil", but there is
no such countervailing tendency in manufacturing. A manufacturing country
then "will not only have a comparative advantage in manufactured goods,
but will probably have a growing comparative advantage. The more it
produces of such goods, the greater may be its advantage for exporting
129
them." Mining he considers an ambiguous case. It might be added that
the tendency towards increasing costs of agriculture will be far stronger
in densely populated areas such as India and China than sparsely populated
ones such as Africa, North America, etc. (There are exceptions: note the
case of Denmark.)
This idea, that increasing costs prevailed in agriculture and decreasing
costs in industry, and that international trade,by exacerbating comparative
costs,pushed the agricultural country into disadvantageous specialisation
and the manufacturing country into advantageous specialisation, was later
taken up, for instance, in an article by Graham (his example involved
watches and wheat in the U.S. and Britain) which was subsequently criticised
130
by, inter alia, Knight, Haberler and Viner. The question is complex,
Hong Kong Singapore Malaya* China Taiwan
1966 1,182 1,169 1,170 91 26
1967 1,211 1,181 1,102 71 33
1968 1,255 1,180 995 57 32
1969 1,358 1,106 981 53 NS
Source: Annual Statement, various years.
NS: not specified
*1963 - Federation of Malaya; 1964-5 - Malaysia including Singapore;
1966-9 - Malaysia excluding Singapore.
128
Taussig, International Trade, p.84.
129
ibid., p.85.
For Haberler's version of the debate see his Theory of International
Trade, pp.142-144 and 198-208. For Viner's, see Studies..., pp.470-482.
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of course, and leads to the fundamentals - what is the long-term effect
of trade, is it better to eschew the short-term gains of trade to preserve
and develop a balanced, self-reliant economy, and to what degrees should
this be done and by what means; in other words, the whole argument
between free trade and protection, the pursuit of which is beyond the
confines of this study. Nevertheless, there is one further observation
that should be made at this point. If there is an underlying general
tendency towards a deteriorating cost differential between agricultural
products and manufactures (that is, with agricultural costs increasing
vis-a-vis manufacturing costs), then observation of the more accessible
price differential, the net barter terms of trade, may well understate
the disadvantage of the agricultural country.
The third point from Taussig which is of interest covers his obser-
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vations on trade between India and Britain. He sees this as a case of
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'absolute advantage'. He argues that this trade is of indisputable
advantage to both sides but, since money incomes are higher in Britain
but the goods traded sell at virtually the same price in both countries,
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the Englishman "is in a better position as purchaser". The ratio of
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Taussig, International Trade, p.18 and pp.156-160.
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Taussig (chapters 2 to 4) distinguishes three cost differentials.
The first, "equal differences in cost", where the relative costs of the
(2) commodities are the same in both countries, produces no trade. The
other two are "absolute differences" and "comparative differences". The
former, as he defines it, is merely an unnecessarily confusing special
case of the latter. It is doubtful whether "absolute advantage" has any
validity within the Ricardian framework. The phrase is most frequently
used, as here, in discussing trade between tropical and non-tropical
countries. If we are talking about trade in agricultural products, say
mangoes for apples, we merely mean that the cost differences are virtually
absolute and are unlikely to change. But they are not conceptually
absolute since both items could be produced in the other country at some
cost. If we are talking of trade between tropical agricultural products
and manufactures from non-tropical countries, that is quite another matter.
Temperate countries do not have an 'absolute' advantage in manufactures,
merely a temporary, historically produced, comparative advantage. In the




incomes is the mechanism by which the gains of trade are apportioned. At
the same time, the prices are determined by the demand schedules in the
two countries - "The Orient wants the goods of Europe more than Europe
wants those of the Orient."134 A greater amount of Oriental goods is
exchanged for a quantum of European goods:
And this result is in turn brought about by the
distribution of specie. The higher range of European
wages, prices, monetary standards, it is to be supposed,
results from a steady tendency of specie to be gathered
there. As changes take place in the total of specie
that constitutes the medium of change thru the world
at large, it is to be expected that a larger proportion
will make its way to the countries of the West. The
general tendency of the flow of specie might then be
expected to be away from the East and toward the West.
However, he continues, the movement has been in the opposite direction.
He rather lamely invokes Jevon's phrase that India is a sink for precious
metals; that is, that they are commodities which are consumed (for
decorations and hoarding; the two in India merging somewhat into each
other). He also points out that there has been a great increase in
supply and that by far most of what was used as a circulating medium
went to the West. He confesses, however, that in respect of (classical)
1 Sfi
theory "the case is troublesome".'
F.D. GRAHAM
It is convenient to take up here the ideas of F.D. Graham since he
addressed himself specifically to this point, which will serve as an
illustration of his criticism of classical and neo-classical theory.
ibid., p.157. This may have been true at the time Taussig was writing,
and subsequently, but the opposite had certainly held in the past. See,
for instance, Andrew L. March, The Idea of China: Myth and Theory in
Geographic Thought (Newton Abbott, Devon, David and Charles, 1974); G.F.
Hudson's classic Europe and China (London, Arnold, 1931) or Donald Lach's
monumental Asia in the making of Europe (Chicago University Press,1965-70) .
It should also be remembered that Britain only balanced her trade with
China with specie and Indian opium and cotton. If Taussig's explanation
were sufficient, it should have followed that India, China, etc. would






The bulk of Graham's theory is contained in two articles in the
137
Quarterly Journal of Economics and a subsequent book, The Theory of
138
International Values. A succinct summary of his conclusions, in
twenty points, is given in the introduction to this book (pages 16 to 18),
but perhaps at the heart of his criticism was his assertion that the
classical and neo-classical theorists were fundamentally wrong in their
concept of a discrete "national demand" and their assumption that "changes
in the relative values of internationally traded commodities will have
139
no necessary, or even probable, effects upon their relative supply."
On the contrary, he sees an international continuum of goods being
produced at fluctuating opportunity costs.
The following lengthy quotation of part of his criticism of Taussig
may help to elucidate his general position:
The terms of trade between Great Britain and India,
as I conceive the matter, are determined in the following
fashion. India produces, among other things, at an
absolute as well as at a comparative advantage with
respect to Great Britain, the commodity tea. Whether the
foreign demand for tea is "urgent" or not, elastic or
inelastic, India, together with other countries,
produces so much tea that the price of tea has fallen
to the point where it is equally advantageous for the
natives of India to produce jute, cotton, wheat, etc.
for export. In so doing they become competitively
linked with other countries as, for example, the United
States. Cotton and wheat of a given grade must sell at
the same price in any market, whether they have been
produced in India, the United States, or elsewhere. In
the long-run a given grade of labor producing cotton or
wheat in the United States must, on the assumption of
internal mobility of labor, obtain the same wages as
similar labor will obtain in textile factories, steel-
making, and the like. In the latter case the products
will impinge upon the exports of Great Britain. Tea
production in India is thus tied, through the interna¬
tional price structure, to the prices of textiles and
steel in Great Britain. Productive conditions being
unchanged, the price of tea will bear a definite
long-run relationship to that of cotton or wheat so
137
Quarterly Journal of Economics, "The Theory of International
Values Re-examined", Vol.38 (1923), pp.54-86; "The Theory of International
Values", Vol.46 (1932), pp.581-618.
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F.D. Graham, The Theory of International Values (Princeton University
Press, 1948).
139-^ ,ibid. , p. 3.
long as, India produces and exports all of these
products, while the prices of cotton and wheat will
bear a definite long-run price relationship to those
of textiles and steel so long as the United States
produces and exports all of these, British textiles and
steel, grade for grade, will sell in export markets at
the same prices as similar American products, and the
prices of tea, cotton, and wheat (India's exports) are
thus definitely related, via the U.S.A., to those of
textiles and steel (Britain's exports). "Urgency" and
elasticity of international demand schedules are
irrelevant. The native of India, whether he raises tea,
cotton, or wheat will obtain a (money) income, relative
to that of the American, which will be in proportion to
his productivity in wheat or cotton as against the
productivity of the American grower of the latter commo¬
dities. The American worker of a given grade.whether
growing wheat or cotton, or working in a textile or
steel mill, will, in turn, obtain a (money) income,
relatively to that of his British cousin, which will be
in proportion to respective productivities in export
textiles or steel. The money income of the British
worker is in this, and in no other, way indirectly
but very definitely linked with the money income of the
native of India. That the income of the native of India
is low is due to the fact that he has low absolute
productivity in India's marginal export commodities,
while that of the British worker in Britain's marginal
export commodities is fairly high.
The terms of trade are, in fact, rather unfavourable
to India. This is shown, not by the relative height
of British and Indian incomes, but by the circumstance
that India is, in late years, entering more and more
into the production of several typically British goods,
while there is no possibility of Britain's entering
into the production of most of the typically Indian
goods. Rather is England steadily withdrawing from the
relative production of certain Indian commodities such
as wheat. This all means that England is getting the
greater share of the gains from trade. Great Britain is
thus somewhat richer, and India somewhat poorer, than
if the terms were more favourable to India. The over¬
whelming reason for the great difference in incomes,
however, is not the ratio of interchange but the dis¬
parity in absolute productivity of the workers in the
marginal export, and most of the domestic, commodities
of each country. The ratio of interchange is a minor
factor which chould be of decisive importance only in
the case of small countries with a limited number of
exports. If India should greatly raise her absolute
per capita productivity in all agricultural products,
the terms of trade with Great Britain would, in the
absence of other changes, become even more adverse,
but the disparity between British and Indian incomes
would nevertheless tend to disappear. The present
terms of trade are unfavourable to India because the
relative cost of production, in India, of all of the
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various commodities exchanged in both directions is closer
to their relative cost of production in the world at large
than is the case with Great Britain. This is, of course, a
more or less fortuitous situation which happens to be un¬
favourable to India. But the low level of Indian incomes is
so much more due to deficiencies in absolute productivity,
over a range of products sufficient to employ the whole
Indian population, that India need not devote any excessive
concern to the terms of trade. In any case, so long as
productive conditions in India and in the outside world
remain substantially as at present, there is no possibility
of changing the ratio of interchange very much. The character
of the British demand schedule for imports from India, or of
the Indian demand schedule for imports from Britain, is in
no way responsible for the situation.^40
JACOB VINER
The doyen of international trade economists of the period was
perhaps Jacob Viner, whose main work, Studies in the Theory of
International Trade has been referred to extensively. It is appropriate
then to conclude this chapter by considering his section on different
141
concepts of terms of trade. He lists seven:
'* The Commodity Terms of Trade








Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.46 (1932), pp.610-612. For a
contemporary version of some of the points raised here see chapter 10,
"The Terms of Trade and the Dual Economy" of Michael Barratt Brown, The
Economics of Imperialism (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1974), specifically his




where i represents import commodities, e export commodities, P the price
index number, 1 the base year, o the given or current year. He defines
this index as measuring "the trend of the 'physical' amount of foreign
goods received in exchange for one 'physical' unit of the export goods".
At first sight this formulation is confusing since the net barter terms
are usually described in terms of the relationship of price indexes
Px
, which of course corresponds at one remove to his formula). 'Notional'
might have been a better word than 'physical*.
He agrees with J.S. Mill that this index may not even indicate the
direction of changes in gains from trade if costs of production of export
commodities are moving in the same direction. This problem leads to:-
2. The Single Factoral Terms of Trade
ePj
eP0 ePD eFo





where represents "the reciprocal of the index of cost in terms of
®Ff
quantity of factors of production used per unit of export" and so the
single factoral index gives a measure of imports obtained per unit of
factors of production.
Viner then extends this by using concepts of utility. Firstly he derives
3. The Real Cost Terms of Trade
This is the single factoral terms multiplied by the "reciprocal of an




eFl ' % = ' eRl
eRo
where is the disutility index of exports.
eRi
The disutility of exports is, of course, matched by the extra utility
of imports. Factors of production are used to produce goods which are ex¬
ported to pay for imports. These imports have greater 'utility' than
could have been obtained by using these same factors for their domestic





where U is the average desirability or utility and 'a' are the commodities
whose production is foregone in order to produce for export (that is, the
opportunity costs). The result of multiplying this utility index by the


















Viner then returns to cost concepts by quoting the logical development
of the single factoral terms index:—
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He notes that this is usually considered as having the same movement as
the commodity (net barter) terms of trade but argues that this is only so
with constant and 'historically stable' costs.
The Gross Barter Terms of Trade





Finally, he points out that it would be useful to combine a per unit
index (as all the others are) with the total volume of trade to give:-







where Q^, Q0 represent the quantity of trade in the two years. This is a
precursor of Dorrance's 'income terms of trade', as indeed the latter makes
clear.142
Dorrance pointed out that the net barter terms moved favourably when
export prices rose in comparison to import prices but that this change in
export prices (presuming for convenience that export prices rise while
import prices remain stationary) might be due to either increases in
142
G.S. Dorrance, "The Income Terms of Trade", The Review of Economic
Studies, Vol.16 (1), No.39 (1948-49), p.52, n.6.
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"world prices of a country's exports" (that is, an increase in foreign
demand) or increase in "internal prices of its export products"
(probably due to an increase in production costs). In the first case the
'real foreign income' of the country increases but in the second "it
[would be] unable to sell its exports on world markets and thus its real
foreign income [would be] decreased." The solution to this ambiguity,
he says, is:
...to calculate an index of the value (quantity
multiplied by price) of exports and the price of
imports for any country whose foreign accounts are
to be analysed. Then the export value index should
be divided by the import price index. The result
would be an index which would reflect, for the country
concerned, changes in the volume of imports obtainable
from its export income (that is, changes in its "real"
export income, measured in import terms).
that is, ePi eQi . 144
* ipo
ePo eQo ip
In other words, the net barter terms of trade are multiplied by the recipro¬
cal of an index of quantity of exports, giving, in effect, the income





This, it will be noted, differs from Viner's 'total gains' index only
in that it uses exports rather than total trade for the quantum index.
143 ■
T, • „zbid., p.52.
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For purposes of calculation this would be re-written:-
SV1 ipo
T. = . —°-
eV0 ^
where eV^ and eVQ are the export values in the two years. This obviates the
calculation of export prices.
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It will be apparent that, for practical reasons, only three of these
terras of trade indexes are utilisable in this study - the net barter,
the gross and (in preference to Viner's 'total gains') the income terms
of trade.
POSTSCRIPT
It is clear that, despite the ingenuity of these economists of the
"Bourgeois Metropolitan Tradition" in fashioning analytical tools, they
had not begun, in most cases, to address problems that became increasing¬
ly prominent in the post-war world. It can be argued that, in a very real
sense, these economists operated in a world of equality between nations,
because those who were not equal did not exist or were not perceived to
exist or, in the final resort, could be ignored. The nationalism of the
post-war world brought decolonisation to the old European empires and,
to both those areas in which the new world had long since been brought
into being to redress the balance of the old or, like China, had hovered
on the brink, a resurgence of nationalism. But this post-war world,
whilst it was composed of nations which were politically equal, in,for
instance,the United Nations, was one in which there was manifest economic
inequality; or rather the economic inequality became problematic because
of the political equality. Thus, new questions came to be asked and the
old tools turned to analyse relationships now under challenge.
